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VEDĀNTAKALPALATIKĀ

EDITED

**With an Introduction, English Translation
and Appendices**

By

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P R E F A C E

The *Vedāntakalpalatikā* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is a well-known Sanskrit manual embracing all important topics relating to Vedānta philosophy. It is most probably the first work written by the author who all the same thinks highly of it, as is clear from the ambitious title bestowed upon it.

The aim of the writer is to show how the non-Advaita philosophic doctrines fail to give a true evaluation of the ultimate Reality which must be admitted to be Nirviśeṣa and Nirdharmaka, if one is to do proper justice to both Śruti and Tarka.

A detailed summary in English of the work is given in the Introduction, for the benefit of the reader.

I have to thank Prof. R. N. Dandekar (Poona University) for many useful suggestions. Thanks are also due to Prof. Dr. Sulochana Nachane, M. A., Ph. D. (Baroda University), Dr. Shilavati Oke, M. A., Ph. D., Miss Vimal Thakar, M. A. and other Research workers of the Post-Graduate Department, Shri G. N. Shrigondekar, Librarian, and Shri S. N. Savadi of the Manuscript Department for help in various ways.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ऋ. सं.	(R. Sañ.)	ऋग्वेदसंहिता
कठो.	(Kātho.)	कठोपनिषद्
का. रुद्रो.	(Kā. Rudro.)	कालाग्निरुद्रोपनिषद्
केनो.	(Keno.)	केनोपनिषद्
गीता	(Gītā)	भगवद्गीता
चिस्थु.	(Cittyu.)	चिस्थुपनिषद्
छा.	(Chā.)	छान्दोग्योपनिषद्
तैत्ति.	(Taitti.)	तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्
ना. प.	(Nā. Pa.)	नारदपरिव्राजकोपनिषद्
निरा.	(Nirā)	निरालम्बोपनिषद्
न्या. भा.	(Nyā. Bhā.)	न्यायभाष्य
न्या. सू.	(Nyā. Sū.)	न्यायसूत्र
पञ्च.	(Pañca.)	पञ्चपादिका
प्रश्नो.	(Praśno.)	प्रश्नोपनिषद्
बृ. }	(Br.) }	बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्
बृह. }	(Br̥ha.) }	
बृह. सं. वा.	(Br̥ha. Sañ. Vā.)	बृहदारण्यक सं. वार्तिक
बृह. वा. का.	(Br̥ha. Vā. kā.)	बृहदारण्यक वार्तिक- कारिका
ब्र. सि.	(Bra. Si.)	ब्रह्मसिद्धि
ब्र. सू.	(B. S.)	ब्रह्मसूत्र
ब्रह्मो.	(Brahmo.)	ब्रह्मोपनिषद्
भ. गी.	(Gītā)	भगवद्गीता
म.	(Ma.)	महाभाष्य
मी. भा.	(Mī. Bhā.)	मीमांसाभाष्य
मी. श्लो. वा. चो. सू. का.	(Mī-Ślo-Vā-Co Sū-kā)	मीमांसा-श्लोक-वार्तिक- चोदनासूत्र-कारिका

मी. सू.	(Mī. Sū.)	मीमांसासूत्र
मुण्ड.	(Muṇḍa.)	मुण्डकोपनिषद्
मैत्रा.	(Maitrā.)	मैत्रायण्युपनिषद्
वा. सं.	(Vā. Sa.)	वाजसनेयसंहिता
शाक्या.	(Śāṭyā.)	शाक्यायन (तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण)
शि. सू.	(Śi. Sū.)	शिवसूत्र
श्वेता.	(Śvetā.)	श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्
सा. का.	(Sā. kā.)	साङ्ख्यकारिका
सुबालो.	(Subālo.)	सुबालोपनिषद्
सं. शा.	(Saṁ. Śā.)	संक्षेपशारीरक

INTRODUCTION

I *Vedāntakalpalatikā*: Text

The present text of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* is based upon a collation of two manuscripts (one from the India Office Library — I.O., and the other from the Ānandāśrama, Poona — Ā) and the printed edition of the work edited by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraja (Banaras 1920). This printed work is itself based upon a collation of two manuscripts as is pointed out by the editors. We have designated this printed edition as A.

Details about the manuscripts I. O. and Ā consulted by us are as follows :—

वेदान्तकल्पलतिका

India Office Library [I. O.]

No. 539
I. O. Lib.
E 2399

Size — $9\frac{1}{2}'' \times 3\frac{3}{4}''$

Extent — 43 leaves ; 9-10 lines to a page ; 42 letters to a line.

(foll. 8, 9, 10 missing)

Description — Country paper ; Devanāgarī characters ; handwriting clear, legible and uniform ; red pigment occasionally used ; the MS. is in a bound book along with two other works viz. : (1) Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava and (2) Tattvasāra. Foll. 8, 9, 10 missing. The MS. has been described in the India Office catalogue Vol. 1, pt. IV, pp. 768-769.

Age — Appears to be old.

Author — Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

Subject — “ A treatise on Mokṣa by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wherein the author refutes the views of Jaimini, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda and others and follows those of Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara ” — Colebrooke.

Begins — मीमांसया कपटतो भुजगांबयेव
 स्वाधीनतामुपनिषद्विनतेव नीता ।
 येनोद्धृतामृतफलेन गरुत्मतेव
 तस्मै नमो भगवतेऽद्भुतशंकराय ॥

Ends — इति वेदान्तकल्पलतिकायां परमहंसपरिव्राजकमधुसूदनसरस्वतीकृतायां ससाधनाप-
 वर्गनिरूपणं नाम प्रथमस्तबकः ॥

गोविन्दो व्यलिखत्स्वार्थपक्षे भाद्रेऽसिते तिथौ ।

चतुर्थ्यां त्वरया तेन प्रसीदतु रमापतिः ॥

नमः श्रिये

In Bengali characters —

श्रीकृष्णभट्टाचार्यपुत्रगोपालभट्टाचार्येणैदं पुस्तकं या मुद्रया गृहीतम् ॥

Ānandāśrama (Ā)

No. 7175
 Ā

Size — 11¼" × 3¾"

Extent — 50 leaves ; 8 lines to a page ; 42 letters to a line.

Description — Thick country paper ; Devanāgarī characters ; handwriting beautiful, clear, legible and uniform ; red pigment used for marking certain portion of the text and yellow used for corrections ; modern paper with watermarks used for the last two folios ; complete.

1st Stabaka only.

Age — Not very old.

Subject — Vedānta.

Begins — fol. 1^b

श्रीमत्सद्गुरुचरणारविन्दाभ्यां नमः ॥

श्रीसद्गुरोश्चरणपंकजमादरेण ।

नत्वा मनोभ्रमरभूरिशमैकसिद्धयै ॥

वेदान्तकल्पतिका परिलिख्यतेसौ ।

विद्वद्रसंततिलकात्मसुखप्रदास्तु ॥

Ends — fol. 50

न्यायैर्निर्द्ध्य दुष्टानिह कपिलकणादाक्षपादादिवादा-

नादायादुष्टमेकं श्रुतिमितममृतासारमद्वैतवादं ।

वेदान्तैकप्रमेयं परमसुखमयं ज्ञानमज्ञानशून्यं

मोक्षं व्याचक्षतेयं कमपि लुक्कृतिनः सेहमेवास्मि पूर्णः ॥ १ ॥


इति श्रीपरमहंसश्रीविश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीशिष्यश्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वत्युक्तवेदान्तकल्पतिकायां
ससाधनापवर्गनिरूपणः प्रथमस्तबकः संपूर्णः ॥ १ ॥ शिवं ॥

The important variants have been given in the foot-notes ; these do not materially involve any change in the many passages concerned. We have taken the I. O. text as authoritative ; in two or three places, however, it was found desirable to admit readings from \bar{A} or A to make the meaning clearer.

II. THE AUTHOR : DATE AND WORKS

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is generally accepted to have been born and bred in Bengal. The following facts about his genealogy can be cited as follows :—

Pramada(Pramodana)purandarācārya



Kamalajanayana spent his days at Banaras and became a Saṁnyāsin, changing his name to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. The famous Hindi poet Tulasīdāsa was his contemporary. He had been invited to his court by Emperor Akbar, and the Pundits at the court praised him for his scholarship,¹ 'Madhusūdana Sarasvatī knows the bounds of the Goddess of Learning; the Goddess of Learning knows the bounds of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī'. Madhusūdana was a contemporary of Gadādharaḥṭṭa also.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī appears to have studied under more than one preceptor. He mentions Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara-sarasvatī and Mādhavasarasvatī as his Gurus in his *Gūḍhār-thadīpikā*² (one Śrīpāda is also mentioned as his Guru). Balabhadra, Puruṣottamasarasvatī and Śeṣa Govinda (author of *Sarvasiddhāntarahasyavivarṇa*) are described as his pupils.

Date

Madhusūdana is generally taken to have lived about 1540–1647 A. D.¹ Shri S. L. Katre² has, however, shown

¹ वेत्ति पारं सरस्वत्या मधुसूदनसरस्वती ।

मधुसूदनसरस्वत्याः पारं वेत्ति सरस्वती ॥

² श्रीरामविश्वेश्वरमाधवानां प्रणम्य पादाम्बुजपुण्यपांसून् ।

तेषां प्रभावादहमस्मि योग्यः शिलापि चैतन्यमलब्ध येभ्यः ॥

³ P. C. Divanji — Introduction to *Siddhāntabindu* GOS.

⁴ Ganganath Jha Research Institute Journal p. 181, Vol. VII, parts 2 and 4

that the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* and *Siddhāntabindu* must have been written before 1500 A. D., on the strength of a contemporary Ms. of the *Mahimnastotra-ṭikā* copied in 1593 A. D. Dr. Miss Nachane takes the verse

अदीन्द्रदीन्दुसंख्येऽब्दौ राक्षसे चैत(त्र)मेचके ।

द्वितीयेऽब्दौ पञ्चवत्स्यां कृत्वापि तमिदं गुरोः ॥

which occurs after the colophon in the *Ānandāśrama* Ms. of the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*, as having been written by Madhusūdana himself.

Shri S. L. Katre shows more or less convincingly that the year 1717 in the above verse can only be of the Śāka era and that the verse in question could have been written only by the copyist and not by Madhusūdana, the author.¹

Works

The following works (alphabetically arranged) can be definitely attributed to Madhusūdana.

- (1) *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* — It is a criticism of *Bhedaratna* (cf Śāṅkaramiśra), and contains references to *Advaitasiddhi* and *V. L.* (*Vedāntakalpalatikā*).
- (2) *Advaitasiddhi* — A voluminous work, refuting the *Nyāyāmṛta* (of Vyāsarājasvāmin, a Dvaita).
- (3) *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (*Bhaktisāmānyanirūpaṇa*) — Referred to in *V. L.* and in *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* and *Paramahansa-priyā*.
- (4) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* — A commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* from the point of view of Śāṅkara.
- (5) *Harilīlāmṛtaṭikā* — A commentary on *Harilīlāmṛta* of

1 *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. XIII, Nos. 3 and 4.

Vopadeva (12th century). It refers to his work *Paramahansaṣaṁprīyā*.

- (6) *Mahimnastotraṭīkā*
- (7) *Paramahansaṣaṁprīyā* — A commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*.
- (8) *Prasthānabhedā*.
- (9) *Saṁkṣepaśārīrakaṭīkā* — A commentary on the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman.
- (10) *Siddhānta (tattva) bindu* — A commentary on Śaṅkara's *Daśaśloki*. Refers to *V. L.* twice and is itself referred to in *V. L.*
- (11) *Vedāntakalpalatikā* — The Mss. mention this work as प्रथमः स्तवकः ससाधनापवर्गनिरूपणं नाम. It is referred to frequently in the other works.

Madhusūdana is also credited with having been the author of the following works,—commentaries on (1) *Ātmabodha*, (2) *Vedastuti* and (3) *Śāṇḍilyasūtras*.

Anandamandākinī, *Kṛṣṇakutūhalanāṭaka* and *Rājñām Pratibodhaḥ* are also ascribed to him.

The *V. L.*, *S. B.* and *M. S. T.* are most probably his earliest works. Some Mss. describe the *V. L.* as a *Stabaka* (of the *Kalpalatā*), but the work is obviously complete in itself and no Ms. describes any other work as a *Stabaka*. It appears that both the *V. L.* and *S. B.* are intended to give the reader Madhusūdana's ideas about the Advaita-Vedānta in a nutshell, and the other works are just expositions of these in greater detail. Similarly the *Mahimnastotraṭīkā* explains Madhusūdana's views on Bhakti in general.

Taking all this into consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the name *Vedāntakalpalatikā* for the present work is a misnomer ; all the works of Madhusūdana can be

jointly considered as Vedāntakalpalatikā with many Stābakas. In that case the present work may better be styled *Sasūclhanūpavarganirūpaṇa*.

III. A SUMMARY OF THE VEDĀNTAKALPALATIKĀ

(1) Madhusūdana gives his aim in writing his work—

- (1) Explaining the Śāstra correctly (this could be done due to the grace of his teacher Viśveśvara).
- (2) Refutation of the views of Jaimini, Patañjali, Gautama, Kaṇāda, Kapila, Śaiva etc., in accordance with the interpretation given by Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(Madhusūdana fervently salutes Śaṅkara who, in his opinion, has correctly interpreted the Upaniṣads, and shows how the views of the Mīmāṃsāvādins are fallacious.)

- (3) Explaining the true nature of Mokṣa and the means thereof, and pointing out the fallacies in the views of the opponents.

(2) Philosophers (both Nāstika and Āstika) hold different views about the nature of Mokṣa, and the means of securing Mokṣa. Thus —

- (1) The Cārvākas do not admit any Caitanya apart from the body, and admit only Direct perception as a means of proof. So, there is no question of any eternal thing like Mokṣa being admitted in their system.
- (2) A section of the Cārvākas admits the sense-organs (individually or collectively), mind or Prāṇa as the Cetana element. (They are no better than Cārvākas referred to in (1) above.)

- (3) The Vijñānavādins (Bauddhas) regard Vijñāna-santāna as momentary, and its total extinction as Mokṣa.
- (4) The Mādhyamikas (Bauddhas) describe ' void ' (Śūnyabhāva) as Mokṣa.
- (5) The Jainas (Ārhatas) regard Mokṣa as the ascent of the Jīva upwards, when freed from the clutches of the eight-fold Karman-bondage.
- (6) The Vaiśeṣikas regard Mokṣa as the realisation of the Ātman as freed from his special qualities.
- (7) The Naiyāyikas regard Mokṣa as the extinction of the twenty-one divisions of Duḥkha, due to the coming to an end of the Karman, as a result of the disappearance of Rāga, Dveṣa and Moha, caused by the realisation of the two-fold Ātman.
- (8) Others regard Mokṣa as the extinction of all Karman in the present birth, due to the proper observance of the Nitya and Naimittika Karmans, and the avoiding of the prohibited and Kāmya Karmans.
- (9) The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as the total extinction of Dharma and Adharma which are connected with the body and sense-organs, through the absence of the Vedic Karmans enjoined, preceded by the ordained knowledge of the Ātman.
- (10) The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as arising from the combination of Jñāna and Karman. Mokṣa is the manifestation of eternal bliss.
- (11) Some Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as the mani-

festation of bliss or absence of misery through mental realisation.

- (12) The Sāṅkhyas regard Mokṣa as the realisation of the Puruṣa as quite apart from the Prakṛti.
- (13) The Pātañjalas regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the highest Samādhi, through the complete restraint of the five-fold mental tendencies by following the Yogic practices.
- (14) The Tridaṇḍins regard Mokṣa as the merging of the Jīva into Brahman, through Jñāna and Karman.
- (15) Some Tridaṇḍins regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the Highest Lord.
- (16) Some regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the changless state of Brahman, by giving up the state subject to change, through the combination of Jñāna and Karman.
- (17) According to the Pāśupatas, Mokṣa is to be always near Paśupati.
- (18) According to the devotees of Viṣṇu, Mokṣa is to stay in the world of Viṣṇu, through devotion to Viṣṇu.
- (19) According to the devotees of Hiranyagarbha, Mokṣa is attainment to Hiranyagarbha, through the devoted observance of the Five-fire-Vidyā etc.
- (20) Others hold similar views about Mokṣa that are opposed to Śruti and reasoning.
- (21) The followers of the Upaniṣads, who are graced by Nārāyaṇa, hold Ātman alone with the Avidyā

gone away, constituted of limitless bliss and enlightenment, to be Mokṣa.

The last view is the most reasonable one, because Avidyā is the cause of all misery ; with its disappearance all misery vanishes.

Mokṣa, being just the true nature of Ātman, stands in no need for any means to secure it. We talk of means only metaphorically, when we say that Mokṣa is due to the realisation of the nature of Ātman, freed from the four obstacles — (1) the Vāsanās for enjoyment of the objects of senses, (2, 3) wrong notions about the means of proof and the object of knowledge and (4) perverted conceptions.

The practice of Śama, Dama etc., (which lead to the proper Śravaṇa), Śravaṇa, Manana, and Nididhyāsana remove respectively the above four obstacles, and the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa help in the removing of these obstacles.

(3) In short, the Upaniṣad view is that one desirous of salvation, practising Śama etc., should approach a duly qualified teacher and under his direction should revolve upon the Vedānta-passages in the Brahmasūtras till his purpose is achieved, viz. the removal of obstacles for the realisation of the one-ness of Brahman and Ātman, which ensures salvation.

(4) It is necessary first to have a clear idea of the nature of Mokṣa, before a desire arises to secure Mokṣa ; then the question of the proper means could be properly considered.

(5) Excepting the followers of the Upaniṣads, other philosophers propound views not supported by the means of proof. Thus, amongst the Nāstika philosophers —

- (1) The Cārvākas admit no permanent entity which can survive the body etc., and so there can be no question of Mokṣa, according to them.
- (2) The Bauddhas regard everything to be momentary ; their Mokṣa can thus be only the destruction of Ātman (People committing suicide at Prayāga for securing Mokṣa, no doubt destroy themselves in popular parlance, but they actually believe in a permanent imperishable enjoyer).
- (3) The Vijñānavādi-Bauddhas who admit a stream (Santāna) of Vijñāna fare no better ; the Santāna can not be separated from its members, and it must come to an end when the members are no more.
- (4) The Śūnyavādins can not even dream of Mokṣa.
- (5) According to the Jainas, rising upwards (ऊर्ध्वगमन) is Mokṣa, but that being a Kriyā must be impermanent. Secondly, the Jīva being screened by the eight Karmans, can not be proved. Thirdly, the Jīva has a fluctuating dimension which means that the Jīva is liable to destruction, and lastly the Jain idea of Mokṣa, attaining to heaven etc., can not be the highest human purpose in life.

So, the above Nāstika systems (not believing in any permanent entity) can be ruled out of consideration without much ado.

- (6) But the different Āstika systems can not be so summarily dismissed; for, a desire for securing Mokṣa can arise there :—

All these systems admit the existence of the Ātman, eternal, all-pervading and apart from the body, sense-organs; thus —

- (i) Recognition in the form 'I who perceived my parents in my childhood, am now perceiving my grand-sons' — this shows that the Ātman must not be a momentary entity.
- (ii) A child newly-born is able to suck the breasts of the mother — this shows that the Ātman remembers the impressions in the previous birth.

Anumāna — Buddhi, Sukha etc., are Guṇas; they must have a Guṇin ; that is the Ātman.

An object of enjoyment must have an enjoyer ; the body is Bhoga; it must have a Bhoktr, viz. the Ātman.

Ātman can have no prior existing cause and so is not liable to destruction.

Śruti — The Śruti passages, all of them describe Ātman as imperishable.

Such an Ātman can only be atomic or Vibhu. As the effect of Ātman is seen everywhere, Ātman should be considered to be Vibhu as his nature is not different from that of Brahman.

Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, and Prābhākaras (Mīmāṃsakas) — They admit the nine Viśeṣaguṇas, Buddhi etc., due to the contact of the mind, as existing in the Ātman in the Saṃsāra state. Mokṣa is the simultaneous disappearance of these. Thus, for the sake of the absolute cessation of pain, desire for Mokṣa does arise in the case of the thinking people.

The refutation of the above views would be as follows :—

(1) As long as the Dharmin (Ātman) exists, the destruction of the natural Dharmas is impossible. Both Dharmas and Dharmin must disappear together. This means that there would be no Ātman !

(2) There is no proof to show that Ātman can exist even when the Viśeṣa-Guṇas are no more.

(3) The absence of pain which cannot be known can not be the human purpose in life.

(4) The Śruti can be no help here, as it deals with the Ātman who is bereft of the Dehābhimāna.

(5) Again if one Duḥkha is destroyed, there is no guarantee that a fresh Duḥkha would not arise.

(6) The suggestion that as Duḥkhaprāgabdhāva is responsible for Duḥkha (in the sense that the destruction of Duḥkhaprāgabdhāva is due to Duḥkha) why should not Duḥkha cease to exist if there is no Duḥkhaprāgabdhāva at all ? The answer is :— How many Duḥkhaprāgabdhāvas are you going to eliminate and when and how ? They can not be eliminated all at once and the elimination can not be effected by any human effort. What use then can one have for Śravaṇa, Manana etc., which involve Pravṛtti which surely does produce Duḥkha ? Actually this view shows no prospect of Sukha being achieved, involves the elimination of Sukha of every kind and deserves to be kept at arm's length ; who would indeed like to stay on like a dried piece of wood ?

(7) The view of the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* that the absence of all Duḥkha should be the Puruṣārtha is also objectionable. Duḥkhābdhāva can only be acceptable if it leads to Sukha. One enjoying a little Sukha craves for more ; Sukha is not Duḥkhābdhāva ; at the Dissolution and in Deep sleep, there is no Sukha when Duḥkhābdhāva is there. So, it is better to say that one yearns for positive Sukha, not merely for Duḥkhābdhāva.

(8) The view of Kumārila, viz. Mokṣa is the manifestation of permanent Sukha is also not acceptable. If we

analyse the view, we would find that if the Sukha is different from Ātman and is to be produced, no one would desire for such an impermanent Sukha. If it is not different from Ātman, how can it be known or experienced? There being no connection with the mind and sense-organs in Mokṣa, such a Sukha cannot be experienced. If the mind and sense-organs persist in Mokṣa also, what difference is there between Saṃsāra and Mokṣa? If Ātman is described to be enveloped by some covering element, which is neither Sat, nor Asat, and indescribable, then this is exactly the view of the Brahmovādin. That is why the Neo-Mīmāṃsakas having given up the view about Sukha being not different from Ātman who is always uncovered and the same at all times, have preached Mokṣa to be only negation of Duhkha; but as has already been pointed out, this view cannot stand, as Ātman cannot have any Vikriyā in himself to get rid of the Duhkha resorting to him.

(9) The view of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, which admits Ātman to be Asaṅga and Duhkha to be a dharma of the Buddhi — it is true — rules out of order Ātman being exterminated, and further Ātman being self-illuminating, is able to work consciously — this view also fares no better. Because if Duhkha is Sat, it cannot be destroyed, and what exists not cannot be produced either. So, the Saṃsāra and Mokṣa according to the Sāṅkhyas who are Satkāryavādins are hardly different from each other. (The Vaiśeṣikas are more honest when they say that an Asat thing can be produced and destroyed!) To say that production and destruction are just manifestation and non-manifestation would also not help; for they are just Sattva and not different from Sattva. If they are admitted to be Anirvacanīya, that would be admitting the Brahmovādin's view.

(10) It would thus be seen that all the above views

cannot get rid of the basic objection viz., Mokṣa, whether described as an entity or negation, is an adventitious thing and is non-eternal, being regarded as a product. Even admitting some Dharma residing in the counter-entity, makes no difference, because that Dharma also is perishable.

Mokṣa can never be regarded as Utpādyā, Āpya, Vikārya or Saṁskārya; for, that would make it perishable (This has been very well explained by Śaṅkarācārya in his Bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. I. 1. 4.)

The view that there is both Bheda and Abheda in the case of Mokṣa is most absurd, being opposed to all means of proof. A real Bheda cannot be removed by Jñāna (which can remove only non-knowledge or ignorance). If both Bheda and Abheda are regarded to be known from the Veda, they would persist in the Mokṣa-state as well !

Limiting the respective spheres of action such as, — from Jñāna comes the cessation of false knowledge, and from Karman, of Bheda — also does not stand. For, if once you admit Bheda and also Abheda, everything would be Pramā and false Jñāna cannot be singled out; nowhere again is ever seen the disappearance of Bheda by Karman. The combination of Jñāna and Karman is opposed to the Śruti which preaches Advaita, and the attainment to the Nirviśeṣa Brahman would be an impossibility, if such a combination of Jñāna and Karman is admitted.

The Bauddhas talk about the four-fold Bhāvanā (pertaining to individuality, momentariness, grief and 'void') as the means of salvation. But there is no proof for this, beyond the word of Buddha, and this is opposed to the Śruti, and the Bhāvanās are just illusion.

Likewise, the Jaina doctrine is not proved by any proof, and the means of salvation spoken of by them cannot be acceptable.

Thus, there is no proof whatsoever to show that the Jñāna of the six Padārthas (of the Vaiśeṣikas) or of the sixteen Padārthas (of the Naiyāyikas) leads to Mokṣa, the knowledge of which could be had only through the Scriptures. A mere statement about Mokṣa by some sage like Kaṇāda can not be held to be authoritative ; in that case, there would be no necessity for the definition, examination etc., of any statement. The Śruti of course never countenances this. Further a knowledge of the Padārthas, whether in a general way or in their characteristics, cannot produce Mokṣa. A general knowledge everybody has ; it is impossible to know the special features of all Padārthas ; to understand the Padārthas as merely being Dravya is both obvious and useless.

(Some who hold that Karman gives its fruit in the present one birth only, hardly deserve any consideration.)

Similarly, the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is of no use, whether general or particular. The knowledge of Ātman only, in a general way, is patent to everyone, as one is conscious of the same when one says ' I know '. That such a knowledge gets rid of the false Vāsanā, after practising ' hearing ' etc., by producing another knowledge is also untenable ; for, in that case the direct knowledge of Ātman, which is not illusion, would appear superfluous.

The followers of Prabhākara who do not admit illusion are in a worse position. For, the knowledge of Reality does not help at all. It cannot destroy the Karman, as such a knowledge is always there ; so, the question of the destruction of Karman does not arise. The very idea that Jñāna could be *enjoined* to achieve something is ridiculous. Again, the nature of Ātman, untrammelled in any way can alone be Mokṣa. The Śruti referring to the destruction of

Karman, does not refer to any direct destruction, but through the destruction of false knowledge removable by the realisation of the Ātman.

Self-realisation is impossible for the Sāṅkhyas who regard Ātman to be always inferable, and so, indirect knowledge being always there, it cannot be means for realisation. Yogic practices help only in intensifying the indirect knowledge ; they cannot bring about realisation.

The objector says that Kāmanā cannot arise in the Upaniṣadic scheme of things either. Thus —

(1) Kāmanā can arise in respect of an entity to be established or known. But Ātman is neither Heya nor Upādeya, and is always Siddha.

(2) There cannot be any desire for something already established.

(3) It cannot be said that Ātman in the Samsāra state is enveloped by Avidyā, and so a desire for the removal of Avidyā can arise, because the removal of Avidyā is difficult to envisage, whether it is different from or not different from Ātman.

The Siddhāntin replies —

(1) Simply because an entity is Asiddha, it is no cause for the absence of Kāmanā.

(2) After all, what is meant by being Siddha ?

(i) It cannot be 'really existing'; for, in that case, the removal of the illusory serpent on the rope would not be concerned with a Siddha entity. A Siddha thing forgotten for the time being is Asiddha.

- (ii) It cannot be 'being known'; for that cannot be produced by desire. A desire can arise about something known in a way.
- (iii) It cannot be the object of unobstructed realisation; for, in the present case, the obstructions are there which prevent the realisation. A person suffering from biliousness cannot realise the sweetness of sugar. Further, one desires for a thing, which is
 - (A) actually not secured,
 - (B) though secured, is associated with illusion. Likewise a thing to be avoided is
 - (C) something which really exists and which has to be avoided (like a big trench on the way)
 - (D) which, already avoided and not existing (the serpent on the rope) but as good as not avoided owing to illusion.

Now, as regards A and C, some Kriyā or action is necessary, before A is secured and C is avoided. B and D can only be accomplished through direct realisation; that is why the highest purpose in life, Mokṣa, is said to have nothing to do with Kriyā.

A desire for Ātman who is always Siddha arises as the attainment to the highest bliss and cessation of Avidyā are Asiddha owing to illusion.

The removal of Avidyā cannot be described as impossible to demonstrate. It is true that Avidyā (and it Kārya) cannot be described as (1) Sat, (2) Asat, or (3) Sadasat; and so usually it is described as (4) Anirvacanīya; but owing to this position, while Avidyā becomes identical with anirvacanīya, its Nivṛtti and Pratiyoḡin (counter-

entity) cannot be regarded as identical with it ; so a fifth method viz. Anirvacaniya-vilakṣaṇa, should be accepted to describe Avidyā. (Actually, the Advaita-Śruti concerns itself with the Sad-Advaita only.) In this way the Ātman could be described as free from the Bheda idea, whether homogenous or heterogenous. Thus the Advitiya Śruti (as also the Asthūlādi Śruti) could be properly explained.

This is the view of the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi*, and others. Really speaking, the Anirvacaniya-vilakṣaṇa method is unhelpful in cognising Abhāva. Abhāva, after all, must be connected with some Caitanya ; if it is just imaginary, it is rooted in Avidyā.

The Śruti-passages, Asthūla etc., (describing the Ātman) point out to Ātman's nature being different from Sthūla etc., and not their Abhāva ; because both Bhāva and Abhāva natures of imaginary things are nothing but the nature of their Adhiṣṭhāna. For instance —

A conch-shell, not cognised properly, can be said to be possessed of the Bhāva of the silver ; but when cognised it is known to be constituted of the Abhāva of the silver.

In the same way the Ātman, not realised properly, is constituted of all Dvaita ; but when realised he is known to be constituted of the Abhāva of Dvaita.

This is not a novel view at all. The followers of Prabhākara admit the nature of the भूतल as giving us the idea of any Abhāva (as घटाभाववत् भूतलम्). The logicians also explain घटाभाव as घटो न भवति, and do not admit any घटाभाव-अभाव as any counter-entity for the Abhāva. All this shows that घटस्वरूप itself is competent to give the idea of Abhāva.

Thus Ātman who is Sat, Caitanya, Advitiya and entire perfect Bliss, is spoken of as ' the cessation of Avidyā ' when realised.

The objector says —

When the expression ज्ञात आत्मा is used, ज्ञान particularises Ātman and that means Mokṣa is particularised by ज्ञान ; if ज्ञान is not there, Mokṣa also would disappear. ज्ञान, therefore, must be taken to be just an accidental characteristic (उपलक्षण) in which case, Mokṣa would be there even before the realisation.

The answer is :— An उपलक्षण can not affect the object in question. When we say ‘ Devadatta’s house is the one on which a crow is sitting ’ that does not mean that Devadatta’s house was not there before the crow came in the scene. An उपलक्षण, therefore, performs its function after it is there. The case is similar here. Avidyā being beginningless does not function again, like the antecedent negation, when the right knowledge is secured.

Now, what is the nature of Jñāna involved in the expression ज्ञात-आत्मा, which removes Avidyā or the Ajñāna ? It cannot be —

(1) Merely Sentiency, because that being always there, Avidyā would always be not existing. with the result that Samsāra based upon Avidyā would not be there and all Śāstra would be without any job ! Further, there would arise contradiction with actual experience !

(2) It cannot be any functioning on the part of Ātman —

(A) If the functioning is real, its cause, the Avidyā in the mind, must also be real, with the result that the functioning could not possibly remove the cause and there would be the uselessness of all Vedānta.

(B) If the functioning is unreal, how could any-

thing unreal remove the Ajñāna? In that case, even the knowledge in a dream can be effective! Our experience is that only the real knowledge of the rope can remove the illusory knowledge of the serpent.

(3) This Jñāna, whether it is सप्रकारक or निष्प्रकारक, is impotent to achieve its object —

(A) A सप्रकारकज्ञान is useless to tackle the निष्प्रकारक Brahman in any way, as it is अयथार्थ.

If it is यथार्थ, there would be no Advaita left.

(B) A निष्प्रकारकज्ञान is nowhere seen to remove Ajñāna. ज्ञान can remove that Ajñāna only which has समान आश्रय, प्रकार and विषय with the Jñāna. Otherwise, even a general knowledge, like ' A substance is knowledge ' would enable us to remove the Ajñāna about a jar !

(4) Further, if this ज्ञान is indirect, it cannot remove the Ajñāna which is the cause of direct superimposition ; otherwise, an inferential knowledge about whiteness of the conch-shell would remove the illusion about the yellowness on the shell.

The Jñāna cannot be direct, as शब्द can only give us indirect knowledge which is the ज्ञानकरणः. Even in the case of expressions like ' You are the tenth ' (where the speaker who had forgotten to count himself is reminded of that fact), there is first the indirect knowledge and later the direct knowledge is produced in the mind.

In the present case about Brahman, there is no other करण than the Vedānta to cognise Brahman (Ordinary शब्दज्ञान cannot have any power to produce knowledge about any supersensuous entity).

It is true that Vedānta passages like सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म although producing indirect knowledge are not productive of illusion, because they do not refer to any other entity than Brahman. But our Siddhānta is that direct knowledge is identical with the Pramātr himself; if it were not so, the knowledge of Brahman (as being apart from the Pramātr) would be unauthoritative ! No other Kāraṇa can function in the case of Brahman without a second ; from Śabda no direct knowledge can proceed and so no Mokṣa from Śabda-jñāna.

It cannot be argued that the beginningless Ajñāna of a positive form can be removed by the Śabda-jñāna, because a beginningless entity, like the Ātman is invariably associated with indestructibility ; otherwise Ātman also being an entity would be destructible like a jar. It cannot be argued that the comparison with Ātman is misleading, because in the case of the Ātman, it is not the beginninglessness of the Ātman that is the cause of his being eternal but his real or self illumining nature, — the answer is — No similar instance can be produced owing to no highest Reality other than Ātman being admitted. Further, if Ajñāna is the object of the means of proof, it cannot be removable by the means of proof which cannot remove its own object ; if it is not the object of the means of proof, it would be just like the horn of a hare (as it is not admitted to be self-illumining) unable to produce anything. Again, Ajñāna cannot be removed by itself (no one can remove oneself); otherwise it would be just momentary ; nor by another Jñāna which would require another Jñāna to remove itself and so on, there would be the fault of endlessness. It is further impossible to find any resort for this Jñāna ; it cannot be Ātman who is without any Dharmas ; it cannot be the mind, for the Jñāna in the mind cannot remove the Ajñāna

in the Ātman. Ajñāna cannot be resorting to the mind, as Ajñāna exists prior to it and all agree in holding that Caitanya alone can be the resort. Further, what is the sphere of activity of this Ajñāna? It cannot be the Highest Brahman, for, no proof to that effect can exist. The mind cannot do anything in the matter, for, it itself is not self-proven, being merely a co-worker (and in addition, this concept would be contrary to the Śruti). Manas (mind) can only tackle particularised entities, never any Advaita. The mind polished and strengthened by Śravaṇa, Manana etc., can do this, but the real means in that case is the Vedānta-passages themselves.

In this connection it is necessary to clarify our ideas about what the Vedānta-passages actually do in the matter —

- (1) Are they (the Vedānta-vākyas) the actual means of proof for Brahman ?
- (2) Is the Jñāna produced by them Direct, or
- (3) Is the Jñāna produced in the mind dependent on the knowledge of the Vedānta-passages ?

As regards No. 1, no Vākya can have any authoritative nature as regards any निर्धर्मकवस्तु. In the case of निर्धर्मक Brahman, Direct perception is impossible, as Brahman is not possessed of any Rūpa etc., Anumāna is impossible, there being no Liṅga and Vyāpti, possible ; Upamāna also is impossible, there being no resemblance with anything ; similarly Arthūpatti is impossible as also Abhāva (as Brahman has a positive form). Śāstra cannot help, as it deals with possible Dharmas denoted by the words —

To explain the same in detail —

Different views are held as regards the function of a word for giving its meaning —

(1) The Logicians hold that it is God's will that enables a word to give its conventional meaning pointing to a particularised individual entity.

This view is untenable as God's will must be supposed to be one only, and so all words would have only one meaning, or there would be as many meanings as there are limiting adjuncts. Synonymous words are necessarily taken to have different Śaktis to denote their meanings. If the Will is regarded as related to the different objects, it would mean that its denotation is merely formal and there would be no scope left for a metaphorical meaning. There is no point in associating Śakti along with God's will for which there is no proof. The natural Śakti of words cannot be questioned on the ground that it is not included in the six categories admitted. Śakti can be described as playing the same role as the Samavāya admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Lakṣaṇā or metaphor can still function as it is regarded merely as the cause of the remembrance of the object; it cannot denote anything. (The Anvitābhīdhānavādins hold that words in a sentence denote their object, being already grammatically connected with one another.)

The Abhihitānvayavādins hold that the words are grammatically connected after they have denoted their meaning.

It is, therefore, better to hold that Śakti is concerned with merely the Sāmānya as the Mīmāṃsakas declare. There is no necessity of holding that Samavāya as a separate relation should be admitted; for, that purpose is secured by admitting the Tādātmya relation.

As the Vedāntins regard Ātman as the only Sat, it matters very little, if the Śakti refers to Vyakti or Vyakti particularised by some Upādhi. The Śakti (or, denotative

power of words) is two-fold. Conventional or Etymological ; of these Conventional meaning is the more important.

The Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas combine the above two and regard Etymology-convention as the primary power of the word.

The Prābhākaras and Vedāntins contest the above view, declaring that in that case, one cannot possibly have the sense ' the bank of the Ganges ' from the expression गङ्गायां घोषः, if etymology and convention are to prevail everywhere. Though a word may have more than one meaning, the frequency with which a word is found used in a particular sense, enables one easily to find out the proper meaning.

However, it does not matter much if Etymology-convention is regarded as an independent function.

The Subordinate functioning is two fold :—

- (i) Indication (where there is actually possible the connection with the primary sense, e. g. गङ्गायां घोषः, where the indicated sense of गङ्गा, viz. तीर is actually connected with the primary sense गङ्गाप्रवाह.)
- (ii) Qualitative (where the primary sense is connected with the गुण of the indicated entity, e. g. माणवकः सिंहः).

Some regard Metaphor (उपचार) as a separate वृत्ति, distinguishing it from लक्षणा as follows — In उपचार, the connection between the primary sense and the indicated sense is occasional, e. g. in मन्त्राः (मन्त्रस्था बालकाः) कोशन्ति ; while in लक्षणा it is permanent (e. g. गङ्गाप्रवाह and गङ्गातीर).

But it is unnecessary to multiply such divisions. A possible connection between the primary sense and the indicated sense is surely to be met with in both लक्षणा and उपचार.

The grammarians give a six-fold division, but it can be easily shown that हृद, यौगिक and योगहृद can be included in मुख्य्य वृत्ति; and लक्षणा, औपचारिक and गौण in जघन्या.

The Rhetoricians believe in व्यञ्जनावृत्ति, based upon शक्ति, लक्षणा and व्यञ्जना; but this is also unnecessary. It can be included in अर्थोपपत्ति; Even if it is regarded as a separate वृत्ति, we do not mind at all.

Lakṣaṇā is three-fold —

(1) अजहल्लक्षणा — where the primary sense is retained, e. g. कक्केभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्, where कक्क means 'a crow and others capable of injuring Dadhi'.

(शोणो धावति, where शोण means a red horse, is not an example of this type of Lakṣaṇā; there is the तादात्म्य relation involved here. The remark of the महाभाष्यकार, चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः (जाति, गुण, क्रिया and द्रव्य) also shows that no लक्षणा is possible here. If however, समवाय relation is admitted, then, this might be taken as an instance of जहल्लक्षणा where the primary sense is totally given up.)

(2) जहदजहत्स्वार्था — e. g. सोऽयं देवदत्तः, where a part of the primary sense is given up (तत्कालवैशिष्ट्य is given up); also called भागलक्षणा.

(3) जहत्स्वार्था — e. g. गङ्गायां घोषः.

This three-fold लक्षणा is more powerful than the गौणी (based on the Gunas). In this way we have listed the various ways in which a word can give its meaning in the particular context.

It is now pointed out that not one of these is in a position to make us know the Brahman without a second, which is without any Dharmas.

(1) हृदि, which is the outcome of वृद्धव्यवहार and can only

be associated with a tangible object, is powerless to inform us about Brahman ;

(2) so also, Anumāna based upon the connection with a tangible object.

(3) Upamāna, based upon सादृश्य with a tangible object, or knowledge based upon a dissimilar object.

(4) Āptavākya is actually the matter under dispute and so cannot help.

(5) Being in the same case with a well-known word is also impossible in the case of the Nirvikalpa Brahman.

Similarly वाक्यशेष, both विधिरूप and निषेधरूप are of no avail as they cannot point out to the निर्विकल्प Brahman. 'Yoga' also based upon the अद्यवशक्ति of the word is practically based upon रूढि. The etymology of Ātman also cannot take us to the Nirvikalpa Brahman.

Lakṣaṇā, with its three divisions, based upon connection with the primary sense, is equally impotent. Vyañjanā is not supported by any means of proof.

Thus, none of the available means being helpful in finding the import of Ātman, the objector says that the description of salvation as अविद्यानिवृत्त्युपलक्षित आत्मा cannot be sustained.

The Siddhāntin's reply is —

First of all, the objector's obsession that only सत्यस्वरूप ज्ञान is capable of being effective must be removed. The Logicians admit the imaginary Ākāśa (bounded by the hollow of the ear) as capable of perceiving the Sound ; the Mīmāṃsakas admit the imaginary shortness or length of the syllables for their thesis. The knowledge in a dream is not contradicted as long as the dream lasts, though it is certainly Mithyā. In short, it is possible to have the reali-

sation of Brahman even from the Mithyā-jñāna. Again, it must not be forgotten that we admit the Anirvacanīya-khyāti and Vyāvahārika-sattā.

Similarly Niṣprakāra can also remove Ajñāna, as it is the right knowledge (Pramā) of the Adhiṣṭhāna, that really removes the Ajñāna. According to the different circumstances this Pramā may be Niṣprakāra and Saprakāra. This does not mean that we accept a two-fold Kārya-kāraṇabhāva. For, what really matters is the Adhiṣṭhāna. This is not to suggest that even a general Pramā like 'A substance is that which is capable of being known' would give the knowledge of everything. A possible solution that we should accept a particularised causal relation is no good in the case of Brahman, as the right knowledge about Brahman can remove the ignorance about Brahman, without imagining any additional Brahma-prakāra.

This view must not be confused with the Nirvikalpa idea of the Logicians. For, the Logicians do admit the Jñāna of the Viśeṣaṇa as the cause of the particularised knowledge. Actually the Nirvikalpaka is inferable according to the Logicians, — according to our view it is directly realised by the Witness.

So, all this means that directly realisable right knowledge is the proper Pramā and it cannot be one overlapping the Nirvikalpaka that is inferable.

The argument, that Brahman being void of Dharmas, cannot likewise be the object of any knowledge involving Karman, otherwise it would be non-sentient like a jar, cannot be upheld, as it would mean that all the Vedāntas would be regarded as unauthoritative. Brahman cannot be said to be metaphorically an object of knowledge, because nothing is known to remove Ajñāna merely by having that

as its object. — This can be answered as follows — Brahman is not the object of knowledge, but Jñāna can have Brahman as its object. Jñāna is a dharma of the Antaḥkaraṇa and so a Dravya, having a form conforming to the different objects. The difference of forms is actually perceived and that cannot be questioned. Even if being the object is imagined in respect of Brahman, that would not make Brahman non-sentient. Or, we might say being the object of sentiency is the cause of non-sentiency, but that does not make it the object of functioning. The word Phala used in this connection in the Śruti refers only to the Caitanya, and not to the functioning.

The objector asks — Just as you admit the imaginary object, why not admit also an imaginary mode? That would put an end to any awkward positions. The reply is that in that case, the object of knowledge would be a particularised one, and the mode could not be removed by the Jñāna which is incapable of removing its object. So, only the Nisprakāra Jñāna can have Brahman for its object. When Adhyāsa of various kinds is removed, nothing stands in the way of Mokṣa.

The objector says — There can be no removal of Ajñāna by the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman; nowhere is it seen that Jñāna causes the removal of Ajñāna. In believing this, you secure neither Jñāna, nor the removal of Ajñāna.

The answer is — When we talk of the removal of dream-knowledge by the knowledge of the waking state, we presume that the original Ajñāna is possessed of wonderful powers and so if one power is removed, other powers producing other dream-knowledges exist. But when the root-Ajñāna is removed, there cannot be any further manifestations of Ajñāna.

Jñāna is, it is true, a function of the Antaḥkaraṇa, but as the Antaḥkaraṇa is super-imposed upon the Caitanya, no objection need be taken. Even the Logicians have no objection to admit the perception of sound resorting to the Mahākāśa by being intimately connected with the ear-hollow.

We hold that Brahmajñāna is able to remove the Ajñāna not on the strength of any inference, but on the strength of the Śruti, and the presumption based on Śruti. Both Śruti and Smṛti declare Ajñāna as the obstacle for Mokṣa.

It is ridiculous for the objector to doubt the removal of Ajñāna, which is so patent to everybody, by the Jñāna purified by the worship of the Lord of the Nila-mountain. If the removal of the Ajñāna is not effected sometime, it must be due to some unknown obstacle.

It cannot be argued that Ajñāna having the nature of an entity which is beginningless cannot be removed, because in the first place that inference is not warranted by the Śruti and Smṛti, and secondly whatever you understand by the nature of Bhāva, it cannot produce indestructibility. Bhāvatva cannot mean Sattva as it is not proven in the case of Ajñāna which is neither Sat nor Asat; it cannot be Abhāvatva which must be discarded, as no favourable inference is available and unfavourable inference can be produced. Further only Sattva can prove the non-destructibility of Ātman. There being no Sattva other than Ātman, no Vyūpti is possible in the case of Ajñāna. The Śruti again and again points out to the destructibility of Ajñāna which is established in the form 'I am ignorant'. Further the Śruti is interested in describing Brahman, not in establishing Ajñāna which can very well be proved by inference.

Thus, Ajñāna is but something superimposed upon the Ātman and can be removed by the knowledge of the nature of Ātman.

This Jñāna is direct. Śabda-jñāna by nature gives indirect knowledge, and in respect of Ātman no means of knowledge is possible.

(1) Some hold that Śabda gives indirect knowledge and direct knowledge arises from the mind assisted by Bhāvanā.

(2) Others hold that Śabda to start with gives indirect knowledge alone, but later on assisted by hearing, thinking etc., direct knowledge arises, like recognition from the sense-organs assisted by the impressions.

The first view is wrong because Jñāna arising from Bhāvanā can never be authoritative, like the realisation of the absent lady, revolved in the mind by some lover.

The objector argues — Being produced by Bhāvanā is not the cause of the unauthoritative nature, but having its object contradicted. In this case of Brahman which is always uncontradicted, the knowledge produced by Bhāvanā must be regarded as authoritative.

The answer would be — Any Bhāvanā based upon indirect knowledge cannot produce direct realisation. Inferential knowledge about fire, even though repeated a thousand times cannot make one directly realise the fire.

Likewise the mind cannot be authoritative, whether it is assisted by Bhāvanā (in which case the blemishes pointed out above would be there) or alone by itself (in which case, there would always be realisation of Brahman as Brahman is always there.) This would also mean that Śabda cannot be regarded as authoritative, if it is dependent upon some-

thing else. Again Śruti describes Brahman as capable of being thought by the mind. The Śruti स मानसीन आत्मा means that the Ātman is fit to be associated with the Upādhi, Manas, not that it can be realised by the mind. मनसैवानु-द्रष्टव्यम् really means that Ātman is not the doer, not that the mind is the instrument. The Śruti काम, संकल्प etc., shows that Manas is the उपादानकारण of these qualities, Ātman is Nirguṇa, is the Draṣṭṛ and the Dr̥ṣyadharmas cannot belong to him ; they are just super-imposed on him.

विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते does not speak of विज्ञान as an instrument, but as being over and above the sense-organs.

The case of Śabda can not be similar to that of recognition (Pratyabhijñāna) because the eye cannot produce the तत्तांश (in सोऽयं) and प्रत्यभिज्ञा gives direct knowledge ; and remembrance is admitted to produce the तत्तांश which is produced by the impressions, while the eye is not known to be dependent upon the impressions.

It is better, therefore, to say that Śabdai tself is responsible for the realisation directly. Anyway the mind does not come into the picture. The Śabda alone is the cause of Sākṣātkāra. This does not mean that the sense-organs have no function to perform. The eye and the impressions though intended to produce Jñāna having a different genus are found to produce the same type of Jñāna in the case of recognition.

We find the mind producing direct or indirect knowledge somewhere or other, so the same can be postulated in the case of Śabda also. It is unnecessary to imagine in the case of Śabda, two kinds of characteristics producing direct and indirect knowledge.

Śabda (or Vākya) can be shown by the law of Presence and Absence, to ward off the illusion and another mental cognition for that purpose is redundant.

The objector says that just as in the case of the six sense-organs, eye and others, it is usual to admit another sense-organ which may be said to be the general cause, so in the case of Śabda we may allow a general cause. Even if this is done, Śabda cannot function like a sense-organ for the purpose of the popular dealings. The Śruti makes a distinction between the ten Prāṇas and the eleventh Ātman. The detailed description in this context given in the Sāṅkhya philosophy makes it clear that a sense-organ is the material cause of the Sāttvika Ahaṁkāra.

It could not be argued that a sense-organ not concerned with the eleven (ten Prāṇas and Ātman) is quite useless. An Indriya is that which is the Upādāna of the five elements not mixed up five-fold. The Śruti-passages like तेजोमज्ञा वाक् do not mean that Vāk is made of Tejas. This is dealt with in detail in the *Pañcūlaśī*.

Anyway Śabda cannot be called a sense-organ, even though it produces direct knowledge.

This does not mean that there would be a commixture of direct and indirect knowledges, for such a commixture like that of Upādhis, does not cause any flaw in the argument.

It must not be forgotten that direct perception associated with Caitanya is not anything apart from its nature. Direct knowledge is produced by the Śabda pointing out to the identity of the Para with the Tram-entity properly understood.

Even with all this, the question still remains. — Where does the Vicāra (consideration) come in, as the Śabda is capable of producing the direct knowledge even before the Vicāra? The answer is — Vicāra gets rid of the obstacles in the way of the Direct knowledge to be produced. The procedure is as follows —

(1) Instruction about Brahmanavidyā, accompanied by the proper performance of the prescribed duties, gets rid of the Citta-doṣa which obstructs the discrimination between Nitya and Anitya entities.

(2) The Nityānitya-viveka gets rid of the Cittadoṣa coming in the way of aversion to enjoyments here and there hereafter.

(3) Then by the Viśaya-vaitrṣṇya is got rid of the Cittadoṣa obstructing Śama, Dama etc.

(4) Then is got rid of, the Cittadoṣa causing improper activity, by the practice of Śama, Dama etc.

(5-7) Then is got rid of, the Cittadoṣa which believes in the unauthoritative nature of the Vedānta preaching the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, by means of Śravaṇa, Manana, Nididhyāsana in succession.

(8) Thus, ultimately the idea about the real purport of the Vedānta passages gets firm root in the Citta cleansed of all blemishes, and drives away Ajñāna and its effects automatically.

It would be seen that the Vicāra of the Vedānta-Vākyas plays a very important part in removing the blemishes in the Citta; Vicāra does not produce any positive result; thus the Svataḥ-prāmāṇya (self-authoritative nature) of the Vedāntas remains unaffected.

Mokṣa, therefore, is Ātman himself from whom Avidyā has disappeared, and that can be secured by the realisation of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman from the proper scrutiny of the Vedānta passages.

So, a person, removing the world and turning a recluse intent upon securing salvation, should approach a properly qualified teacher and indulge in consideration of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and passages, till the fruit is achieved.

III. A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

The *Vedāntakalpavṛtikā*, as has been pointed out, is probably the author's first work and contains jottings or important points for detailed exposition later on, bearing on the Advaita doctrine in the Upaniṣads.

Madhusūdana first of all briefly refers to the ideas about Mokṣa in the different systems of philosophy (both Āstika and Nāstika) and weeds out the Nāstika systems (of the Materialists, Bauddhas and Jainas, with their sub-sects) as not deserving any consideration, because they do not admit any changeless, permanent entity which could experience the state of Mokṣa which likewise must not be undergoing any change.

There could not exist even a desire for securing Mokṣa among the Cārvākas (who believe that with the extinction of the body, nothing is left behind) or the Bauddhas (who regard everything as momentary) or the Jainas (according to whom Mokṣa is the going up higher and higher, thus involving some Kriyā).

In the case of the Āstika systems, a desire for Mokṣa can arise, but according to these systems, Mokṣa is either something to be newly attained or reached or produced or improved, and certain Sādhanaś are mentioned for securing this end. But such a Mokṣa would necessarily be transient or non-eternal as it is bound to be after all adventitious. Whether Mokṣa is described as absence of misery, or aquisition of new qualities or removal of blemishes, the result is the same.

According to the followers of the Upaniṣads, Mokṣa is Ātman himself realised in his proper nature as being without any Dharmas.

The Bauddhas, Jainas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas mention certain Sādhanaś as leading to salvation; so also the Sāṅkhyas speak of as Sādhana for Mokṣa, the discrimination

between Prakṛti and Puruṣa ; the Mīmāṃsakas denounce Jñāna as a means for Mokṣa. But all these agree in regarding Mokṣa as something to be *produced*, and hence their views are unacceptable.

It might be argued that as Mokṣa (Ātman) is always Siddha, there cannot arise a desire for the same ; possibly the removal of Avidyā may be said to be the desired end, but Avidyā itself can hardly be described in an intelligible manner, whether it is regarded as different or non-different from Ātman. This objection can easily be answered as follows — It cannot be a rule that only an Asiddha entity can produce Kāmanā for it. A Siddha entity, if it be forgotten or misunderstood on account of illusion or if there is some obstructing agency, can certainly produce the necessary Kāmanā. The removal of Avidyā can be demonstrated as being something peculiarly Anirvacanīya. When Ātman is spoken of as Advitiya, we do understand that there is the negation of any second entity and this in no way affects the Advaita idea. Actually there is no necessity for going about in this round about way. The notion of Abhāva is also based upon Avidyā and so Anirvacanīya can very well express the correct position and no Anirvacanīya-vailakṣaṇya need be admitted.

The Highest (Ātman, Brahman) is void of any Dharma and so there can not be any particularised knowledge of the same. The well-known Pramāṇas,—Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti etc.,—cannot help in realising Brahman as they are unable to tackle an entity that is not tangible. The Vedānta-passages (Śabda-Pramāṇa) are helpful, but not in the ordinary way. The well-known powers of Śabda, — Denotation, Indication and Suggestion with their accepted divisions according to the Naiyāyikas and Rhetoricians are useless for the purpose of knowing a Nirdharmaka entity, so also Convention and Etymology.

In short, Brahman cannot be the object of Jñāna, but Jñāna can certainly lead to Brahman. Jñāna and Ajñāna have different resorts, so Jñāna cannot possibly demolish Ajñāna — this objection can be met with by admitting the superimposition of the Antaḥkaraṇa on the Caitanya. The Śruti in so many words assures us that Ajñāna can be removed by Jñāna, and that is also a matter of actual experience. Avidyā is got rid of by the Jñāna of the nature of the Ātman. The Śabda produces direct Jñāna. When Ātman is described in the Śruti as Mānasīna, there it is not meant that the Manas is the Karaṇa; but Kartṛtva is attributed to the Manas. Śabdajñāna cannot be equated with Pratyabhijñā which is indirect, and the sense-organ (eye) there cannot directly perceive the Tattātma (the portion not directly present). Śabda is not to be confused with any Indriya. Though Śabda produces direct knowledge, consideration of the Vedānta-passages is necessary, and this gradually removes the blemishes in the Citta which, when it is cleansed of all blemishes is, with the grace of God, able to realise the Ātman, with the removal of Avidyā.

Madhusūdana, like all Advaitins, is interested in pointing out that Mokṣa can never be described as a product, as that would make Mokṣa impermanent. At the same time he wishes to keep in tact the invulnerable nature of the Śruti-passages. He himself is greatly influenced by devotional fervour and so tries to show that while Mokṣa requires no Karaṇa for its realisation, the Vicāra of Śruti-passages, devotion, instruction from a qualified teacher—all help in preparing the back-ground for the realisation of Ātman, and in removing the Ajñāna, by ensuring all round purity of the Citta, automatically bring about the Realisation or Mokṣa.

॥ श्री ॥

श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचिता

वेदान्तकल्पलतिका

[१]

मीमांसया कपटतो भुजगाम्बयेव

स्वाधीनतामुपनिषद्विनतेव नीता ।

येनोद्धृतामृतफलेन गरुत्मतेव

तस्मै नमो भगवतेऽद्भुतशङ्कराय ॥ १ ॥

दुरापः शास्त्रार्थो नियतयतमानैरपि बुधै-

र्न संप्राप्तुं शक्यो मलिनमतिना यद्यपि मया ।

तथापि श्रीविश्वेश्वरचरणपङ्केरुहसुधा-

मुधाराम्भिः सिक्तो न कथमपि रिक्तोऽस्मि भविता ॥ २ ॥

Śrī

VEDĀNTAKALPALATIKĀ

(Composed by Śrī Madhusūdanasarasvatī)

[1] (1) A bow to that divine wonderful Śaṅkara, by whom, with the fruit, immortality, the Upaniṣad brought under control through fraud by the (Pūrva-) Mīmāṃsā (Karmakāṇḍa) was rescued, as by Garuḍa with the securing of nectar Vinatā, made a slave by (Kadrū) the mother of serpents.

(2) Although by me with confused (soiled) intellect is not possible to comprehend the meaning of the Śāstras difficult to arrive at even by wise persons striving for it continuously, still (I hope that) I, sprinkled over by the auspicious showers of nectar from the lotus-like feet of the

सत्तर्कपुष्पनिकरैः परमात्मबोध-
 निष्ठाफलेन दधती परमां विभूतिम् ।
 शारीरकार्थसुरशाखिगता सुधीभि-
 र्वेदान्तकल्पलतिकेयमुपासनीया ॥ ३ ॥
 निर्धूय जैमिनि-पतञ्जलि-गौतमोक्तीः
 काणाद-कापिल-शिवादिमतानि चाहम् ।
 श्रीव्यास-शङ्कर-सुरेश्वर-सूचितार्थ-
 शुद्धिं व्यनज्मि विशदं मितभाषितेन ॥ ४ ॥
 मुमुक्षूणामनुष्ठेयविक्षेपविनिवृत्तये ।
 मोक्षं ससाधनं वच्मि परपक्षनिरासतः ॥ ५ ॥

Revered Viśveśvara (Brahmadeva—the Lord of the universe; the name of the author's teacher), would not be somehow or other deficient (empty).

(3) This ' Vedāntakalpalatikā ' should be respectfully taken to by the persons of great talents, —growing on the heavenly tree in the form of the true nature of the individual Soul, exhibiting the highest glory by the heaps of flowers in the form of excellent logical reasonings, (and) by the fruit in the form of devotion to the illumining knowledge of the highest Ātman.

(4) Having shaken off the statements of Jaimini (Pūrva-mīmāṃsā), Patañjali (Yoga), Gautama (Nyāya) and the views of Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika), Kapila (Sāṅkhya), Śiva (Pāśupata) etc., I am going to propound clearly in measured words the true sense indicated by Śrī Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(5) I am going to speak of salvation, with the means thereof, by refuting the views of the other parties, for the purpose of removing the obstacles in the prescribed activities of those desirous of salvation.

[२] अथ, मोक्षे तत्साधने च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते विपश्चितः—तत्र

(१) लोकायतिकाः, तावत् प्राकृतलोकांनुसारिणः मनुष्यत्वादि-
विशिष्टभूतचतुष्टयसंघात एव चैतन्यं मन्यमानाः, नानागमपुराणानु-
मानादेः प्रसिद्धमपि देहादिव्यतिरिक्तं चेतनं बन्धमोक्षभागिनम-
शुद्धबुद्धयोऽपलपन्ति, 'नाप्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्' इति वदन्तः । तत्र कस्य
मोक्षप्रत्याशा?

(२) तदेकदेशिनः, अपि प्रत्येकसमुच्चयाभ्यामिन्द्रियाणि मनः
प्राणं वा चेतनमुपगच्छन्तः, तथैव वञ्चकाः ।

(३) विज्ञानवादिनः, तु क्षणिकविज्ञानस्कन्धं देहेन्द्रियादि-

[2] Now, in the matter of salvation and the means thereof, wise men hold different contradictory views :—

(1) There to begin with, the Laukāyatikas (Materialists) following (the views of) the man in the street (*prāk-
ṛta*), holding the aggregate itself of the four elements
particularised by the nature of man etc., as the Sentient
principle, of perverse mind, deny the Sentient sharing in
bondage and salvation, distinct from the body etc., although
well-established by various Āgamas (Śāstras), Purāṇas,
and other means of proof such as inference etc., foolishly
proclaiming ' what is not directly perceived, cannot be the
means of proof '. In that case, how can there be any hope
of salvation for any one ?

(2) Followers of a sect of them (Materialists) also,
taking the sense-organs, the mind or the vital air severally
and jointly as the Sentient, are but cheats in the same way.

(3) The followers of the Vijñāna-vāda as well, holding
the momentary Vijñāna-aggregate distinct from the body,

व्यतिरिक्तमात्मत्वेन मन्यमानाः, चतुर्विधनैरात्म्यभावनया तस्य सोपप्लव-
विज्ञानसन्तानस्यात्यन्तोपरमं वा निरुपप्लवसर्वज्ञसन्तानान्तर्भावं वा मोक्ष-
मिच्छन्ति ।

(४) माध्यमिकाः, पुनः शून्यमात्रमात्मानमुपयन्ताः, न
किञ्चिदपि तत्त्वमस्ति, इति शून्यभावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तात् तत्त्वज्ञानाच्छून्यभाव-
मेवापवर्गमाहुः ।

(५) आर्हताः, तु देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तं देहपरिमाणमात्मान-
मभ्युपगम्य तस्य पुर्यष्टककर्माष्टकपरिवेष्टितस्य, आर्हतशास्त्रोक्तेन तपसा,
आत्मैकाकारसमाधिना परिपाकेन चाष्टविधबन्धप्रध्वंसे सति, सुखैकतानस्य

sense-organs etc., as being the Ātman, consider salvation to
be the complete cessation of the Vijñāna continuity along
with the impediments of that (Vijñāna-skandha) or its in-
clusion within the all-knowing continuity without any impe-
diments, on account of the concept of the four-fold state of
being void of Ātman.

(4) The Mādhyamikas as well, holding the Ātman to
be mere Void, and as there is no reality of any kind, speak
of salvation as just the void-nature, from the metaphysical
knowledge extending over the full development of the
concept of Void.

(5) The followers of the Arhat (i. e. the Jainas) as
well, admitting the Ātman to be of the measure of the
body, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc., speak of
salvation as the constantly going-high-up, or, not-going-to-
the-Lokākāśa (the region meant for the unliberated beings)
on the part of the Ātman, having uniform bliss, freed from
the covering knowledge, when there comes about the total

१ A माध्यमिकास्तु.

२ A उपगताः, ततो.

Δ उपयन्तास्ततो.

३ A आर्हताः, स्वदेहेन्द्रियादि.

४ A नमुपगम्य.

५ A विपरिपाकेन.

निरावरणज्ञानस्य सन्ततोर्ध्वगमनम्, अलोकाकाशगमनं वा मोक्षमाचक्षते, पञ्जरभञ्जन इव पञ्जरस्थस्य शुक्रस्य स्वातन्त्र्यम् । इदमेव च स्वातन्त्र्यं मोक्ष इति प्रसिद्धम् ।

(६) काणादाः, तु देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तं विप्रमात्मानं नव-विशेषगुणाश्रयं कल्पयन्तो जल्पन्ति द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-सम-वायानां षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां यत्तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तत्पूर्वकादात्म-तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारात्, ईश्वरोपासनासहितात्, नवानां वैशेषिकगुणानां प्राग-भावासहवृत्तिः प्रध्वंस एवात्मनः कैवल्यम्, इति ।

destruction of the eight-fold bondage for him enveloped by the Puryaṣṭaka and the eight-fold Karman on account of penance prescribed in the Ārhata-śāstras, and by the culmination of concentration on the unique form of the Ātman, like the freedom of a parrot confined in a cage, when the cage is broken; and this very freedom is well-known as salvation.

(6) The followers of Kaṇāda (the Vaiśeṣikas), again, imagining the all-pervading Ātman, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc., as the resort of the nine Viśeṣa-qualities (*Ichhā, Dveṣa* etc.), prattle on :— What the real knowledge of the six Padārthas (categories) — Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karman (action), Sāmānya (generality), Viśeṣa (particularity), Samavāya (intimate relation), owing to the similarity and dis-similarity — from the realisation of the nature of Ātman, preceded by the above (knowledge), together with the worship of Īśvara, (the resulting) destruction itself of the Ātman not staying with the antecedent negation of the nine Gunas admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas, is salvation.

(७) नैयायिकाः, तु प्रमाण-प्रमेय-संशय-प्रयोजन-दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्त-अवयव-तर्क-निर्णय-वाद-जल्प-वितण्डा-हेत्वाभास-छल-जाति-निग्रह-स्थानानाम्, उद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षाभिः, आत्म-शरीर-इन्द्रिय-अर्थ-बुद्धि-मनः-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-प्रेत्यभाव-फल-दुःख-अपवर्गाख्यद्वादशविधप्रमेयनिःकर्षणं, आत्मद्वयसाक्षात्कारात् श्रवण-मनन-निदिध्यासनपूर्वकात् सवासनमिध्याज्ञान-निवृत्तौ तत्कार्याणां रागद्वेषमोहानां निवृत्तिः, ततस्तत्कार्ययोः प्रवृत्तिपूर्व-कयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः, ततः पूर्वार्जितकर्मणां कायव्यूहपूर्वकभोगेन क्षयात्, शरीरान्तरानारम्भः । ततो बार्धनालक्षणस्यैकविंशतिप्रभेददुःखस्य, अत्यन्त-त्रिमोक्षः, अपवर्गः, इति कल्पयन्ति ।

(7) The followers of Nyāya as well imagine that when there is the realisation of the two Ātmans by the proper appraisal of the twelve-fold Prameyas called Soul, body, sense-organ, object (or categories), cognition, mind, activity, defect, trans-migration, fruit (or result of deeds), pain and salvation — by the enumeration, definition and examination of proof, object of knowledge, doubt, motive, instance, tenet (or, demonstrated truth), member of syllogism, hypothetical reasoning, conclusion, discussion, wrangling, cavilling, fallacy, perversion, futility and ground for confutation ; and when there is the turning away of the false knowledge with the Vāsanās, there is the turning away of passion, hatred and infatuation, the products of that ; and then of Dharma and Adharma, preceded by activity regarding the products of them,—then there comes about the non-production of another body on account of the destruction of Karmans done in previous birth, by the enjoyment preceded by the body-array ; and thereupon the total freedom from misery with twentyone-fold variety, causing obstruction, which is the salvation.

(८) अपरे तु, ऐकभविकन्यायेन, आत्मज्ञानमन्तरेणापि निषिद्ध-
काम्ययोरननुष्ठानात्, नित्यनैमित्तिकानुष्ठानात्, च न, आगामिकर्मोत्पादः ।
विद्यमानस्य चोपभोगेन क्षयात्, सकलकर्मोच्छेदलक्षणमपवर्गम्, आहुः ।

(९) प्राभाकराः, अपि वैदिककर्मानुष्ठानात्, विहितात्मज्ञानपूर्व-
कात्, देहेन्द्रियादिसंबन्धस्य धर्माधर्मपरिक्षयनिमित्तम्, आत्यन्तिकोच्छेद-
लक्षणं मोक्षं मन्यन्ते ।

(१०) भाट्टाः, तु ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयात्, एवात्मनो जडबोधात्मकस्य
नित्यज्ञानं नित्यसुखं च, उदेति । ततश्च विषयविशेषानपेक्षया नित्यज्ञानेन
नित्यसुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिः, इत्याहुः ।

(८) Others again say:—There is no production of
future Karman on account of the non-performance of the
prohibited and voluntary Karmans and by the performance
of the compulsory and occasional Karmans, even without
the knowledge of Ātman, confining to what happens in one
birth; and the present Karman being destroyed by the
enjoyment, they speak of Salvation as characterised by the
destruction of the entire Karman.

(९) The followers of Prabhākara (Pūrvamīmāṃsā)
also, consider Salvation, characterised by the most complete
annihilation (of Karman), due to the destruction of Dharma
and Adharma associated with the body, sense-organs etc.,
through the right performance of Karmans prescribed by the
Veda, preceded by the knowledge of the Ātman as ordained.

(१०) The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila), again,
say:— Only through the combination of knowledge and
Karman, there arises eternal knowledge and eternal bliss
for the Ātman steeped in the knowledge of non-sentient
objects; thereby afterwards, there is the Salvation,— the
manifestation of eternal bliss, by the eternal realisation,
owing to its being not dependent upon particular objects.

(११) मानसज्ञानेन सुखामिव्यक्तिः, वा दुःखाभावमेव वा मुक्तिं^१ तदीयाः केचित् ।

(१२) साङ्ख्याः, तु प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकात्, अनाद्यविवेकनिवृत्तौ तं पुरुषं प्रति चरिताधिकारायाः प्रकृतेः पुनस्तद्भोगार्था, अप्रवृत्तिः, इति त्रिविधदुःखस्य एकान्तात्यन्तविरोधः, एव स्वभावतः केवलस्यापि पुरुषस्य कैवल्यमित्याहुः ।

(१३) पातञ्जलाः, तु प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकेन, अभ्यासवैराग्यपरिपाकात्, यम-नियम-आसन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-संप्रज्ञात-

(11) Some belonging to the same (Bhaṭṭa school) (think) Salvation (which) is, through mental realisation, to be either the manifestation of eternal bliss or merely the absence of misery.

(12) The followers of Sāṅkhya (Kapila), again, say :— When the beginningless non-discrimination is turned away by the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, there is not again activity for the sake of the enjoyment (by Puruṣa) of the Prakṛti that had been lording it over in respect of the Puruṣa — so, the unreserved total obstruction to the three-fold misery alone, is the Salvation of the Puruṣa, although quite unattached (*kevala*) by his very nature.

(13) The followers of Patañjali (the Yoga school) think thus :— Owing to the maturity of passionlessness by practice, due to the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, preceded by the (proper observance of) Yama (restraint), Niyama (regulations), Āsana (Yogic-posture), Prāṇāyāma (breath-control), Pratyāhāra (continuity),

१ A दुःखाभावमात्रम् एव वा. २ A मुक्तिः इत्यपि. A मुक्तिरिति.

३ A न पुनः...र्था प्रवृत्तिः ४ A निरोधः

समाधिपूर्वकात् परमेश्वरप्रसादनात् पञ्चविधानां चित्तवृत्तीनां निरोधादेव धर्ममेघशब्दितात्, असंप्रज्ञातसमाधेः कैवल्यम्, इति कल्पयन्ति ।

(१४) त्रिदण्डिनः, तु जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदाभेदमभ्युपेत्य ज्ञानकर्म-समुच्चयाभ्यासादेव कारणात्मके ब्रह्मणि कार्यात्मकजीवस्य कर्मवासनासहित-भेदांशनिवृत्तिः, मोक्षः, इति वदन्ति ।

(१५) परमेश्वरप्राप्तिः, इति, अन्ये ।

(१६) सतरङ्गनिस्तरङ्गभेदेन समुद्रद्वैविध्यवत् सविकारनिर्विकार-रूपेण, अवस्थाद्वयं ब्रह्मणः परिकल्प्य ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयाभ्यासादेव स-विकारावस्थापरित्यागेन निर्विकारावस्थाप्राप्तिः, एव मोक्षः, इति, अपरे ।

Dhāraṇā (contemplation), Dhyāna (meditation), and Saṁ-
prajñāta-Samādhi (particularised deep concentration),
there (arises) Salvation, through the restraint alone of the
five-fold mental tendencies, effected by the grace of the
Highest Lord, due to the Asaṁprajñāta-Samādhi (deep
concentration, distinctionless) called Dharma-Megha.

(14) The three-staff Ascetics, again, admitting differ-
ence-cum-non-difference between the Jīva and Brahman,
say that Salvation is through the constant combination
alone of Knowledge and Karman, the cessation (merging)
of the part differentiated along with Karman and Vāsanā,
of the Jīva as the Effect, in Brahman constituted as the
(one) Cause.

(15) Others (belonging to the same Tridandin-order
speak of Salvation) as the attainment of the Highest Lord.

(16) Others (of the same Order), having imagined
two states of Brahman, in the forms—changing and change-
less, like the two-fold state of the sea, due to the distinction
of being with waves, and being without waves, speak of Sal-
vation, as the attainment of the changeless state by the

(१७) पाशुपताः, तु यथोक्तपाशुपतधर्माचरणात् पशुपतिसमीप-
गमनमेव पुनरावृत्तिरहितं मोक्षः, इति, आहुः ।

(१८) एवं यथोक्तविष्णुभक्तिधर्माचरणाद् विष्णुलोकगमनमेव
मोक्षः, इति वैष्णवाः ।

(१९) पञ्चाग्निविद्याद्युपासनैः, अर्चिरादिमार्गेण हिरण्यगर्भप्राप्तिः,
एव मोक्षः, इति हैरण्यगर्भाः ।

(२०) एवम्, अपरे, अपि स्वकपोलकल्पितश्रुतियुक्तिविरुद्धमेव
बहु जल्पन्ति ।

(२१) औपनिषदाः, तु भगवता नीलाचलनायकेन नारायणे-

abandonment of the changing state through the constant
combination of Knowledge and Karman alone.

(17) The followers of Paśupati (Śiva, the Śaivas)
speak of Salvation as going near Paśupati, without any
return therefrom, through the observance of the Dharmas
of the Pāśupatas as ordained.

(18) The followers (or devotees) of Viṣṇu, likewise
(say) that Salvation (is) going to the world of Viṣṇu, by
the observance of the Bhakti-ritual as ordained.

(19) The followers of Hiraṇyagarbha (the Golden
Egg, say) :— Salvation (is) just the attainment of Hiraṇya-
garbha by the path, ' Arciḥ etc., ' through the devoted
observance of the Five-fire Vidyā etc.

(20) Thus, others also prattle in various ways, what
is conceived by themselves, contrary to the Śruti (meaning)
and reasoning.

(21) The followers of the Upaniṣads, on the other

नानुगृहीताः, निरतिशयानन्दबोधरूप आत्मा, एव, अनाद्यविद्यानिवृत्त्युप-
लक्षितो मोक्षः, इति, आचक्षते ।

अविद्यायाश्च सर्वदुःखोपादानत्वात्, तन्निवृत्त्या, आत्यन्तिकदुःख-
निवृत्तिरप्युपपद्यते । तस्य च स्वरूपे साधनानपेक्षत्वेऽपि व्यञ्जकतया
महावाक्यकरणकः, तत्स्वरूपसाक्षात्कारः, एव प्रतिबन्धचतुष्टयरहितः, मोक्ष-
साधनम्, इत्युपचर्यते । प्रतिबन्धचतुष्टयं च विषयभोगवासना, प्रमाणगता-
संभावना, प्रमेयगतासंभावना, विपरीतभावना च, इति ।

तत्र विषयासक्तेः श्रवणाङ्गभूताः शमदमार्दयो निवर्तकाः, प्रमाण-

hand, graced by Nārāyaṇa, the divine Lord of the Nīla mountain, speak of Salvation as the Ātman alone, consti-
tuted of limitless bliss and enlightenment, characterised by
the cessation of beginningless Avidyā (Nescience).

And as Avidyā is the material (cause) of all misery,
when that is removed, the total cessation of misery duly
follows. And although the nature of that (Salvation) stands
in no need of any means, the realisation itself of its nature,
freed from the four-fold impediment (and) caused by
the ' Great sentence ' manifesting it is metaphorically
spoken of as the means of Salvation. The four-fold impedi-
ment is:— the Vāsanā for the enjoyment of the objects
of senses; the wrong conception in respect of the means
of proof; the wrong conception in respect of the objects
of knowledge, and contradictory conception.

There Śama (control), Dama (restraint) etc., which
form part of the ' hearing ' (Śravaṇa) are the removers of
the attachment to the objects of sense ; Śravaṇa is the

१ Ā निरतिशयादयानन्द.

२ A omits च.

३ A वेदान्तमहावाक्य

४ Ā omits साधन

५ A साधनप्रतिबन्ध

६ Ā शमादयो

गतासंभावनायाः श्रवणं निवर्तकम्, प्रमेयगतासंभावनाया मननं, विपरीत-
भावनायाश्च निदिध्यासनं निवर्तकम्, इति । अतः श्रवणादिसंपादनेना-
संभावनादिप्रतिबन्धपरिक्षयाय चतुर्लक्षणी शारीरकमीमांसा समारम्भि
भगवता बादरायणेन । मोक्षकामः, च अस्यामधिकारी,

‘ शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुः श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं
पश्येत् । ’ (बृ. ४।४।२३)

इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्तशमाद्युपबृंहितविचारविधिमूलके

‘ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ’ (ब्र. सू. १।१।१)

remover of the wrong conception in respect of the means of proof ; meditation (is the remover) of the wrong conception in respect of the object of knowledge ; and contemplation is the remover of the contradictory conception. Therefore, (the Śāstra of) Mīmāṃsā dealing with the embodied soul, consisting of four Adhyāyas (*Lakṣaṇa*), has been composed by the Revered Bādarāyaṇa for the destruction of the impediments — wrong conception etc., by taking to Śravaṇa etc. And one desirous of salvation is the proper (authorised) person for (the study of) this (Uttara-mīmāṃsā); because (the Sūtra) being based upon the injunctions with their consideration augmented by control, etc., mentioned in the Śruti (passages), such as

‘ Having become controlled, restrained, inactive, enduring (and) full of faith, one should behold the Ātman within the Ātman himself ’. (Br. IV. 4. 23)

in the Sūtra

‘ Now then the desire to know Brahman ’ (B. S. I. 1. 1)

१ A मननं निवर्तकम्

२ A omits प्रतिबन्ध

३ A शारीरमीमांसा

४ A इमदनाद्युपबृंहितविधिमूलके

इति सूत्रे, अथशब्देन शमादिविशिष्टस्य मुमुक्षोरेव सूत्रणात् ।

[३] तदयं निर्गलितार्थः—शमादिसहितेन मुमुक्षुणा गुरुमुपसृत्य मोक्षसाधनब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारप्रतिबन्धासंभावनादिनिवृत्तये चतुर्लक्षेण-मीमांसया वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिपर्यन्तम्, आवर्तनीयः, इति ।

[४] तत्र, मोक्षस्वरूपं यावद्विशिष्य न निश्चीयते, तावत्तत्र कस्य कामनोदेतु ? तत्स्वरूपमात्रनिश्चयात्कामनायां जातायामपि विचारेण साधनविशेषनिश्चये सत्येव तत्र मुमुक्षोः प्रवृत्तिः संभवति, इति तत्तद्वाद्य-

by the word *Atha*, one alone desirous of salvation, characterised by (the possession of the qualities) control etc., has been referred to.

[3] Thus this is the sense ultimately conveyed — By one desirous of salvation, endowed with (the qualities of) control etc., approaching (studying under) a teacher, the consideration of the Vedānta-passages by the *Mīmāṃsā* of four *Adhyāyas* is to be repeatedly gone through till the removal of the impediments, for the purpose of the removal of the wrong conception etc., standing in the way of the realisation of the oneness of Brahman and *Ātman*, which is the means of salvation.

[4] There, so long as the nature of salvation is not definitely ascertained specifically, in whom could any desire for that rise up? Even when desire is produced by the ascertainment of only its nature, it is only when there is the ascertainment of specific means (that) the activity of one desirous of salvation is possible in that behalf,—so, by the refutation of (the wrong idea of) apparent salvation and its means admitted by the various disputants, salvation in its

१. *Ā* प्रतिबन्धकासंभावना

२. *Ā* -तुर्लक्षणी

३. *Ā* सत्येव मुमुक्षोस्तत्र प्रवृत्तिः

भ्युपगतमुक्तिर्तत्साधनाभासनिरासेन परमार्थसती मुक्तिः, तत्साधनं च विचार्याविधार्यते—

[५] तत्र, औपनिषदपक्षव्यतिरिक्तपक्षेषु न तत्साधनेषु कामनो-
देतुमर्हति, तत्तद्वाद्यभ्युपगतानां मोक्षप्रकाराणामप्रामाणिकत्वात् प्रमाण-
विरुद्धत्वाच्च । तथाहि—

(१) चार्वाकनये तावन्मोक्षस्वरूपस्यैवानभ्युपगमात्, देहस्येन्द्रिय-
प्राणमनसां च भौतिकत्वेन विनश्वरत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तेषामेव च स्वरूपतो
दुःस्वरूपत्वात् दुःखहेतुत्वाच्च, न तन्निवृत्तिसमये सत्तासमये वा दुःख-

true nature and the means thereof are definitely ascertained after (due) consideration.

[5] There, a desire for its means does not deserve to rise in respect of the views, other than the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads, on account of the modes of salvation admitted by the various disputants being not supported by the right means of proof and being opposed to the means of proof. Thus—

(1) Apropos the Cārvāka-system, for the matter of that, on account of the nature of salvation itself not being admitted, on account of admitting the perishable nature of the body and of the sense-organs, vital airs and the mind, because they are constituted of the material elements, and on account of their being themselves by nature constituted of misery and being the cause of misery, there is no scope either at the time of their removal or during the period of

- १ Ā मुक्तिरुत्साधना, २ A न मोक्षतत्साधनेषु Ā न मोक्षे तत्साधने वा;
३ Ā ... 'भ्युपगतानां सर्वेषां ४ A विनाशित्वाभ्युपगमात्
५ A संसारसमये, Ā तत्सत्तासमये.

निवृत्त्यात्मकफलभागीतावकाशः ।

(२) अत एव, सौगतमतमप्यपास्तम् । तत्रापि क्षणिकविज्ञानस्य सोपप्लवत्वेन सर्वदुःखरूपत्वात्, तन्निवृत्तौ च स्वयैवाभावात्, कस्य मोक्ष-
वकाशः ? न च, आत्मनो नाशः कस्याप्यभिमतो निरुपाधिप्रेमास्पदत्वात् ।
स्वनाशाद्वरं दुःखितया जीवनम् । यत्तु प्रयागादौ निःश्रेयसकामनया मरण-
विधानं, कुष्ठाद्युपहतानां चान्यत्रापि, तदविनश्वरभोक्तृसद्भावमेव गमयति,
इति न निदर्शनम् ।

(३) एतेन सर्वज्ञसन्तानान्तर्भावपक्षोऽपि निरस्तः, सर्वज्ञस्य सर्व-

existence, for sharing in the fruit (salvation) constituted of the removal of the misery.

(2) Hence too the Buddha-doctrine is also cast away. Even there, on account of the momentary Vijñāna being constituted of every (kind of) misery, owing to being full of impediments, and when that is removed, for whom would there be the scope for salvation on account of the absence of himself ? Surely, nobody favours one's own destruction, on account of (oneself) being the target of unequivocal love. A miserable life is preferable to one's own destruction. As to the statement about death at (the holy Tirtha) Prayāga etc., through the desire to secure the highest bliss, and elsewhere also in respect of those completely affected by leprosy etc. — this cannot be an illustrative instance, because it points out to the existence itself of an imperishable enjoyer.

(3) By this (above argument) is cast away the view advocating the inclusion of an omniscient stream, on account of the all-knower having the form of the entire knowledge

१ A drops अत एव २ A क्षणिकविज्ञानसन्तानस्य ३ A सर्वदा दुःखरूपत्वात्

४ A स्वयमेवाभावात् ५ A तदविनश्वरभोक्तृसद्भाव...

सोपप्लवज्ञानाकारतया संसारिसन्तानापेक्षयापि सोपप्लवाधिक्येनात्यन्तदुःख-
रूपत्वात्, अन्यस्यान्यान्तर्भावानुपपत्तेश्च । अन्यथा, नीलधर्वलानामपि तथा
प्रसङ्गात्, विश्वाद्वैतवादापत्तेः, सन्तानस्य सन्तान्यभिन्नत्वेन सर्वज्ञसन्तान-
स्यापि विनश्वरत्वाच्च, अविनश्वरत्वे वा स्थैर्यापत्तिरित्युपेक्षणीयाः कुबुद्धयः ।

(४) शून्यवादे तु किं केन काम्येत कामिनः कालत्रयेऽप्यसत्त्वात् ?

(५) आर्हतपक्षेऽपि सततोर्ध्वगमनस्य अलोकाकारैश्च शङ्काः

with impediments, being made of extreme misery, as compared to the continuity of one associated with the worldly existence, on account of the greater degree of the impediments and on account of the impropriety of another thing being included in another. Otherwise, there would be the undesirable result of admitting the doctrine of World-Advaita, on account of the (qualities), blue, white, being looked upon as similar and even the all-knower stream would have a perishable nature on account of the continuity not being different from one associated with continuity, or there would be the undesirable contingency of stability (being admitted), if the continuity is not possessed of a perishable nature -- thus these perverse views deserve to be ignored.

(4) Apropos the doctrine of the Void, however, what (and) by whom can be desired, on account of one possessed of desire, not being in existence in all the three times (past, present and future) ?

(5) Even according to the view of the Ārhatas (Jainas) on account of (the Ātman) always going up, residing in the Alokākāśa and as involved in action, being of a perishable nature, there is no object for the desire of salva-

च क्रियात्वेन विनाशित्वात्, न, अपुनरावृत्तिलक्षणमोक्षकामनाविषयता;
सुखस्य वा मोक्षरूपत्वाभ्युपगमे तस्य जन्यत्वे पूर्वोक्त एव दोषः ।
अजन्यत्वेऽपि मुक्तसंसारिणोरविशेषात् स एव दोषः । संसारदशायां
कर्मणामावरणत्वस्य कुत्राप्यदर्शनात् । आत्मस्वरूपत्वतद्विन्नत्वादिनापि
तस्यानुपपत्तिमग्रे वक्ष्यामः । किं च, आत्मनो देहपरिमाणत्वाभ्युपगमा-
देहानां च, अव्यवस्थितपरिमाणवत्त्वात्, गजमशकशरीरादाववयवोपचयाङ्गी-
कारेणानियतपरिमाणवत्त्वः, आत्मनो वाच्यम् । तथा च परिमाणभेदे

tion, characterised by a non-return; or, if happiness is admit-
ted to have the form of salvation there would be the same
aforesaid defect, as that would be a product. Even if (it is
held that) it is not originated, the same defect remains on
account of there being no distinction between the released
Soul and one continuing in the Samsāra. If it is argued
that the happiness is veiled by the eight-fold Karman in the
state of Samsāra, but when the eight-fold Karman ceases
that is without any veil,—(our answer is)—No, on account
of the nature of having a veil in respect of the Karmans
not being seen anywhere. We shall be speaking of that
being impossible later on, on the strength of the nature
of the Ātman and his being distinct from that etc., as well.
And further, by admitting the size of the body for the
Ātman, and that the bodies are possessed of dimensions not
fixed up, and by the acceptance of (the theory of) the in-
crease and decrease of parts in respect of the bodies, of an
elephant, a mosquito etc., it will have to be said that the
Ātman is possessed of dimensions not fixed. And accordingly
when there is the change of dimension, the destruction of

१ A सुखस्य च २ A सुखमिति विशेष इति चेन्न

३ A कर्मणामनावरणत्वस्य

आत्मनो विनाशः प्राप्तः प्रदीपादिवत्, द्रव्यभेदं विना परिमाणभेदानुपपत्तेः । यावत्प्रत्यभिज्ञं वस्तुस्थितिरित्यभ्युपगमेऽपि सावयवत्वेन विनाशित्वध्रौव्यात्, न, अविनाशिमोक्षफलभागिता, विनाशिनः फलस्य तु स्वर्गादान्तर्भावेन नात्यन्तपुमर्थमोक्षरूपता, इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण ।

[६] ननु नास्तिकमतेषु मास्तु मोक्षकामना, फलफलिनोर्विनाशित्वात् । आस्तिकमते तु नास्ति स दोष इति तत्रोपपद्यत एव सा । तथा हि—

देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्तो नित्यो विश्वरात्मा, इति तावत्सर्वप्रमाण-

Ātman would perforce be there, like that of the lamp etc., on account of the change of the dimension not being reasonable without a change in substance. Even though the stability of a thing is admitted so long as the recognition takes place, there cannot be the sharing of the fruit—the imperishable salvation—on account of the perishable nature being certain owing to its being possessed of parts; and there cannot be that nature of salvation—the very highest human purpose—owing to the perishable fruit being included in heaven etc.,—so enough of this great prolixity !

[6] I say (says the objector)—Let there be no desire for salvation in heretical theories, on account of the fruit and the enjoyer of the fruit (being both) perishable. That blemish does not exist in the orthodox view. And so, that (desire for salvation) properly fits in there. To explain the same —

It has been established, for the matter of that, by all means of proof, that the Ātman is eternal, all-pervading, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc. Regarding this (*tatra*), Direct perception, for the matter of that, is of the

सिद्धम् । तत्र, प्रत्यक्षं तावद्, 'योऽहं पितरौ बाल्येऽन्वभूवं सोऽहं वार्धके प्रणप्ननुभवामि', इति प्रत्यभिज्ञात्मकम्, अनन्यथासिद्धम्, अबाधितं च बाल्यवार्धकयोर्देहभेदेऽप्येकं प्रतिसंधातारं विषयीकुर्वत्तदतिरिक्तमेव स्थायि-
नमात्मानं विषयीकरोति । तस्य च पूर्वकोटिरहितत्वं, जातस्यास्मिञ्जन्मनि किञ्चिदप्यननुभूतवतः स्तनपानाद्यर्थप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या तज्जातीयेष्टसाधन-
तास्मरणतज्जनकसंस्कारतज्जनकानुभवाश्रयत्वनियमेन ततः पूर्वमपि तथैवा-
भ्युपगमात्पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारस्मरणेच्छादीनामेकाश्रयाणामेकविषयत्वेन कार्य-
कारणसम्बन्धेऽप्युक्तम् । तथा च पारमर्षसूत्रम्—

nature of recognition in the form, 'That I, who noted (my) parents in childhood, in old age am noting great-grandsons', (that perception) not proven otherwise and uncontradicted having for its province the one same continuous perceiver, even though in childhood and old age the body has become different, refers to a permanent Ātman definitely over and above that (body etc.). And it is void of any previous contact (i. e. beginning), on account of the rule of the relation of cause and effect, because there being no other way to explain reasonably the activity towards the purpose, drinking the milk from the breast etc., in his case, when born, having no experience whatsoever in this birth and being invariably the resort of the experience of the remembrance of the desirable means of that type, of the impressions producing that, and of those producing the same, and that same (state of things) being admitted (to exist) even prior to that, and because of the previous experience, impressions, remembrance, desire-etc., having the same resort and referring to the same object. To the same effect is the Sūtra of the great sage —

‘ इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ’

(न्या. सू. १. १. १०)

इति । संघातस्य परार्थत्वाच्च, शय्यासनादेः, हि, अचेतनस्य भोग्यस्य भोक्त्रर्थत्वं दृष्टम् । एवं देहस्यापि भोग्यत्वाविशेषाद्भोक्त्रर्थत्वम् । यश्च भोक्ता सैव स्वयमसंहतः स्वार्थ एव सिद्ध्यति, अन्यथानवस्थानात् । एवं जड-वर्गद्रष्टृत्वेनापि तत्सिद्धिः । एवं च सदेकारणवत्त्वेनोत्तराद्विनाशकारणवत्त्वं तस्य विनाशकारणासंभवाच्च

‘ अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा ’

(बृह. ४. ५. १४)

‘ Desire, hatred, mental effort, pleasure, pain, knowledge — these are the logical mark (to prove the existence) of the Ātman. ’

(Nyā. Sū. I. 1. 10)

As the aggregate of objects is for the sake of another, it is seen that the non-sentient object of enjoyment — the bed, seat etc., is for the sake of the enjoyer. Thus in the case of the body also, it is (intended) for the sake of the enjoyer as it is of no different nature than (other) objects of enjoyment. And he who is the enjoyer, himself keeping apart, is proved to have his own purpose, otherwise he would not be staying there. Similarly his establishment (is proved) also on account of his being the perceiver of the non-sentient class of objects. And such being the case, there is in his case even the absence of the other end (i. e. destruction), owing to his having no prior existing cause and owing to the impossibility of any cause of destruction, and on account of the Śruti-passage

‘ O dear, this Ātman is, verily, imperishable ’ (Brha. IV. 5. 14)

१ Ā ... लिङ्गानि

२ Ā drops स

३ A स स्वयमस्वार्थ

४ A सत्यकारण ...

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च । एवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दैस्तस्य नित्यत्वसिद्धेस्तद्विरोध्य-
नित्यत्वव्याप्यसावयवत्वमध्यमपरिमाणवत्त्वासंभवात्, निरवयवत्वे निश्चिते,
परमाणुः परममहान् वा, इति विशये, सर्वत्र दृष्टकार्यत्वात्परममहानेवेति
निश्चीयते

‘ आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः ’

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च । परमाणुत्वपक्षेऽपि त्रित्वत्वं भवादापाततो न मुमुक्षानु-
पपत्तिः, विचारनिष्कर्षे तु परममहद्ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वरूपमोक्षासिद्ध्या तदनुपपत्तिं
वक्ष्यामः ।

and others. Thus, on account of that (Ātman) being proved to have a permanent nature by (the means of proof). Direct perception, Inference and Word, and on account of the impossibility of his being possessed of the nature of having parts and middle dimension, being pervaded by the non-eternal nature opposed to that — when it is concluded that Ātman is without parts, there being the doubt whether (the Ātman) is atomic or of the highest dimension, it is concluded that he is of the highest dimension, on account of his activity being seen everywhere and on account of the Śruti-passage such as

‘ Like Ākāśa, all-pervading and eternal ’.

Even according to the view of his being atomic, prima facie, though the desire for salvation can be regarded as reasonable owing to the possibility of his possession of the eternal nature, still, as a result of serious pondering, we shall state its unreasonableness (impossibility) on account of the non-establishment of salvation as having the nature of not being different from Brahman of the highest dimension.

[७] तदेवं सर्वास्तिकसाधारण्येन देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्ते भोक्तरि बन्धमोक्षभागिनि नित्ये सिद्धे, तस्य बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्म-भावनारूपां नवविशेषगुणान् मनःसंयोगजन्यान् मन्यन्ते वैशेषिक-तार्किक-प्राभाकराः । नवविशेषगुणोदय एव तस्य संसारः, युगपद्विवृत्तिश्च मोक्षः, इति । तथा च पारमर्षस्त्रयम्—

‘ दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावादपवर्गः । ’

(न्या. सू. १. १. २)

इति । तस्मादात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेरविनाशित्वात्परमपुमर्थत्वाच्चात्र विवेकिनां कामनोपपद्यते, इति ।

[7] Thus then, in common with all orthodox systems, the Enjoyer, apart from the body and the sense-organs sharing in Bondage and Salvation, being established as eternal, the Vaiśeṣikas, the followers of Nyāya and the followers of Prabhākara (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) attribute to him nine particular qualities, — cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, activity, merit, demerit, Bhāvanā (mental impression) — as being produced by the contact with the mind. The rise of the nine particular qualities in him is Saṁsāra, and salvation is the simultaneous destruction (of them). To the same effect is the Sūtra of the great sage —

‘ On the passing away in succession of pain, birth, activity, blemish, false knowledge, there is the salvation due to their absolute absence. ’

(Nyā. Sū. I. 1. 2)

Therefore, owing to the absolute cessation of pain, owing to its imperishable nature, owing to its denoting the highest human purpose, reasonably enough is produced the desire for this here in the case of the discriminating persons —

मैवम्—स्वाभाविकधर्माणां धर्मिणि सति, इत्युच्छेदासंभवाद् घटे सति तद्रतयावद्रिशेषगुणनिवृत्त्यदर्शनात् । तथा चोक्तं वार्तिके—

‘ आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्मा काङ्क्षीस्तर्हि मुक्तताम् ।

न हि स्वभावो भावानां व्यावर्तेतौष्ण्यवद्भवेः ॥ ’

(बृह. वा. का. ५५-५६)

इति । तथा च धर्मिणा सहैव तेषां निवृत्तिरङ्गीकरणीया, इति वक्तव्येनात्म्यवादप्रसङ्गः । तदुक्तं ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारैः—

‘ विज्ञानादिविशेषगुणनिवृत्तिलक्षणा च मुक्तिरुच्छेदपक्षान्न भिद्यते । न

(The Siddhāntin replies) — (Do) not (say) so, owing to the impossibility of destruction of the natural qualities, when the entity possessing the qualities is in existence, as when the jar is there, it is not perceived that there is the absence (or, turning away) of the entire particular (or, special) qualities in it. To the same effect has been stated in the Vārtika —

‘ If the Ātman has the nature of the doer etc., then expect not (his) release from that; for, not indeed does the nature of entities turn away, like heat from the Sun.”

(Bṛha. Vā. Kā. 55-56)

Consequently, the turning away of them (the special qualities), verily, along with the entity itself possessing the qualities has to be admitted — which would bring forth the (undesirable) contingency of (accepting) the theory of Ātman-less-ness spoken of before. That is spoken of by the revered author of *Brahmasiddhi* —

‘ Salvation having the characteristic of the turning away of the special quality, Vijnāna etc., is not different from the theory of extinction. Not indeed is the total

हि सतोऽप्यात्यन्तिको दर्शनाभावोऽभावाद्विशिष्यते, कश्च सर्वतः
प्रेयसः आत्मनोऽभावमभिकाङ्क्षेत्, इति, अपुरुषार्थो मोक्षः स्याद् '

(ब्र. सि. ब्र. का.)

इति । सर्वविशेषगुणनिवृत्तिविशिष्टे चात्मनि प्रमाणाभावात्, अज्ञाय-
मानस्य दुःखाभावस्यापुमर्थत्वाच्चान्धकारप्रनृत्तवदसल्लक्षणत्वव्याप्तिः । अ-
ज्ञायमानस्यापि स्वरूपेण पुमर्थत्वमित्यपि न, मानाभावेन तत्स्वरूपस्यै-
वासिद्धेरुक्तत्वात्, तत्प्रमाणत्वाभिमतानामनुमानानामाभासत्वात् ।

‘ अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः । ’

(छा. ८. १२. १)

absence of perception in the case of an entity although exist-
ing, different from negation; and who indeed would be
hankering after the absence of the Ātman dear (to him) in
all respects? — thus salvation would be serving no human
purpose. ’
(Bra. Si. Bra. Kā.)

Because there is the absence of any means of proof in
regard to the Ātman characterised by the turning away of
all special qualities, and because the absence of pain not
known, serves no human purpose, there is the invariable
concomitance with the non-existing nature, like dancing in
darkness. (Even if it is argued that) there would be the
human purpose served in the case of something not known by
its very nature, (the answer is) — No; the non-establish-
ment of its own nature on account of the absence of means of
proof has been (already) stated, on account of the inferences
taken as favouring the existence of means of proof in their
case being mere fallacies. If it be said that the Śruti itself,

‘ The agreeable and the disagreeable, verily, touch not
him without a body ’,
(Chā. VIII. 12. 1)

इति श्रुतिरेव तत्र मानमिति चेत्, न । जीवतोऽपि देहाभिमानरहितस्य सुखदुःखसंबन्धाभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्तस्याः, नवविशेषगुणरहितावस्थाविशेष-
प्रमाणकत्वाभावात्, तत्प्रतिपादकपदाभावाच्च । किं च, दुःखध्वंसस्य न
पुरुषार्थत्वम्, पुनर्दुःखान्तरोत्पादसंभवात्, इदानीन्तनदुःखध्वंसवत् ।

[८] अथ दुःखप्रागभावस्य दुःखकारणत्वात्, तन्निवृत्तौ दुःखान्त-
समुत्पादः, इति मतम्, तत्, न । कियतां प्रागभावानां निवृत्तावप्यन्येषां
सद्भावसंभवात्, सर्वेषामेकदा निवृत्तौ मानाभावात्, प्रागभावनिवृत्तेः पुरुष-
व्यापारासाध्यतया तदर्थं पञ्चाध्यायीप्रभृतिशास्त्राभ्यासश्रवणमनननिदि-

is the proof, (the reply is)—No. Because that (Śruti pass-
age) is concerned with postulating the absence of connec-
tion with pleasure and pain in the case of one bereft of
egoism about the body although he is living, and there
is the absence of anything to measure the special state
bereft of the nine particular qualities, and also the absence
of any word postulating that. And further, the destruction
of pain cannot be the human purpose, owing to the possibi-
lity of the rise of another pain again, like the destruction of
pain obtaining at the present moment.

[8] Now, if the idea is favoured viz. as the antecedent
negation of pain is the cause of pain; when that is removed
there would be the non-production of another pain — (our
reply is) — No. Even if some antecedent negations be re-
moved, there would be the possibility of the existence of
others owing to the absence of any proof regarding the
removal of all (antecedent negations) once for all; owing
to the removal of antecedent negation not being capable of
being accomplished by human effort, there the continuous
study of the Śāstras such as *Pañcālhyāyī* and others, and

ध्यासादिप्रयासानां निष्फलत्वापत्तेः, दुःखोत्पत्त्यर्थमेव प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च ।
परमपुमर्थभूतसर्वप्रकारसुखनिवृत्तित्वेन द्वेषस्यैवात्रोचितत्वात्, को हि सर्व-
प्रकारसुखपरिहारेण शुष्ककाष्ठवदवस्थातुमिच्छेत् ?

[९] यत्तु न्यायभाष्यकृतोक्तम्

‘ शान्तः खल्वयं सर्वविप्रयोगः सर्वोपरमोऽपवर्गः बह्वत्र कृच्छ्रं
घोरं पापकं लुप्यते, इति कश्चै बुद्धिमान् सर्वदुःखोच्छेदं सर्वदुःखा-
संविदमपवर्गं न रोचयेत् ? इति । तद्यथा—मधुविषसंपृक्तान्नमना-
देयम्, इति, एवं सुखं दुःखानुषक्तमनादेयम् । ’

(न्या. भा. १. १. २)

efforts for that (as involved in) hearing, thinking, medita-
tion etc., are bound to result in being fruitless, and further
there would be the undesirable contingency of activity
being meant for the purpose of production of pain itself.
Actually the feeling of hatred itself being proper here on
account of the removal of every kind of pleasure, which is
the highest human purpose, who possibly would desire to
remain like a dry piece of wood, by the removal of every
kind of pleasure ?

[9] As to what has been said by the author of the
Nyāya-bhāṣya

‘ Tranquil, verily, is this Salvation—the detachment
from all, the cessation of all. A lot of difficult, terrible
sin is wiped off in it—what talented person would not
like this Salvation, —the uprooting of all pain and the
non-cognition of all pain ? It is like this—as food mixed
up with honey and poison should not be taken, so pleasure
mixed up with pain is unacceptable. ’

(Nyā. Bhā. I. 1. 2)

इति, तत्, न— दुःखाभावस्यापि सुखशेषत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वात्, स्वतन्त्रपुरुषार्थ-
द्वयकल्पने मानाभावात्, सुखकाले दुःखाभावस्य नियतत्वात्, दुःखाभाव-
काले च सुषुप्तिप्रलयादौ सुखस्याप्यभावात्, न सुखस्य दुःखाभावार्थत्वेन
पुमर्थत्वसंभावना, व्यभिचारात् । अधिकसुखेच्छया तल्पसुखोपेक्षा युज्यते,
न तु केवलदुःखाभावाय, इति प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिणां पन्थाः ।

[१०] अस्तु तर्हि नित्यसुखामिव्यक्तिः, इति भट्टाचार्यमतम्,
तत्र पूर्वोक्तदूषणासंभवात् । न, विकल्पासहत्वात्—तन्नित्यं सुखं, आत्मनो
भिन्नं, अभिन्नं वा । आद्येऽपि जन्यं, अजन्यं वा । तत्राद्ये, जन्यस्य क्षयित्व-

— (Our reply is) — That is not (so). On account of the
absence of any proof for postulating two independent human
purposes of life, as even the negation of pain, being sub-
ordinated to pleasure, is a human purpose of life, on account
of the negation of pain being there as a rule at the time
of (experiencing) pleasure, and on account of the absence
even of pleasure in the states of deep sleep, Dissolution etc.,
at the time of the absence of pain, there cannot be
the conception of pleasure as the human purpose of life,
as conveying the negation of pain, owing to the violation
(of the concomitance between ' Sukha ' and ' Duḥkhā-
bhāva '). However, indifference towards pleasure in a
small measure is proper with a desire for more pleasure, but
not merely for the sake of negation of pain — this is the
way of (argument of) those who act after proper scrutiny.

[10] Well then, let (Salvation) be the manifestation
of permanent pleasure,—the view of Bhaṭṭācārya (Kumārila),
on account of the impossibility there of the blemishes
spoken of before. (Our reply is)—No ; because that would
not allow any alternatives — is that permanent pleasure
different from Ātman or not different? And in respect of

नियमेन कथं, अक्षयपुमर्थकामनाविषयता ? ब्रह्मलोकान्तसुखवितृष्णो हि मुमुक्षुरुच्यते, तद्वैतृष्ण्यं च जन्यत्वेन क्षयित्वादेव । अन्त्येऽपि पक्षे, तस्य ज्ञापकं वाच्यम्, स्वप्नकाशत्वासंभवात्, अनभ्युपगमाच्च । मोक्षे च ज्ञान-करणमनःसंयोगाद्यभावात्, असंवेद्यत्वेन तदेवापुमर्थत्वमायातम् । न ह्यसं-वेद्यसुखस्य पुमर्थत्वमस्ति, परसुखस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । इन्द्रियाद्यभ्युपगमे च संसारावस्थातो न विशेषः, संसारावस्थायां च तस्य भाने हेतुर्वाच्यः । कस्यचिदावरणस्याभ्युपगमे च तस्य सत्त्वासत्त्वमिन्नत्वादिरूपेण विचारासह-

even the first, is it produced or not produced ? Apropos the first, as what is produced is as a rule perishable, how could it be the object of desire for the imperishable human purpose of life ? For, one desirous of salvation is spoken of as one having no longing for the pleasure ending in the Brahmaloка ; and that absence of longing (arises), verily, because of its being perishable, on account of its being produced. Apropos even the last view, some agency for making it known should be stated, on account of the impossibility of its being self-illuminating and on account of this not being admitted. Further, there being the absence of the connection between the mind and the organs of knowledge in salvation, that same viz. not being the human purpose in life, would be the (undesirable) result on account of its not being comprehended. For, pleasure not capable of being comprehended cannot be the human purpose in life ; otherwise, the pleasure of another also would have perforce to be (treated) like that. If the sense-organs etc., are admitted (to function in salvation), there would be no distinction from the state of worldly existence and further in that case you will have to state (some) cause for its comprehension in the Samsāra-state. If some enveloping factor be admitted, there would be the undesirable contingency (from your point of view) of the admission of the

त्वात्, अनिर्वचनीयमायाभ्युपगमत्वं प्रसङ्गः, तथा च सर्वं ब्रह्मवादिमतमङ्गीकृतं स्यात् । अत एवात्मानिर्भन्नं तत्सुखम्, इति परास्तम्, आत्मरूपस्य सर्वदा, अनावृतत्वेन तदभिन्नसुखस्य संसारावस्थायां, अपि भानप्रसङ्गात् । अनया चानुपपत्त्या नव्यमीमांसकैः केवलदुःखाभाव एव परिगृहीतः । स च निराकृत एव, आत्मनि वृत्तिमन्तरेण तदाश्रितदुःखनिवृत्त्ययोगात्, भाट्टैः कार्यकारणयोस्तादात्म्याभ्युपगमात्, समवायकारणनिवृत्त्यैव लोके कार्यनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च ।

[११] अस्तु तर्हि सांख्ययोगमतम् । तत्र हि, असङ्गस्यात्मनो

indescribable Māyā, on account of the impossibility of pondering, with its nature being different from existence and non-existence; but in that case you would be admitting the entire view-point of the Brahmvādins. For this very reason, (the view) that pleasure is not different from Ātman is dismissed, because the form of Ātman being always uncovered, the pleasure not different from it would perforce be comprehended, (an undesirable contingency), even in the state of Samsāra. On account of this very impropriety, the Neo-Mīmāṃsakas have admitted merely the negation of pain. But that stands, verily, dismissed; because without activity in the Ātman, there would not be any chance of the removal of pain, resorting to him, on account of the followers of Bhatta having admitted the identity of cause and effect, and on account of the removal of the effect being seen in the world by the removal of the material cause itself.

[11] Well then, (let us) accept the view of the followers of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. For, there on account of Ātman, who is without any attachment, being bereft of

निर्विशेषत्वात्, दुःखस्य बुद्धिधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमात्, दुःखसमवायिकारणध्वंस-
हेतुकदुःखनिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमेऽपि नात्मन उच्छेदसंभावना । स्वप्रकाशत्वाच्च
नान्धकारप्रवृत्तितुल्यता । न, अस्मिन्नपि पक्षे सतो दुःखस्य निरोधासंभवात्,
असतो निरोधस्य च उत्पत्त्यसंभवात्,

‘ नासतो विद्यते भावो नामावो विद्यते सतः ’ (गीता २।१६)

इति स्मृतेः । संसारान्मोक्षस्याणुमात्रेणापि विशेषानुपपत्तेः, अगुरुष्वर्थत्वं
तुल्यमेव । वरं वैशेषिकादिमते, असतोऽपि दुःखस्य निरोधः संभवति,

any particularity, and the admission of pain being the quality of *Buddhi*, there is no possibility of the extinction of the *Ātman* even though it is admitted that the removal of pain has for its cause the destruction of the constituent cause of pain. And on account of (the *Ātman* himself) being self-illuminating there cannot be any comparison with the dancing in darkness—(Our reply is)—No. Apropos even this view there is the impossibility of destruction of pain having the *sat*-nature, and the impossibility of the origination of the destruction having the *asat*-nature, on account of the *Smṛti*-passage

‘ There cannot be the existence of what is *asat*, nor is there the non-existence of what is *sat*. ’

(*Gītā* II. 16)

On account of the impossibility of any distinction of the slightest degree in the case of salvation from *Samsāra*—its not being the human purpose in life remains there equally. It is better (to admit) that according to the *Vaiśeṣika* view, the destruction of pain even though not existing is possible, and the origination of the non-existing

१ *Ā* प्रवृत्त्य २ *Ā* असतोऽपि निरोधस्त्वोक्त ...

३ *Ā* वैशेषिकादि मतं तन्मते ...

असतश्च निरोधस्योत्पत्तिः संभवति । तदपेक्षयापि तुच्छ एवायं सत्कार्य-
वादपक्षः । सत्त्वेऽप्याविर्भावतिरोभावौ संभवतः, इति चेत्, न, तयोरपि
सत्त्वाविशेषात् । तत्राप्यन्यकल्पने, अनवस्था मूलक्षतिकरी । तयोः सदस-
द्विलक्षणत्वाङ्गीकारे च, अनिर्वचनीयत्वाभ्युपगमात् ब्रह्मवादिमतापत्तिः ।
तस्मादस्मिन्पक्षे नितरां नोपपद्यते मोक्षः ।

[१२] सर्वस्मिंश्च मते मोक्षस्यागन्तुकत्वाभ्युपगमे भावत्वे, अभावत्वे
वा, जन्यत्वेन अवश्यं विनाशित्वम्, जन्यत्वमात्रस्यैव लाघवेन विनाशित्व-

destruction is possible.— As compared to that view, this doctrine of the effect being always sat (*satkāryavāda*) is absolutely without any substance. If it be argued that appearance and disappearance can exist even in an existing nature, (our reply is)—No; even those two are not distinct from the existing nature. If some other thing is imagined even there, there would be (the fault of) Endlessness, which strikes at the very root (of the doctrine). On the other hand, if the two are admitted to be possessed of the characteristic of being different from sat and asat, that would be (tantamount to) the acceptance of indescribable nature for them; so, there would be the undesirable contingency (from your point of view) of accepting the view of the Brahmarādins. Therefore, salvation is quite impossible according to this view.

[12] According to all these views, salvation being admitted to be an adventitious thing—whether it is possessed of a positive nature or a negative nature, there is bound to be the perishable nature on account of its being something produced, because merely being something produced becomes straight away the cause of perishable nature.

प्रयोजकत्वात् । प्रतियोगिनिष्ठस्य कस्यचिदतिशयस्य भावरूपस्यैव विना-
शिनो ध्वंसत्वाभ्युपगमात्, अधिकरणातिरिक्ताभावानभ्युपगमाद्वा, न ध्वंसे
व्यभिचारः । घटो ध्वस्तः, इति प्रतीतेः, ध्वंसाश्रयत्वेन वा तत्प्रतियोगित्वा-
श्रयत्वेन वा, घटविषयीकरणत्वात्, तस्मिन्काले घटासत्त्वे च निराश्रयधर्म-
प्रतीययोगात् । घटस्य ध्वंसः, इति षष्ठ्यर्थसंबन्धस्य राहोः शिरः, इतिवत्,
इष्टत्वात्, न तार्किकाभ्युपगता निष्प्रतियोगिकध्वंससिद्धिः । घटस्य ध्वंस-
कालेऽपि सत्त्वे पूर्ववत् प्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात्, इति चेत्, न । प्रत्यक्षत्वमन्तरे-
णापि कुड्यादिव्यवहितस्य सत्ताङ्गीकारात्, प्रत्यक्षत्वाव्याप्येन सत्त्वेन

Whether is admitted the destruction of some peculiar special feature residing in the counter-entity which is perishable and possessed of a positive nature itself, or whether a non-entity over and above the basic resort is not admitted,—nothing can come in the way of destruction. Because the apprehension—The jar is destroyed—whether as resorting to the destruction or as resorting to the nature of its counter-entity, it involves the jar as the object of knowledge, because at that time, the jar being not in existence there cannot be any apprehension of a quality without any resort. As regards (the statement) ‘ the destruction of the jar ’ relating to the meaning of the genitive, — that is welcome to us like the statement, the head of Rāhu (who was headless), and thus there cannot be the establishment of the destruction without any reference to the counter-entity as admitted by the Logicians. If it be argued that even at the time of the destruction, there would be the perception of the jar as before, on account of its existent nature, — (our reply is)—No. Because even without direct perception, the existence of something screened by

तदापादनायोगात्, व्यवधानानां च फलैकोभेयत्वात्, कुड्यादिविलक्षण-
व्यवधानं ध्वंसान्यथानुपपत्तिरेव गमयति, इति न दोषः । न चैवं सति
सत्कार्यवादोक्तदोषापत्तिः, सदसद्विलक्षणत्वाम्युपगमेन, उभयपक्षोक्तदोष-
परिहारात् । विस्तरेण चैतदुपपादयिष्यामः ।

तथा च, आत्मनो दुःखाभावो नाम कश्चित्, अतिशयो गुणाधानलक्षणो
मलक्षालनलक्षणो वा वक्तव्यः । उभयथापि तस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वम्, उत्पत्ति-
आप्ति-विकृति-संस्कृति-लक्षणानां चतुर्णामपि क्रियाफलानां विनाशित-
the fencing etc., is taken for granted; because that cannot
be obtained through the existent nature not in invariable
concomitance with direct perception, and the screening
objects can be inferred only by the result thereof, the
impossibility otherwise of the destruction alone causes the
screening things of a different nature like fencing etc. to be
comprehended—so, there is no blemish (on our side). (You
cannot argue that) if that is the case, then there would be
the undesirable result of the blemishes being there spoken
of in connection with the satkāryavāda, on account of the
removal of the blemishes stated by both the parties by the
admission of the unique state of being neither sat nor asat.
We shall propound this further in detail.

And further likewise, apropos some particular distinc-
tion called the absence of pain in the case of the Ātman—
you have to state whether it is characterised by the addi-
tion of good qualities, or characterised by the wiping away
of the blemishes. According to even both of these views
there (would result) its impermanent nature surely, because
even the four-fold results of action characterised by origina-
tion, attainment, transformation and polish are as a rule
possessed of a perishable nature and the imperishable nature

नियमात्, मोक्षस्य सर्ववादिभिरविनाशित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तदुक्तं वार्तिक-
कारैः —

‘ उत्पत्तिराप्तिर्विकृतिः संस्कृतिश्च क्रियाफलम् ।

मुक्तिर्विलक्षणैतेभ्यस्तेनेहानर्थको विधिः ॥

(बृह. वा. का. २३६)

इति । भाष्यकारैश्च महता प्रबन्धेन प्रतिपादितमेतत् समन्वयाधिकरणे ।

[१३] अत एव, एकदेशिमतानामप्यनवकाशः, भेदाभेदपक्षस्य
सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात्, पारमार्थिकभेदस्य निवृत्त्ययोगाच्च । किं वा तस्य
निवर्तकम् ? तत्त्वज्ञानं इति चेत्, तत् किं भिन्नाभिन्नविषयम्, अभिन्नमात्र-

of salvation is admitted by all the disputants. To the same effect has been stated by the venerable author of the Vārtika —

‘ Origination, attainment, transformation and polish—
that is the result of action. Salvation is different from
these. Therefore, injunction serves no purpose here. ’

(Br̥ha. Vā. Kā. 256)

And by the venerable commentator (Śaṅkara) has this been propounded in great detail in the topic Samanvaya (harmonising).

[13] For this very reason, there is no scope for the view of those who partially agree (with the above), on account of difference-cum-non-difference being opposed to all means of proof, and on account of real difference not admitting removal. What, again, can be its remover ? If you say (it is) the knowledge of Reality, (we further ask)— Does that refer to the different and the non-different, or does it refer only to the non-different ? In respect of the first (alter-

विषयं वा ? आद्ये, न तस्य भेदनिवर्तकत्वं संभवति, ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयनिवर्तकत्वायोगात् । द्वितीये, ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वेन कल्पितत्वप्रसङ्गः, कल्पितस्यैव ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वनियमात् । पुरुषोत्तमदर्शनादिना पापादिनिवृत्तौ व्यभिचारः, इति चेत्, न । तत्र विहितक्रियाविशेषत्वेनैव पापादिनिवर्तकत्वात् । इह च ज्ञानत्वस्य निवर्तकत्वावच्छेदकत्वेनैव विवक्षितत्वात्, स्वप्नगन्धर्वनगरशुक्ति-रजतादौ तथा दर्शनात् । तदुक्तं पञ्चपादिकाकृद्भिः

‘ यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् । ’ (पञ्च.)

इति । अज्ञानस्य च विश्वभ्रमोपादानत्वेन, अद्वितीयचैतन्ये कल्पितत्वं

native), that cannot possibly be the remover of difference because knowledge cannot be associated with the nature of the remover in respect of its own object. In the case of the second (alternative), the difference being removable by the knowledge, it will have to be admitted as being imaginary, because as a rule only an imaginary thing is removable by knowledge. If it is argued that there is violation (of the above rule) in the removal of sin etc. by the sight of Puruṣottama, (our reply is)—No. For, there exists the nature of the remover of sin etc. by the very distinctive prescribed rite. Here, on the other hand, the nature of knowledge is definitely intended as being restricted to the remover-nature, because that is seen in respect of dream, the Gandharva-city, conch-shell and silver, etc. As has been said by the venerable author of *Pañcapādikā* —

‘ Because the knowledge is the remover of non-know-
ledge ’. (*Pañca.*)

We shall describe further on, the Ajñāna as being superimposed on the Sentient without a second, on account of its being the constituent cause of the world-illusion. When

वक्ष्यामः । अभिन्नभात्रस्य वेदप्रमेयत्वे भेदांशस्य कथं शास्त्रीयत्वम् ? भिन्नाभिन्नस्य वेदप्रमेयत्वे मोक्षदशायाप्ये तथैव स्यात्, भिन्नभात्रे प्रमाणाभावात्, इत्थलं मृतमारणेन ।

ज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिः कर्मणा भेदनिवृत्तिः, इत्यपि तुच्छम्, भेदाभेदवादिनते मिथ्याज्ञानत्वस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् । भेदाभेदेन सर्वत्रैव सर्व-प्रमासंभवात् । कर्मणां च न कुत्रापि भेदनिवर्तकत्वं दृष्टं न वा श्रुतम् । कर्मजन्यस्य चानित्यत्वमवोचाम ।

‘ न स पुनरावर्तते ’ (निरा. ३३; ना. प. ९.२२; का. रुद्रो.)

only the non-different (knowledge of Reality) is the thing to be known from the Vedas, how can the difference-portion be in accordance with the Śāstras ? If different as well as non-different (knowledge of Reality) is the thing to be known from the Vedas, it would be exactly the same even in the state of salvation, on account of there being no means of proof regarding that as different — enough of this killing a dead person !

The removal of the false knowledge is due to Jñāna, the removal of difference is due to Karman, — this (argument) also is extremely flimsy, on account of the nature of the false knowledge being difficult to point out according to the view of those who advocate the ‘ difference-cum-non-difference ’ view, (and) on account of the possibility of every kind of apprehension everywhere indeed, by (resorting to the view of) Bhedābheda. And regarding the Karmans, nowhere indeed is seen or heard their nature as the remover of difference. And we have already spoken of the impermanent nature of what is produced by Karman. If it is argued that inference about returning again is contradicted by the Śruti-passage

‘ He does not return again ’ (Nirā. XXXIII; Nā. Pa. IX. 22, Kā. Ru.)

इति श्रुत्या पुनरावृत्त्यनुमानं बाध्यते, इति चेत्—न, विरोधाभावात् । न हि यदा ब्रह्मलोकं प्राप्नोति तदैव पुनरावर्तते, इति वयं ब्रूमः । श्रुतिश्च नावर्तते, इति वर्तमानकालेऽनावृत्तिं दर्शयति । नावर्तिष्यते, इति तु कल्पना कृत-
कत्वेन विनाशित्वानुमानविरुद्धा, इति ब्रूमः । उपासनाविधेः स्तुतिपरत्वात्
च नास्य प्रमाणान्तरबाधकत्वम् , श्रुतिश्च

‘ तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते ’

(छां. ८. १. ६)

इति केवलकर्मजन्यत्वात्, च । ज्ञानकर्मजन्यत्वे कोऽपि न विशेषः । अश-
नायाद्यतीतात्मज्ञानस्य सर्वकर्मविरोधित्वात्, च न समुच्चयावकाशः । नि-

(our answer is) — No, on account of the absence of contra-
diction. We say (in this connection) it is not that when
one reaches the Brahmaloка, he returns again at the very
time. Further, the Śruti-passage — does not return — points
out to non-return obtaining at the present time. We say
that the idea (that this means) would not be returning, is
opposed to the inference about its perishable nature,
because it is artificial. The injunction about the worship
being laudatory, no other means of proof contradicts this,
and there is the Śruti-passage

‘ Just as the world secured by Karman perishes, in the
same way, verily, hereafter the world secured by merit
perishes. ’
(Chā. VIII. 1. 6)

And on account of being produced by mere Karman only,
there is no difference if (it is regarded as) produced by
Jñāna and Karman. There is no scope for (such a) combi-
nation on account of the Jñāna of the Ātman being beyond
hunger etc. and on account of its being opposed to all
Karman. And the attainment of Brahman free from all
changes and states — all this would become unreasonable,
on account of there being no means of proof, on account of

विकारावस्थब्रह्मप्राप्त्यादिकं च सर्वमनुपपन्नम् प्रमाणशून्यत्वात्, अद्वैतश्रुति-
विरोधात्, उक्तदूषणगणप्राप्तात्, च— इत्यास्तां तद्वत् ।

[१४] सौगताद्युक्तसाधनाभासानां च, अप्रामाणिकत्वेनैव न मोक्ष-
साधनत्वसंभावनापि । तथाहि— स्वलक्षणभावना क्षणिकभावना दुःखभावना
शून्यभावना च, इति भावनचतुष्टयं मोक्षहेतुः, इत्यत्र न किञ्चिदपि
मानमस्ति

‘ तमेव विदित्वा, अतिमृत्युमेति ’

(वा. सं. ३१.१८; श्वेता. ३.८, ६. १५)

इत्यागमविरोधश्च, सौगतागमस्य च पौरुषेयस्य मूलप्रमाणशून्यत्वेनाप्रमाण-

the contradiction with the Śruti-passages advocating non-
duality and on account of its being steeped in the host of
blemishes spoken of— let this stand over for the matter
of that.

[14] In the case of the apparent means spoken of in
the Buddhist and other (systems), there is not even the
possibility of their being the means of salvation, on account
of their very nature, not supported by means of proof. To
explain the same — There is not the slightest proof (about
the contention) here viz. the four Bhāvanās — the Bhāvanā
in respect of the individual, the Bhāvanā about the moment-
ariness, the Bhāvanā about pain, the Bhāvanā about the
void — are the cause of salvation; and there is also the
contradiction of the Scriptural passage such as

‘ Having, verily, known that (Ātman), one goes beyond
death ’ (Vā. Sa. XXXI. 18; Śvetā. III. 8, VI. 15)

and further on account of the Buddhistic Scriptures being
composed by human agency, being unauthoritative as they

त्वात्, नामजात्यादियोजनासहितेषु स्थिरेषु सुखसाधनेषु सदात्मकेषु स्व-
लक्षणादिभावनानां विभ्रममात्रत्वात्, च । यथा चैतत्तथा वक्ष्यामः ।

अत एव, आर्हतशास्त्रस्य, अग्रमाणत्वात्, तदुक्तसाधनानादेयत्वमेव ।

[१५] एवं षट्पदार्थज्ञानस्य षोडशपदार्थज्ञानस्य वा हेतुत्वे न
किञ्चिन्मानमस्ति, अलौकिकफलसाधनताया आगमैकवेद्यत्वात् । न च
कणादादिमहर्षिवाक्यमेव सन्वादिवाक्यवत्, अत्र प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम् ।
युक्तिशास्त्रत्वेनागमविधया प्रामाण्याभावात् । अन्यथा प्रतिज्ञामात्रेणैव

are wanting in the basic means of proof; and on account of
the Bhāvanās about the individual etc. being just illusion as
regarding the permanent means of happiness, constituting
the sat-nature, associated with the paraphernalia of name,
genus etc. How it is so, we shall describe (later on).

For this very reason, the Ārhatā-Śāstra (Jaina-Śāstra)
being unauthoritative, the means mentioned there are indeed
not fit for acceptance.

[15] Thus, there is not the slightest proof to regard
the knowledge of the six categories or the knowledge of
the sixteen types, as the cause (of salvation), on account
of the nature of the means for (securing) the non-mundane
fruit being fit to be known only from the Scriptures. Nor
should it be said that the statements themselves of the
great sages Kaṇāda and others are the authority here like
the statements of Manu and others, on account of there
being no authoritative nature in them in accordance with
the statement in the Scriptures, on the strength of logical
reasoning. Otherwise, if an entity is established merely
by an authoritative statement, nobody would be taking

वस्तुसिद्धेः, उद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षादिप्रयासो न स्यात् ।

‘य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्त्यथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्ति’

(कठो. ६. ९, १३. ४. १७; श्वेता. ३. १०)

‘मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेन पश्यति’

(कठो. ४. १०; बृह. ४. ४. १९; आ. प्र. १)

इत्यादिश्रुतिबाधितत्वाच्च । क्रीडशं च पदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानं मोक्षहेतुः, सामान्याकारेण वा, विशेषाकारेण वा ? आद्ये, प्रमेयत्वादिरूपेण सर्वेषामस्त्येव तज्ज्ञानम् । द्वितीये तु, सर्वेषां पदार्थानां तेन रूपेण ज्ञानं ब्रह्मणोऽप्यशक्यमनन्तत्वात् । द्रव्यत्वादिना ज्ञानं कारणमिति चेत्, तर्हि तद्विभागवचनादेव तल्लाभात्, पृथिवीत्वादिरूपेण तद्व्युत्पादनं व्यर्थम् । यथा

the trouble about enumeration, definition, examination etc. And further, this is opposed to the Śruti-passages such as

‘Those who know this, they become immortal -- and others get sunk into pain alone.’ (Kātho. VI. 9, XIII. 4. 17; Svetā. III. 10)

‘From death to death he goes, who perceives here as though manifold.’ (Kātho. IV. 10; Br̥ha. IV. 4. 19; Ā. Pra. 1)

Of what nature, again, is the real knowledge of entity as the cause of salvation — is it in its general form, or in a particular form? Apropos the first (alternative), there does exist that knowledge in the form of being the object of knowledge etc., in the case of all. Apropos the second (alternative), the knowledge of all entities in their different forms is impossible even in the case of Brahmadeva, because they are infinite. If it be argued that the knowledge as characterised by the nature of the substance etc., is the cause, then that is secured by the statement of that division alone. Its exposition in the form of the nature of earth etc., is useless. How there is the unauthoritative

चे, अप्रामाणिकत्वमनयोः पक्षयोस्तथा विशिष्य वक्ष्यामः ।

[१६] ऐक्यविक्रयपक्षनिराकरणं निराकर्तुं पामापादयति । केवलं निर्युक्तिकत्वात्, इत्युपेक्षते ।

[१७] एवं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकेऽपि विकल्पनीयम् । तत्रापि सामान्याकारज्ञानस्यातिसुलभत्वात्, विशेषाकारेण चाशक्यत्वात्, तुल्यैवानुपपत्तिः । आत्ममात्रज्ञानं कारणम्, इति चेत्, तत्र तार्किकादिपक्षे 'जानामि' इति, आत्मज्ञानं वर्तत एव सार्वजनीनम् । न चास्य परोक्षत्वं भ्रान्तित्वं वा शक्यं वक्तुम् । एतस्य, अपरोक्षप्रमात्वेऽपि मिथ्याज्ञानवासनावशीकृतत्वात्, न

nature of these two, we shall explain in a special (detailed) manner (later on).

[16] The refutation of the doctrine of those who believe only in one life, only brings on a sense of shame for one who refutes ! It is ignored, being just completely void of reasoning !

[17] Thus also would be the process of thought (or the alternatives) in respect of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Therein also, knowledge in a general form is extremely easy to have, but on account of the impossibility of (having it) in a particularised form, there is the same kind of impropriety (as in the other systems criticised above). If it be argued that the comprehension of only the Ātman would be the cause (the reply is)—There, according to the view of the Logicians, does exist the knowledge of the Ātman, viz. 'I know', which is a public experience. It is not possible to speak of (or dub) it as being non-perception or illusion. (If it is argued) even though it be regarded as Direct right comprehension, there can not be the power to remove the false knowledge, owing to its being under the control of the Vāsanā and

मिथ्याज्ञाननिवर्तकता, किन्तु पदार्थतत्त्वविवेकोत्तरकालीनश्रवणादिपरिपाक-
जनितज्ञानान्तरस्यैव सवासनमिथ्याज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वम्, इति चेत् - न ।
आत्मापरोक्षप्रमात्वेन वासनानिवर्तकत्वाभावः, तत्रापि समानः, तन्निष्ठ-
वैजात्ये न च किञ्चिन्मानं पश्यामः ।

[१८] प्राभाकराणां तु भ्रान्तित्वानभ्युपगमात्, तत्त्वज्ञानस्य
क्षोपयोगः ?

‘ क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि ’ (मुण्ड. २. २. ८)

इति श्रुतेः कर्मक्षय एव ज्ञानेन क्रियते, इति चेत्, न तर्हि, आत्मतत्त्व-
ज्ञानस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात्, कुतो न कर्मक्षयः ? त्वया तु गुणगतजाते-

false knowledge ; but it is another knowledge, produced as a
mature result of hearing etc., at a period subsequent to the
discrimination about the real nature of the entity, which
alone is the remover of the false knowledge along with the
Vāsanā — (our reply is) — No. There too is common the
absence of being the remover of Vāsanā on the part of the
direct knowledge of Ātman ; we cannot see even any slight
proof (to postulate) about any different state of things
associated with it.

[18] As for the followers of Prabhākara, where can be
the use of the knowledge of Reality (to them) on account
of their not admitting any illusory nature ? If it be said
that the destruction of Karman itself is effected by know-
ledge on the strength of the Śruti-passage —

‘ His Karmans perish ’ (Muṇḍa. II. 2. 8)

— (our reply is) — No ; then why is there no destruction
of the Karmans as the real knowledge of the Ātman exists
there always ? There is an additional (point against you)

रनङ्गीकाराद्वैजात्यं शङ्कितुमपि न शक्यते, इति अधिकम् । अतएव
शमदमाद्युपबृंहितं, अपुनरावृत्तिफलकं विहितं ज्ञानं तन्निवर्तकम्, इति चेत्,
न, ज्ञानस्य कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथाकर्तुमशक्यत्वेन विधेयत्वानुपपत्तेः । कीदृशं च
ज्ञानं विधीयते, ज्ञानादिविशिष्टात्मविषयं वा, केवलात्मविषयं वा? आद्ये,
सांसारिकज्ञानात्, न कोऽपि विशेषः । द्वितीये तु, मोक्षसाधनतत्त्वज्ञान-
विषयस्वरूपमेवात्मनो वास्तवम्, शास्त्रीयत्वात्, ज्ञानमत्त्वादित्यायातं ब्रह्म-
वादिमतम् । अशनायाद्यतीतात्मज्ञानस्याभ्रान्तित्वेन मोक्षे हेतुत्वायोगात् ।

in that it is not possible even to suspect any different position as you do not admit any generality associated with the qualities. If it be said that the ordained knowledge strengthened by the accessories control, restraint etc., leading a celibate life etc., having for its ultimate fruit, no return again, is the removing factor, (our reply is) — No ; as it is impossible for knowledge to do, not to do, or to do otherwise, its being the subject of injunction would be impossible. (We ask you) — What kind of knowledge is to be enjoined — it is concerned with Ātman particularised by knowledge etc., or is it concerned with mere Ātman ? Apropos the first (alternative) there is here not the slightest distinction from the knowledge associated with the Samsāra. Apropos the second (alternative), again, that nature itself of Ātman which is the province of the knowledge of Reality — the means of salvation — is real, as it is based upon the Śāstras and is constituted of knowledge, — so comes in here the view of the Brahmanvādins ; because the knowledge of Ātman, beyond hunger etc., is not linked with being the cause of salvation as it is not of an illusory nature. We shall

१ A omits न (only — ज्ञानस्य कर्तुमकर्तुम्...)

२ A ... विषयं स्वरूपमेव ... Ā विषयस्वरूपमेव वास्तवम्

३ A ज्ञानात्मत्वादित्यायातम् Ā शास्त्रीयं तत् ज्ञानादिमत्त्वं तैत्त्यायातम्

४ A मोक्षहेतुत्वयोगात् Ā मोक्षहेतुत्वायोगात्

प्रत्यक्षादीनां चान्यथोपपत्तिं वक्ष्यामः । उदाहृतश्रुतेश्च कर्मकारणीभूतमिथ्या-
ज्ञानस्य तत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वात्, तद्वारा कर्मक्षयप्रतिपादने तात्पर्यम्, न तु
साक्षात्, विरोधाभावात्, इत्यवधेयम् ।

[१९] सांख्यादिमतेऽपि, आत्मनो नित्यानुमेयत्वात्, तत्साक्षात्कारो
न संभवत्येव । परोक्षज्ञानं तु, अध्यापि, अस्ति, इति न तत्साधनम् । परोक्ष-
स्वभावस्याप्यात्मनो योगजधर्मप्रभावात्साक्षात्कारः, इति, अपि न, योगज-
धर्मस्यापि पदार्थसामर्थ्यानुसारेणैवातिशयहेतुत्वात् । तदाहुः भट्टाचार्याः—

‘ यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।

describe later on the propriety of Direct perception etc., in
a different way. As for the Śruti-passage quoted here, its
purport is the propounding of the destruction of Karman
—because the wrong knowledge which is the cause of
Karman is fit to be removed by Right knowledge, — by means
of that (tattvajñāna) and not directly, there being no con-
tradiction in this way — this has to be borne in mind.

[19] Even according to the view of the Sāṅkhya and
others, as the Ātman is always to be inferred, his realisation
is absolutely impossible. Indirect knowledge (of the Ātman)
cannot be its means as it continues to exist even today.
(The argument that) there is the realisation of the Ātman,
with his nature although beyond the sense-organs, on
account of the efficacy of the power due to Yogic practices,
cannot stand either; because even the power produced by
Yoga is (just) the cause of (producing) an excess in con-
formity with the original capacity of the object concerned.
The venerable Bhaṭṭācārya says in that connection —

‘ Where again is seen an excess of power, that (is
there) without transgressing the limits of its own province ;

दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ॥ '

(मी. श्लो. वा. चो. सू. का. ११४)

इति । हेयोपादेयशून्यत्वाच्च तस्य वैयर्थ्यमवोचाम ।

आस्तां तावदितः परं कृतधियामद्वैतनिष्ठावतां

तत्तद्वादिभिर्भीषिकानिरसनैः किं कर्णकोलाहलैः ।

यत्तु प्रस्तुतमद्वितीयपरमानन्दैकज्ञानात्मकं

वस्तु प्रत्यगभिन्नमेतदधुना निर्णयते न्यायतः ॥

[२०] ननु, औपनिषदपक्षे, अपि, अनुपपत्तिः समाना । तथाहि—

the activity of the ear may extend to the comprehension in respect of (hearing) what is at a distance and subtle, but not in respect of its visual form. '

(Mi. Ślo. Vā. Co. Sū. Kā. 114)

We have already spoken of the useless nature of this view, on account of this being void of what is fit to be abandoned and what is fit to be taken.

Let this discussion stand over! What is the use of the refutations of the (so-called) threatening (arguments) of the various disputants and their howlings jarring upon the ear, in the case of those who have fixed their thoughts and are wedded to non-duality? — After this, now would be convincingly proved by right reasoning, what again is this matter in hand — the Entity constituted of the one knowledge, without a second, the highest bliss, not different from the inmost (Ātman).

[20] (I say, says the objector) — The impropriety is the same even in the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads. To explain the same — As desire cannot rise in respect of something unknown, the desire must be spoken of there in

अज्ञाते कामनानुदयात्, ज्ञाने तत्र कामना वाच्या । तथा च, कथमहेयानुपादेये नित्यसिद्ध आत्मनि सा भवतु? सिद्धे, इच्छाविरहात् संसारावस्थायामपि मोक्षापत्तेश्च । तदुक्तम्—

‘ किं च मानादविज्ञाता विमुक्तिः काम्यते न च ।

ज्ञातायां त्वात्मनित्यत्वान्नितरां नास्ति कामना ॥ ’

(बृह. वा. का. २८९)

इति । न च संसारावस्थायाम्, अविद्यावृतत्वाद्विद्यमानोऽप्यद्वयानन्दो न भासते, विद्यया त्वविद्यायां निवृत्तायां स्वप्रकाशत्वादानन्दरूपेण स्वयमेव प्रथ्यते, इति, अविद्यानिवृत्तिविशिष्टत्वेन काम्यते, इति वाच्यम्, अविद्या-

respect of what is known. And so, how can it arise in respect of the Ātman always existent, which has nothing to be abandoned and nothing to be taken? If the Ātman is (already) established, there cannot be any desire (for the same) and there would be the undesirable result of salvation even in the Saṁsāra-state. As has been said —

‘ And further, salvation not known by any means of proof—is it longed for or not? If it is known, as the Ātman is eternal, there cannot be any desire for the same whatsoever. ’
(Br̥ha. Vā. Kā. 289)

Nor again should it be argued by you — In the Saṁsāra-state, because it is screened by Avidyā, the bliss due to the realisation of non-duality although existing, does not appear on the scene ; but when the Avidyā is removed by Vidyā, it by itself spreads on in the form of bliss owing to its self-illuminating nature,—thus arises the desire characterised by the removal of Avidyā — because the removal of Avidyā is difficult to point out. (We ask you) — Is that Avidyā

निवृत्तेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात् । सा, अविद्या, आत्ममित्रा तत्स्वरूपा वा? आद्ये, द्वैतापत्तिः, अद्वैतश्रुतिव्याकोपश्च; द्वितीये पूर्वोक्तदोषः, इति ।

[२१] अत्रोच्यते—न सिद्धत्वमात्रेण, आत्मनि, इच्छाविरहः । सिद्धत्वं किं सत्त्वं वा, ज्ञायमानत्वं वा, अप्रतिरुद्धसाक्षात्कारविषयत्वं वा? नाद्यः, विस्मृतग्रैवेयकप्राप्तौ रज्जुशुजङ्गमनिवृत्तौ च व्यभिचारात् । अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि, तस्मैच्छाप्रद्योतकत्वात् । तृतीयस्तु भवति, इच्छापरिपन्थी । स तु प्रकृते नास्ति, असंभावनादिप्रतिबन्धात् । अत एव पित्तदूषितरसनस्य सितामंशतो मधुरत्वेन तां जानतोऽपि न माधुर्यनिमित्ततृप्तिविशेषोत्पत्तिः,

different from Ātman, or his own nature? Apropos the first (alternative), there would arise the undesirable admission of duality, and also the wrath of the Śruti advocating his being one without a second; apropos the second (alternative) there would be the fault pointed out before.

[21] In this connection, we reply (as follows) — There is not the absence of longing in respect of the Ātman, merely on the ground of his being established. Is being established, existence or being known or being the object of unobstructed realisation? Not the first (alternative can stand). Because it is vitiated in respect of the finding of the necklace that is forgotten and in respect of the disappearance of the snake on the rope. For the same reason, the second (alternative) also (cannot stand), because it points out to the desire. The third (alternative), however, can stand in the way of desire. But that exists not in the present case, on account of the obstacles, wrong conception etc. For this very reason, in the case of a person whose tongue is spoiled by the bile, in eating sugar although knowing it to be possessed of sweetness, there is no rise of

१. A अद्वितीयश्रुति ...

३. A प्रयोजकत्वात्

२. A नासिद्धत्व

४. A शुद्धसिताश्रतो ...

पित्तदोषेण माधुर्यसाक्षात्काराभावात् । तथा च द्विविधमिष्टम्- वस्तुतोऽप्राप्तं ग्रामादि, प्राप्तमपि भ्रमव्यवहितं कण्ठचामीकरादि । एवं परिहार्यमपि द्विविधम्—वस्तुतोऽपरिहृतं गर्तादि, सर्वदा परिहृतं रज्जुशृङ्गादि भ्रममात्रादपरिहृतमिव । तत्राद्ययोः क्रियाव्यवधानौ प्राप्तिपरिहारौ । द्वितीयोस्तु साक्षात्कारमात्रसाध्यौ । अत्रैव परमपुमर्थत्वं मन्यते क्रियाव्यवधानाभावात् । तथा च परमानन्दप्राप्त्यविद्यानिवृत्त्योरपि भ्रमव्यवहितत्वात्, असिद्धत्वप्रत्ययेन कामनाविषयत्वं, उपपद्यते, एव । तदुक्तं वार्तिके—

‘ न युक्तं कामना मुक्तौ पुंसां नास्तीति भाषितुम् ।

the special contentment due to the sweetness, on account of the absence of the realisation of sweetness, due to the blemish of the bile. Thus there are two things desirable— (1) the village etc., which is not really reached, (2) the golden necklace etc., although already secured, screened by illusion. Similarly things fit to be discarded are also two-fold — (1) ditch etc., which cannot actually be discarded, (2) the serpent on the rope etc., always given up, are as good as not discarded on account of there being only illusion. There, in the case of the first two, the impediments for the action are (respectively) the attainment (already) and the discarding. In the case of the second two, they are to be attained by realisation (realistic attitude) alone. Here, verily, one understands the highest human purpose owing to action not being the intervening (or screening) factor. Similarly, even in the case of the attainment of the Highest bliss and the removal of Avidyā, there does exist rightly the nature of being the object of longing, owing to the conclusion that they stand as unestablished, as they are screened by illusion. As has been said in the *Vārtika* —

‘ It is not right to say that longing does not exist in

देशकालानवच्छिन्नसुखाद्यर्थित्वदर्शनात् ॥ '

(बृह. सं. वा. २९०)

इति । आत्मत्वेन सिद्धत्वेऽपि निरतिशयसुखत्वेन, असिद्धत्वात्, तेन रूपेण कामनोपपद्यते, इत्यर्थः । अन्यच्च—

‘ ग्रामादि किञ्चिदप्राप्तं प्राप्तुमिष्टमिहेच्छति ।

हेमादिविस्मृतं किञ्चित्करस्थमपि लिप्सते ॥

परिहार्यं तथानिष्टं कण्टकादि जिहासति ।

रज्वां सर्पादि किञ्चिच्च त्यक्तमेव जिहासति ॥

नियतोपायसाध्यत्वादवाप्यपरिहार्ययोः ।

विधितः प्रतिषेधाच्च सौधनापेक्षिता भवेत् ॥

men on being Released ; because there is seen the longing for happiness etc., not circumscribed by space and time. '

(Brha. Sam. Vā. 290)

The sense is — Even though the state of being the Ātman is established, the state of having unlimited happiness, not being established, the desire (or, longing) rightly persists in that form. And further,

‘ One desires to reach the desired (goal) here, what little — the village etc., — has not been secured ; one also longs for something, gold etc., forgotten, although (actually) held in the hand ; similarly, one wishes to abandon the undesirable thorn etc., that are fit to be abandoned ; one wishes to abandon, though already abandoned, something, the snake etc., on the rope. In the case of objects fit to be secured or fit to be abandoned, because they can be had by definite means, there would be the expectancy for the means, through a positive injunction and the prohibitory statement ; but in

अज्ञानान्तरितत्वेन संप्राप्त्यक्तयोः पुनः ।

याथात्म्यज्ञानतो नान्यत्पुरुषार्थाय कल्पते ॥ ’

(बृह. सं. वा. ८८५-८८८)

[२२] यत्तु, अविद्यानिवृत्तेर्दुर्निरूपत्वमुक्तम्, तत्, न, पञ्चमप्रकार-
त्वाभ्युपगमात् । यथा हि सत्त्वमसत्त्वं सदसत्त्वं वा, अविद्यातत्कार्ययोर्न
संभवति, इति चतुर्थी कोटिरनिर्वचनीयत्वमेवाश्रिता, तथा, अनिर्वचनीयस्य,
अविद्यातादात्म्यनियमान्निवृत्तितत्प्रतियोगिनोश्च तादात्म्यायोगादनिर्वच-
नीयविलक्षणत्वमपि, अविद्यानिवृत्तेः सिध्यति, अन्यथानुपपत्तेः सर्वतो
बलवत्त्वात् । अद्वैतश्रुतेश्च सदद्वैतमात्रविषयत्वात्, न विरोधः । एवं सति,

the case of things, secured or abandoned, characterised by
the intervention of Ajñāna, nothing else than the knowledge
of things as they are, can be conducive to the human pur-
pose. ’
(Brha. Sam. Vā. 885-888)

[22] As to what has been stated (by you) — the
removal of Avidyā is difficult to point out, (our reply is) —
That (is) not (so), on account of our admitting a fifth mode
Just as the fourth mode, the ‘ indescribable nature ’ itself, was
admitted, as (1) existence, (2) non-existence, or (3) exist-
ence and non-existence, are not possible in the case of Avidyā
and its effects ; so, as the Anirvacanīya is invariably identic-
al with Avidyā, and because its removal and counter-entity
cannot have identity with it, even something different from
Anirvacanīya is established, in the case of the removal
of Avidyā ; everywhere (the argument) ‘ the impossibility
otherwise ’ being the strongest. Again, as the Śruti advo-
cating non-duality, is concerned merely with ‘ Sat-Advaita’,
there is no conflict with it. Such being the position, the
passages (describing the Ātman) as ‘ not gross ’ etc., would

अस्थूलादिवाक्यमप्यनुगृहीतं भवति, स्थूलत्वाद्यभावानावात्मनि प्रमेयत्वात्, अद्वितीयशब्देनापि द्वितीयाभावबोधनाच्च । अन्यथा केवलात्मबोधने सजातीयविजातीयभेदाभावाप्रतीतौ किमद्वैतश्रुत्या विरुध्यते ? तस्मात्, अभावाभ्युपगमः, अद्वितीयसाधक एव, इति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः, इति इष्टसिद्धिकारादयः ।

वस्तुतस्तु, अभावस्य चैतन्यात्मकत्वात्, स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यसंबन्धेन, एव भानमभ्युपेयम्, कूटस्थासङ्गस्वभावस्य वास्तवसंबन्धायोगात्, काल्पनिकत्वेऽवश्यं वाच्ये, सर्वस्या अपि कल्पनाया अविद्यामूलत्वात्, अभावकल्पना,

also be rightly given their due, as the negations of being gross etc., can be cognised in the Ātman, and the cognition of the absence of a second, by the expression 'without a second' also. Otherwise, if there is the knowledge only of the Ātman, in the absence of comprehension of the absence of homogenous and heterogenous distinctions, what is being opposed by the Śruti advocating non-duality ? Therefore, the admission of 'negation' (as a means of proof), verily, establishes the nature of being without a second — thus there is no impropriety whatsoever (in concluding thus) — so hold the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* and others.

In reality, however, as negation is constituted of sentiency, its apprehension ought to be taken as being connected with the self-illuminating sentiency itself; if its imaginary nature has to be necessarily spoken of owing to the impossibility of connection with reality of something absolutely unchanging and of contactless nature, then as the whole fancy is based upon Avidyā, the fancy about negation is also based upon Avidyā — and so, there exists not the

१ Ā केवलात्ममात्रबोधने

२ A अद्वितीयत्वसाधक ...

३ Ā कूटस्थासङ्गस्वभावस्य च

अपि, अविद्यामूला, इति न, अनिर्वचनीयवैलक्षण्यम् । तदुक्तं वार्तिककृद्भिः-

‘ नान्यदज्ञानतोऽस्तित्वं द्वितीयस्यात्मनो यथा ।

निवृत्तिस्तु तदेवास्य नावगत्यात्मनोऽपरा ॥ ’

(बृह. वा. ३. ८. १२२)

इति । अस्थूलादिवाक्यानां च स्थूलादिविलक्षणात्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधकत्वम्, न तदभावबोधकत्वम्, कल्पितपदार्थभावाभावयोरधिष्ठानस्वरूपमात्रत्वात् । यथा, अज्ञातं शुक्तिद्रव्यमेव रजतभावात्मकम्, तदेव ज्ञातं रजताभावात्मकम्, तदसाधारणस्वरूपस्यैव रजताभावत्वात् । एवं, अत्र, अपि, अज्ञातं आत्मा सर्वद्वैतभावात्मकः, ज्ञातश्च तदभावात्मकः, तदसाधारणस्वरूपस्यैव द्वैता-

unique indescribable nature about it. So has been spoken of by the author of the *Vārtika*—

‘ There is no other existence apart from Ajñāna like that of a second other than Ātman. Its removal is, verily, that (comprehension) itself; and no other (removal) by the comprehension of Ātman is there. ’ (Br̥ha. Vā. III. 8. 122)

As for the passages (describing the qualities) ‘ not gross etc., — they only convey the nature of the Ātman as being quite different from the ‘gross’ etc. ; they do not convey the negation of them ; because the presence and the absence of fancied entities have only the nature of their basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*). As the conch-shell substance itself, when unknown is constituted of the nature of silver ; that same when comprehended is constituted of the negation of silver, on account of its unique nature itself being constituted of the negation of silver. — Thus here also the Ātman, unknown, is constituted of the nature of all duality ; but when known he is constituted of its negation, on account of the nature of

भावरूपत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

‘ स्थूलापहुतिरत्र स्याद् वस्तु यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
नाभावनिष्ठोऽन्यत्रापि निषेधः किमुताक्षरे ॥ ’

(बृह. वा. ३. ८. ७४)

‘ अक्षरं येन रूपेण स्थूलं वस्तु निषेधति ।
तेनैवात्रापि निःशेषं तस्य सर्वविरोधतः ॥
अन्येनान्येन रूपेण विरुद्धान् हन्ति पावकः ।
विरोधिना यथा तद्वन्नैह स्थूलाद्यप्रक्रिया ॥
मानित्वादिनिषेधः स्याद्यथैवाक्रियरूपतः ।
प्रत्यक्कूटस्थरूपेण तथा सर्वनिषेधकृत् ॥
कूटस्थबोधपूर्णत्वं प्रत्यक्षं वस्तुतः स्वतः ।

the negation of duality of that unusual form itself. So has been said —

‘ Here there is the concealment of the gross, inasmuch as the entity concerns reality. There can be no denial based upon negation even elsewhere; what then in the case of the Immutable ? ’
(Br̥ha. Vā. III. 8. 74)

‘ By which form the Immutable denies the gross entity, by that itself, here too there is a complete (denial), on account of its being opposed to everything.

As the fire destroys the opposites with various different opposite forms, like that there is not here the driving out of the gross etc.

As there might be the denial of being associated with the means of proof (mānitva) etc, with the form of the actionless, so (here also), on account of the inmost absolutely unchanging form it is the denier of everything.

There the direct realisation, the fullest comprehension

एतदस्य विरोधित्वं कार्यकारणवस्तुभिः ॥

(बृह. वा. ३. ८. १०१-१०४)

इति । भूतलादिस्वरूपस्यैवाभावव्यवहारहेतुत्वं प्राभाकरैः, अङ्गीक्रियते । तार्किकैरपि घटाभावो घटो न भवति, इत्यादौ, अभावप्रतियोगिकाभावा-
न्तरानभ्युपगमात् तत्स्वरूपस्यैवाभावबुद्धिहेतुत्वमङ्गीकृतम्, तत्तु, अस्माकं
किं न स्यात् ? एतदेवाभिप्रेत्योक्तम्—

‘ नाभावनिष्ठोऽन्यत्रापि निषेधः ’ (बृह. वा. ३. ८. ७४)

इति । तस्मादखण्डानन्दाद्वितीयचैतन्यसन्मात्र आत्मा ज्ञातः सन्, अविद्या-
निवृत्तिः, इत्युच्यते । अत्रैव च सर्वपुमर्थविश्रान्तिः,

of the unchanging, is, in reality, from itself. — This is why
it has opposition to objects governed by the relation of
cause and effect. ’ (Br̥ha. Vā. III. 8. 101-104)

The followers of Prabhākara admit the real nature itself o
the ground-region etc., as the cause of dealing with negation.
As the Logicians also not admitting another negation, the
counter-number of negation in the case of the (cognition
of) absence of a jar — ‘ The jar exists not ’ etc., admit the
nature itself of that as the cause of the idea of negation, —
then why should it not be for (applicable to) us also ?
Concerning this itself, it has been said —

‘ There can be no denial based upon negation even
elsewhere. ’ (Br̥ha. Vā. III. 8. 74)

Therefore, the Ātman being known as continuous Bliss,
without a second, sentiency and merely Sat, is spoken of as
the removal of Avidyā. Here itself is the culmination of all
human purposes, as from the Smṛti passage—

‘ कृतं कृत्यं, प्राप्तं प्रापणीयम्, आत्मलाभान्न परं विद्यते । ’

इति स्मृतेः ।

ननु, ज्ञात आत्मा, इत्यत्र ज्ञानस्य विशेषणत्वे ज्ञानविशिष्टस्यैव मोक्षत्वात्, विशेषणनाशे, तदभावप्रसङ्गः, तेनोपलक्षणत्वमेव तस्य वक्तव्यम् । तथा च ततः प्राक्कालेऽपि मोक्षव्यवहारापत्तिः, इति । मैवम्, ‘काकवन्तो देवदत्तस्य गृहाः’ इत्यादावपि काकसंबन्धात्प्रागपि देवदत्तस्य गृहत्वादिव्यवहारापत्तेः, तुल्यत्वात् । उपलक्षणस्यापि खोत्तरकाल एव व्यावर्तकत्वम्, इति चेत्, इहापि तुल्यम् । न हि दृष्टे, अनुपपन्नं नाम । अविद्यायाश्च,

What is fit to be done, has been done; what is fit to be reachad, has been reached; there exists nothing beyond the attainment of Ātman.

I say (says the objector) — Here in (the expression) ‘ Comprehended is the Ātman ’, Jñāna being the qualifier, something qualified by Jñāna itself would be salvation, — so, with the destruction of the qualifying attribute there would follow the undesirable result viz., the negation of that (Ātman), therefore that should be regarded as just its characteristic. Further still, even prior to that time, there would be the absurd position of practical association with salvation. — (Our reply is) — (Do) not (say) so. Even (in expressions) like ‘ Devadatta’s houses are associated with crows (sitting upon them) ’ etc., even prior to the association of the crows, the undesirable contingency about the practical use of the houses etc., is the same. If it is argued that the characteristic feature also has the power of turning away something only in the time after its own (establish-ment), then (our answer is) — here also the state of things is similar. Surely there cannot be indeed (any discussion about) the impropriety (impossibility) in respect of what is (actually) perceived. Now Avidyā being beginningless, even though (there is) the removal of the jar in the form of

अनादित्वात् प्रागभावनिवृत्तिरूपघटनिवृत्तावपि^१ प्रागभावानुत्पत्तिवत्, न तत्त्वज्ञाननिवृत्तावपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः ।

[२३] कीदृशं पुनर्ज्ञानमज्ञाननिवर्तकमभ्युपेयते ? न केवलचैतन्यम्, तस्य सर्वदा सत्त्वेन, अविद्याया नित्यनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च तन्मूलकसंसारो-पलब्ध्यनुपपत्तेः, सर्वशास्त्रानारम्भप्रसङ्गः, अनुभवविरोधश्च । नापि वृत्तिरूपम्, तस्य सत्यत्वे तत्कारणान्तःकरणाविद्यादेरपि सत्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्, न तेन तन्निवृत्तिः सर्ववेदान्तार्थविप्लवापत्तिश्च । मिथ्यात्वे कथमज्ञाननिवर्तकता ? न हि मिथ्याज्ञानम्, अज्ञाननिवर्तकं दृष्टम्, स्वप्नज्ञानस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् ।

the removal of the antecedent negation, there is the non-production of the antecedent negation,—like that even when the exclusion (of Avidyā) by the knowledge of Reality is effected, there is not the undesirable contingency of its advent again.

[23] What kind of knowledge, again, is admitted as the remover of Ajñāna ? (It) cannot be merely sentiency, because it being always in existence, Avidyā would be always removed — an undesirable contingency. And as a consequence, there is the impossibility of the existence of Samsāra as based upon that, the unwelcome position of there being no scope for activity on the part of all Śāstras and further, the contradiction with the experience. Neither can it be of the nature of functioning, — if that is real, the Avidyā in the *antahkaraṇa* would also necessarily be real on account of that cause ; it cannot be removed by that, and further there would be the unwelcome position of the violation of the implications of all the Vedānta. If that is false, how is there the capacity to remove Ajñāna ? Not indeed is (any) false knowledge seen to be the remover of Ajñāna ; otherwise, even in the case of knowledge in dreams, that

१ Ā ... घटनिवृत्तावपि पुनः प्रागभाव ...

सत्यस्यैव हि^१ रज्ज्वादिज्ञानस्य भुजङ्गादिभ्रमोपादानाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमुप-
लब्धम् । किं च, तत्, सप्रकारं निष्प्रकारं वा ? आद्ये, निष्प्रकारे ब्रह्मणि
सप्रकारज्ञानस्यायथार्थत्वान्नाज्ञाननिवर्तकता, तस्य यथार्थत्वे वा, नाद्वैत-
सिद्धिः । न द्वितीयः, कुत्रापि निष्प्रकारकज्ञानस्य, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वाददर्शनात्,
समानाश्रय-समानप्रकार-समानविषयज्ञानस्यैव तथात्वदर्शनात् । अन्यथा,
'प्रमेयं द्रव्यम्', इति ज्ञानादपि घटाद्याकाराज्ञाननिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । समान-
विषयत्वस्य घटत्वप्रकारकाज्ञानादिना तुल्यत्वात् ।

would take place — an undesirable result ! Only the real knowledge of rope etc., is found as being the remover of Ajñāna, which is the producing cause of the illusion about the serpent etc. And again, is that (Jñāna) possessed of some mode, or without any mode whatsoever ? Apropos the first (alternative), the Jñāna having a mode being unreal in respect of Brahman without any mode, there can be no capacity to remove the Ajñāna ; even if it is possessed of a real nature, there can be no establishment of Advaita. Neither is the second (alternative possible) — Nowhere indeed is seen the modeless Jñāna to be the remover of Ajñāna, because that kind of nature (of removing) is seen in the case of (that) Jñāna alone, having the same resort, the same mode and the same object. Otherwise, even from the knowledge viz., 'a substance is the object of knowledge', there would be the unwelcome position about the removal of Ajñāna about the form of the jar etc. ; because it is on a par with the Ajñāna etc., having the mode of the nature of the jar on account of having the same object.

१ A omits हि २ Ā किं च तत्सप्रकारकं निष्प्रकारकं वा ? नाद्यः, आद्ये.....

३ Ā सप्रकारकज्ञानस्य ... ४ निष्प्रकारज्ञानस्य

५ Ā प्रकार, विषय transposed

किं च, तत्परोक्षं, अपरोक्षं वा ? आद्ये, न तस्यापरोक्षाध्यासोपादानो-
 ज्ञाननिवर्तकता, श्वेत्या-मानादिनापि शङ्खपीतत्वभ्रमनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्, अप-
 रोक्षाध्यासस्य; अपरोक्षप्रमानिवर्त्यत्वात् । न द्वितीयः, शब्दस्य, अपरोक्ष-
 ज्ञानजनकत्वाददर्शनात्, ज्ञानकरणत्वावच्छेदेन परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वनियमात् ।
 'दशमस्त्वमसि', इत्यादावपि शब्देन परोक्षे ज्ञाने जनिते, पश्चान्मानसा-
 परोक्षज्ञानं,— अन्यथा कारणस्वभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गः । न च, अत्रापि तथास्तु,
 इति वाच्यम्, औपनिषदसमाख्याविरोधात्,

And further, is that (Jñāna) indirect or direct ?
 Apropos the first (alternative), it cannot have the capacity
 of being the remover of Ajñāna which is the producing
 cause of super-imposition on the direct (perception); other-
 wise, even by the inference etc., about whiteness, there would
 be the undesirable contingency viz. the removal of illusion
 about the yellow colour of the conch, because the direct
 superimposition is fit to be removed by the direct know-
 ledge. Not the second (alternative either), because the
 Word is not seen to be producing direct knowledge, because
 it is a rule that the Word is the producing cause of the in-
 direct knowledge, as characterised by being the means of
 knowledge. Even in cases like ' You are the tenth ', when
 (at first) the indirect knowledge is produced by the word,
 then afterwards is (produced) the direct knowledge in the
 mind. — Otherwise, there would be the undesirable con-
 tingency, viz. the loss of its nature as the cause (of know-
 ledge). Neither can it be said that the same might take
 place even in the present case, because it would go counter
 to the explanations in the Upaniṣads ; because there is a
 denial of any instrument of knowledge over and above the
 Vedānta in the Śruti-passages like —

‘ नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम् । ’

(इतिहा. २०; शाख्या. ४)

इत्यादिश्रुत्या वेदान्तातिरिक्तकरणनिषेधाच्च, अत्रापि परोक्षज्ञानं जनयतः शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यायोगाच्च । यद्यपि

‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम् ’

(तैत्ति. २.१)

इत्यादिवाक्यजनितं स्वरूपतः परोक्षमपि ज्ञानं परोक्षत्वाग्राहकत्वात्, न भ्रमत्वमर्हति व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वाभावात्, तथापि स्वसिद्धान्ते प्रमात्रमित्येव भासमानत्वमपरोक्षत्वम्; तत् चेत्, तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्ये ज्ञाने नास्ति तर्हि ब्रह्मणः प्रमात्रभेदानवभासादबोधकत्वलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं वाक्यस्य ।

‘ None, not knowing the Vedas, comprehends that Big
(Brahman). ’

(Itihā. XX ; Śātyā. IV)

and because the Word would lose its authoritative nature in producing an indirect knowledge in the case of an object directly visible. Even though the knowledge produced by passages —

‘ Truth, Knowledge, Infinite ’

(Taitti. II. 1)

and others, although by nature indirect, should not be regarded as illusory, because it cannot grasp the indirect state, owing to the absence of the mode of having a different resort; still what appears as not different from the Knower, has the nature of directness according to our own conclusive view; if however that (directness) exists not in the knowledge produced by the passages, That thou art, and others, then as Brahman would not appear as not different from the Knower, the scriptural passages would have an unauthoritative status, marked by the non-enlightening nature. Now (if you say), the cognizance of Brahman is accepted as not

अथ प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणो भानमङ्गीक्रियते, तदा तदेवापरोक्षत्वम्, इति न तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्य परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्, इति सिद्धम् । तस्मात् कारणान्तरस्य, अद्वितीये ब्रह्मण्यसंभवात्, शब्दस्य च परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्व- नियमात्, न अपरोक्षज्ञानसिद्धिः । तदभावाच्च न, अपरोक्षभ्रमकारणाज्ञान- निवृत्तिः, इति अनिमोक्षः ।

[२४] किं वा तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्य भावरूपम्, अनाद्यज्ञानम्, इति चेत्— अनादिभावस्य, अविनाशित्वव्याप्तत्वात्, आत्मनि तथा दर्शनात् । अन्यथा, आत्मनोऽपि भावत्वेन घटादिवद्विनाशित्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्, अनादिभावत्वात्, न, अज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । न च, आत्मनि परमार्थसत्त्वं वा स्वप्रकाशत्वं

different from the Knower, then (we say) that same is the direct nature ; so, on that ground it is not established that the passages, That thou art, and others are the producing causes of indirect knowledge. Therefore, no other cause being possible in the case of Brahman without a second, and as the Word as a rule produces indirect knowledge, there is not the establishment of the direct knowledge. And in its absence, there would not be the removal of Ajñāna — the cause of direct illusion, and so there would be the absence of salvation.

[24] And further, if it be argued that the beginning- less Ajñāna of a positive form is capable of being removed by that knowledge, (our reply is) as the beginningless state is co-extensive with the imperishable nature, so is it seen in the case of Ātman. Otherwise, Ātman also being an entity, there would be the undesirable contingency of his having the perishable nature of a jar and others. Therefore, there cannot be the contingency of the removal of Ajñāna as it is possessed of a beginningless nature. Further, it should not

१. Ā किं तावत् ...

२. अनादिभावस्य ... विनाशित्वप्रसङ्गः । dropped in IO

वा नित्यत्वप्रयोजकम्, न त्वनादिभावत्वम्, इति वाच्यम्, दृष्टान्ताभावेन प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावस्य, असिद्धत्वात्, आत्मातिरिक्ते परमार्थसत्त्वाद्यनङ्गीकारात् । किं च मानविषयत्वे, मानस्य स्वविषयानिवर्तकत्वात्, न मान-निवर्त्यत्वं संभवति; मानाविषयत्वे च स्वप्रकाशत्वानङ्गीकारात्, शशविषाणादितुल्यत्वेनार्थक्रियाशून्यत्वात्, न कारणत्वसंभवः, इति । किं वा तस्य निवर्तकम् ? न तावत्स्वयमेव; न हि क्वापि स्वनिवर्तकत्वमुपलब्धम्, स्वस्य तथात्वे क्षणभङ्गापत्तेः । नापि ज्ञानान्तरम्, तदपि न स्वनिवर्तकम्, इति

be said (by you) that in the case of the Ātman either his nature as the highest Reality or (his) self-illumining nature is the cause of eternal existence and not his being possessed of a beginningless nature, (our reply is) — Owing to the absence of a similar illustration, the relation of product and the producing cause is not established, as we do not accept the existence of the highest Reality etc., in something other than the Ātman. And further, in the case of the object of some means of proof, the position of being fit to be removed by some means of proof is not possible, because the means of proof cannot be the remover of its own object. If (Ajñāna) is not the object of some means of proof, as its self-illumining nature is not accepted, there is no possibility of its being the cause, as it would be incapable of doing anything for some purpose, being on a par with the horn of a hare etc. What, again, is its remover ? Not for the matter of that it itself; for, nowhere indeed is found the self-removing nature ; otherwise, if it is so, there is bound to be the undesirable contingency of momentariness. Nor again, some other knowledge, — that also cannot be removing itself and so there too, (for the other knowledge) another (would be the remover), there too, another — by such endless proce-

१ A किं च, तस्य अनाद्यज्ञानस्य मानवि ... A किं च, अनाद्यज्ञानस्य मानवि...

२ A कारणत्वादिसंभवः ३ A स्वस्य स्वयं निवर्तकत्वं... ४ dropped in A

तत्राप्यन्यत्, तत्राप्यन्यत्, इत्यनवस्थया न कदापि कैवल्यसिद्धिः स्यात् । को वा तस्याश्रयः ? न तावदात्मैव, तस्य निर्धर्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात्, जन्यधर्माश्रयत्वे कौटस्थ्यव्याघातेन, अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्; नापि, अन्तःकरणम्, तदाश्रितज्ञानस्यात्माश्रिताज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तेः, समानाश्रययोरेव हि ज्ञानाज्ञानयोर्विरोधो नेतरयोः, अन्यथातिप्रसङ्गात् । अज्ञानस्य च नान्तःकरणाश्रितत्वं संभवति, तस्य तत्कार्यत्वेन तदुत्पत्तेः प्रागपि सत्त्वात्, केवलचैतन्यमात्राश्रयत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च । को वा तस्य विषयः ? प्रत्यगमिन्नम्, अद्वितीयपरमानन्दज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म, इति चेत्, किमत्र मानम् ? न तावन्मनः,

sure there would never be the establishment of salvation. Which again is its resort ? Not, for the matter of that, the Ātman himself; he is admitted to be not possessed of any Dharmas. If he is the resort of Dharmas that are to be produced, there would be the undesirable contingency of his being of an impermanent nature, owing to his immutability being jeopardised thereby. Nor again, the mind, on account of the impossibility of knowledge resorting to it, being the remover of Ajñāna belonging to Ātman, because there is contradiction between Jñāna and Ajñāna belonging only to the same resort, not between any two; otherwise, there would be an unwarranted extended application (of the rule). Further, Ajñāna cannot have the mind as its resort, because that (Ajñāna), its product, exists even prior to its being produced from it and because it is admitted that it has for its resort pure sentiency. What again is its object (sphere of activity) ? If (you say that) it is the Brahman, not different from the inmost, (and) its nature being — without a second, highest Bliss, knowledge, — (we ask you) — What is the proof here ? It cannot, for the matter of that, be the mind; because it lacks the nature of being self-proven

तस्य प्रमाणान्तरसहकारित्वेनालोकादिवत्स्वतः प्रमाणत्वाभावात्,

‘ यन्मनसा न मनुते ’

(केनो. १.५)

इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधाच्च । तस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमे च तार्किकमत-
प्रवेशात्, अद्वैतवादहानिः, मनसा सुखादिविशिष्टस्यैव ग्रहात् । वेदान्त-
श्रवण-मनन-निदिध्यासनसंस्कृतं मनस्तत्र मानम्, तेन नोक्तदोषः, इति
चेत्, तर्हि, उपजीव्यत्वात्, वेदान्तवाक्यमेव । मनस्तु केवलमपरोक्षत्वाधाय-
कम्, इत्यवधेयम् ।

[२५] तच्च वादान्तरम् । प्रथमं वेदान्तवाक्यस्यैव तत्र मानत्व-
मुपपाद्यताम्, ततस्तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं वा, अपरोक्षम्, तदुपजीवि मानसं ज्ञानं वा,

on account of its being just a co-worker with other means
of proof, like light etc., and because it would be against the
Scriptural passage

‘ What one thinks not by the mind ’

(Keno. I. 5)

and others. If it is admitted to be perceptible by the mind,
there would be the giving up of the Advaita-doctrine by
accepting the creed of the Tārkikas, because the mind can
grasp only what is particularised by pleasure and others. If
you say that the mind perfected by hearing, thinking (and)
contemplating the Vedānta-passages is the proof there —
thereby would not ensue the blemish spoken of — then the
Vedānta-passages themselves would be (the proof), being
something on which the others are dependent ; the mind,
however, is only concerned with the direct state — this
should be noted.

[25] But, all that is but another point at issue. First,
let the nature of proof of Vedānta-passages themselves be
propounded ; then (should be considered) whether the know-
ledge produced by them (is) direct, or the mental compre-

इति । न हि निर्धर्मके वस्तुनि वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । वाक्यं हि पदार्थ-
ज्ञानद्वारा बोधकम् । पदार्थज्ञानं च गृहीतसंगतिकेभ्यः पदेभ्यो वृत्त्या
भवति । संगतिग्रहश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानात्पूर्वमेव प्रमाणान्तरोपस्थिते वृद्ध-
व्यवहारादिना भवति । न चात्र निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तरं प्रक्रमते,
रूपाद्यभावेन प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात् । तद्व्याप्तिलिङ्गाभावेन, अनुमानागोचरत्वात् ।
सादृश्यरहितत्वेन, उपमानाविषयत्वात् । तद्विना, अनुपपद्यमानार्था-
भावेन, अर्थापत्त्यागम्यत्वात् । रूपत्वेन, अभावागोचरत्वात् । यूपाहवनीया-

hension depends upon that. For, surely, the authoritative nature of a sentence is not possible in the case of an entity without Dharmas. For, a sentence enlightens through the knowledge of the meaning of words. The knowledge of the meaning of words ensues through the power of the words with their inter-relation grasped. And the comprehension of the inter-relation takes place even before the knowledge of the import of the sentence by the practical behaviour etc., of the elders in respect of what is put forth by other means of proof. Here, however, in the case of Brahman without any Dharmas, no other means of proof can function, because, Direct perception is untenable owing to the absence of form etc. It cannot come within the province of Inference on account of the absence of a logical mark pervaded by that. It cannot be the province of Analogy, on account of its being bereft of similarity. It cannot be understood by Presumption, on account of the absence of any object, which cannot be accounted for without that. It cannot come within the ken of Negation, because it is possessed of a positive form. If (you say that) it can come in through the Śāstra itself like the sacrificial post, Āhavanīya fire etc., (our reply is) — No, there is here

दिवत्, शास्त्रादेव तदुपस्थितिः, इति चेत्,—न, वैषम्यात्, यूषाहवनीयादीनां शब्दशब्दयतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वात् । इह च सर्वधर्मातीतत्वेन पदवृत्त्यविषयत्वात् ।

[२६] तथाहि— पदवृत्तिस्तावद् द्वेधा—मुख्या, जघन्या च ।

तत्र मुख्या, सामान्यविशिष्टव्यक्तिविषया, अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः, इति, ईश्वरेच्छारूपा, सङ्केदः, इति तार्किकाः ।

सामान्यमात्रविषयः स्वाभाविक एवार्थप्रतीतिजननसामर्थ्यविलक्षणः सर्वेभ्यः, इति मीमांसकाः ।

तत्र, आद्यो न क्षोदक्षमः, ईश्वरेच्छाया एकत्वेन सर्वशब्दानामेकशक्ति-

complete dissimilarity — because the sacrificial post, Āhavanīya-fire etc., are possessed of Dharmas, characterised by the words and the possibility; while here (Brahman) being beyond all Dharmas, cannot be the object of any function of the word.

[26] To explain the same — the word-function, for the matter of that, is two-fold — (1) Principal and (2) Subordinate.

There the Principal (function) is concerned with an individual particularised by generality, — of the nature of God's will in the form 'from this word this meaning is to be understood' — the convention, so (say) the Tārkikas.

(The Principal function) is a relation concerning itself only with generality, by its own nature having the unique power of producing the comprehension of the meaning, — so (say) the Mīmāṃsakas.

There, the first (view of the Tārkikas) cannot bear investigation (pounding), on account of the unwelcome

प्रसङ्गात् । उपाधिभेदात्तद्भेदः, इति चेत्, प्रतिशब्दं तद्भेदापत्तिः । शक्य-
तावच्छेदकैक्यादनुगमः, इति चेत्, तदैक्येऽपि पर्यायशब्दानां शक्ततावच्छे-
दकभेदेन शक्तिभेदस्वीकारात्, इच्छायाः शब्दनिष्ठत्वाभावाच्च । विषयता-
संबन्धाभ्युपगमे वा, औपचारिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, अतिरिक्तविषयताभ्युपगमाच्च,
लाक्षणिकशब्दस्यापीश्वरेच्छाविषयत्वेन शक्तत्वसंभवेन लक्षणोच्छेदप्रसङ्गाच्च,
ईश्वरेच्छायाः साधारणकारणत्वेन तत्र सत्त्वनियमात् । अन्यथा, कार्यानु-
दयप्रसङ्गात् । ईश्वरेच्छया समं स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः शक्तिः, स च न

result viz., all words having only one power, as the will of God is only one. If (it be argued that) there is division on account of the division of limiting adjuncts, (the reply is) — there would necessarily be that division in respect of each word. If (it be argued that) there is the proper understanding through the unity characterised by possibility, then even though the unity is there, the difference of power of the synonymous words is accepted through the division due to the characteristics of the power and because the will cannot have its dependence upon the word; or, even if its (of the will) connection with the object is accepted, it would perforce be of merely conventional nature, and also because no separate nature of the object is accepted, and further there would be the undesirable position, viz. there would be the destruction (end) of all figurative use; for, even in the case of a figurative word there would be the possibility of the denotative power (persisting) owing to its being the object of God's will; because God's will exists as a rule there, because it is a general cause. Otherwise, there would be the contingency of the effect not coming into existence. If (it be argued that) the denotative power is a special connection with its

लाक्षणिकेषु, इति न दोषः, इति चेत्, तस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वापत्तेर्नैवम्, तादृ-
शेश्वरे मानाभावाच्च । स्वाभाविकं शब्दसामर्थ्यमपि षट्सु पदार्थेष्वनन्त-
र्भावात्, असदिति चेत्,— अहो महतीयं विभीषिका, षट्पदार्थातिरिक्त-
शक्तिवादिना यथा तृणारणिमणिषु बह्विजननसामर्थ्यं कल्प्यते, लाघवात्,
न तु बह्विनिष्ठमतिशयत्रयं गौरवात् । तथा घटकलशकुम्भादिपदानां
घटत्वप्रकारकप्रतीतिजननसामर्थ्यमेकं कल्प्यते, लाघवात् । अन्यथा,
व्यभिचारेण, कार्यकारणभावग्रहानुपपत्तेः । तथा च पारमर्षसूत्रम् —

nature along with God's will, and that exists not in the case
of the figurative (words); so, there would not be the blemish
referred to above, — then (our reply is) it is not so ;
because in that case there would perforce be its indescriba-
ble nature, and also there is no proof to postulate the exis-
tence of that kind of God. If (it be argued that) even the
natural denotative power of the word is non-existent on
account of its non-inclusion in the six categories (of the
Vaiśeṣikas), (the reply is) — then O ! What a big frighten-
ing argument this (is) ! As by one who advocates the
existence of the denotative power over and above the six
categories, is imagined the power to produce fire in the
case of grass, the seat of kindling wood and the jewel, — this
way being simpler, — but not this three-fold speciality depen-
dent upon fire, as that would be more cumbrous ; in the same
way, in the case of synonymous words like Ghāṭa, Kalaśa,
Kumbha etc., only one power producing the apprehension
referring to the mode of jariness is imagined, on account of
simplicity. Otherwise, there would be the impossibility of
grasping the relation of cause and effect owing to the viola-
tion of the rule. To the same effect is the Sūtra of the
great sage (Jaimini) —

१ Ā इत्यदोषः २ A बह्विजननसामर्थ्यमेव ; Ā ... सामर्थ्यमेकं
३ Ā पारमर्ष सूत्रम्

‘ औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः ’ (मी. सू. १. १. ५)

इति, तस्मात्, सैव, अभिधा नाम मुख्या वृत्तिः । न च घटपदे गृहीत-
शक्तेः कुम्भपदश्रवणादप्यर्थबोधः स्यात्, तदैक्यात्, इति वाच्यम्, तन्निष्ठ-
त्वेनाग्रहणात्तव ‘ समवायः ’ इव ममापि शक्तिपदार्थः, इत्यवधेहि ।

[२७] न च लाक्षणिकस्यापि तत्तत्प्रकारकप्रतीतिजननसामर्थ्य-
रूपशक्तिसंभवात्, लक्षणोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः, अन्यथा तत्र कार्यानुदयप्रसङ्गात्,
इति वाच्यम्—(१) अन्विताभिधानवादे लाक्षणिकस्य, अन्वितानुभवजनन-

‘ The word is connected with the meaning due to etymo-
logy. ’ (Mī. Sū. I. 1. 5)

Therefore, that same is the principal function called Deno-
tation (*abhidhā*). Nor again should it be argued (by you)
that there would be the apprehension of the meaning even
on hearing the word Kumbha from the denotative power
understood in respect of the word Ghāṭa on account of their
identity, because it is not understood as residing in there ;
like your ‘ intimate relation ’, understand the Śakti-category
also of mine !

[27] Nor again should it be argued by you, that on
account of the possibility of the denotative power in the form
of the capacity of producing the apprehension of various
modes even in the case of the figurative (word) there would be
the undesirable position, viz. the destruction of the figura-
tive use (itself); otherwise, there would follow the disaster,
viz. the non-production of the effect, — (the reply is) —
(1) According to the view of the Anvitābhidhānavādins
(those who advocate that words already grammatically
connected, have the denotative power), in the case of a
figurative word, the capacity to produce a connected appre-

सामर्थ्यानङ्गीकारेण, अन्वितानुभवजननसामर्थ्यरूपायाः शक्तेस्तत्राप्रसङ्गात्, लक्षणायाः केवलपदार्थस्मृतिमात्रहेतुत्वात् । लाक्षणिकपदयुक्तवाचकपदस्यैवान्वयानुभावकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अर्थवादपदानां सर्वेषां लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि तद्युक्तविधिपदस्य, अन्वयानुभावकत्वाविरोधात् । अत एव लाक्षणिकं नानुभावकम्, इति प्रसिद्धिः शास्त्रेषु ।

[२८] (२) अभिहितान्वयवादे तु पदशक्त्या पदार्थोपस्थित्यैव तत्र, अन्वयायोग्यतायां पदार्थेनैव स्वसंबन्धी पदार्थो वाक्यार्थान्वययोग्य उप-

hension not being admitted, there could not be the butting in of the denotative power, forming the capacity to produce the connected apprehension, because Lakṣaṇā is merely the cause of remembrance only of the meaning of words. Because only in the case of a denotative word connected with the figurative word is admitted the power to make one comprehend connectedly. Even though all the words in the glorificatory passages are figurative, there is no contradiction in having the power to make one apprehend connectedly in the case of the injunctive word connected with it. For this very reason, it is an established fact in the Śāstras that a figurative word cannot make one apprehend (the denotation).

[28] (2) According to the view of the Abhihitānvayavādins (those who advocate that there is the subsequent connection of the words denoting their meaning), however, there being no possibility of the relation involved, as the denotative power of the word merely points out the meaning of the word, by the meaning of the word itself is brought forth the meaning of the word connected with it, which is fit for the connection with the meaning of the sentence. — There, the figurative use is, verily, based upon

स्थाप्यते, तत्र पदार्थनिष्ठैव लक्षणा न तु पदनिष्ठा । वाक्यार्थोऽपि पदार्थैरेव लक्ष्यते, न तु पदैरिति न लाक्षणिकानां शक्तत्त्वप्रसङ्गः । पदोपस्थापित-
पदार्थस्थाप्ये लक्ष्ये पदवृत्तिविषयत्वव्यवहारो वाक्यार्थशब्दत्ववत्परम्परया,
इति, अदोषः । तस्य च शक्तिपदार्थस्य सामान्यमात्रविषयत्वं लाघवात्,
आनन्त्यव्यभिचारदोषाभावाच्च, न तु सामान्यविशिष्टव्यक्तिविषयत्वं
गौरवात् । तदुक्तम्—

‘ विशेष्यं नाभिधा गच्छेत् क्षीणशक्तिविशेषणे ’

इति । उपाधितद्वतोश्च तादात्म्याभ्युपगमात्, उपाधिवाचकादपि व्यक्त्यु-

the meaning of the word, and not based upon the word. The meaning of the sentence also is indicated by the meanings themselves of the words and not by the words, — thus the indicative words would not have the contingency of possessing the denotative power. In the case of the indicated (sense), which is to be brought forth by the meaning of the word established by the word, the practical method about its being the object of the functioning of the word takes place in (successive) order, being possessed of the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the words — thus there is no blemish. And that sense of the denotative word refers only in a general manner, on account of (this procedure involving) simplicity, and also on account of the absence of the blemishes — endlessness and violation, — and does not refer to an individual particularised by that generality, because that would be cumbrous. As has been said —

‘ Denotation does not reach the particular object, with its power coming to an end in respect of a qualifying attribute. ’

On account of the admission of the identity of the limiting adjunct and the object possessing that, even from the denotative word of the limiting adjunct could be accounted for,

पस्थित्युपपत्तिः, सामान्यस्य जातिरूपतया पच्यादिक्रियारूपोपाधिरूपतया च व्यक्तौ समवायः, तथा च सामान्यवाचकस्य व्यक्तौ, आक्षेपो लक्षणा वा, इति, अपरे —तत्, न, समवायानङ्गीकारात्, 'नीलो घटः', इत्यादौ तादात्म्यप्रतीतिः, तत्रापि लक्षणानङ्गीकारात् ।

[२९] (३) वेदान्तिमते सद्रूपस्यात्मनः सर्वतादात्म्यापन्नस्यैव किञ्चिद्विशिष्टस्य तत्तत्सामान्यरूपत्वात्, अनिर्वचनीयगोत्वादिसामान्याभ्युपगमेन वा, तन्मात्रे शक्तिर्न विरुध्यते । उपाधिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ शक्तिस्वीकारेऽपि नास्माकं कापि क्षतिः । सापि द्विविधा—रूढिः, योगश्च । तत्र

the presence of the individual ; there is the intimate relation of the generality in respect of the individual in the form of the genus and also in the form of the limitation of the nature of the action 'cooking' etc. ; in the same way (there is the intimate relation) of (the word) denoting the generality with the individual, (that is to say), the implication or indication — so (argue) others. (Our reply is) — That is not (right), because we do not admit any intimate relation, on account of the apprehension of identity in cases like a 'dark jar', and Indication not being admitted there too.

[29] (3) According to the view of the Vedāntins, in the case of the Ātman having the Sat-nature, involving identity with everything, denotation in respect of merely that, is not contradicted, owing to something particularised having the form of the varied generality concerned, or by admitting the generality bull-ness etc., that is indescribable. Even if the denotative power is regarded as belonging to the individual particularised by the limiting adjuncts, we do not stand to lose anything. That (denotative power) also is two-fold — (1) Convention, (2) Etymological usage.

रूढिः, नाम निखिलजनपदेष्वविप्रतिपन्नप्रयोगेण वा, गवाद्याकृतिवाचकत्वेन वा, वृत्तिः समुदायशक्तिः, इत्याख्यायते, यथा, अक्षादिपदानां गवादिपदानां च । योगो नाम शब्दस्यान्यत्र ह्युपवयवद्वारेणार्थान्तरे वृत्तिः, यथा चन्द्रे रूढस्य सोमशब्दस्य, उमया सह वर्तते, इति व्युत्पत्त्या महेशे वृत्तिः, यथा वा, पाचकपङ्कजादिपदानाम् । अत एव रूढिः सर्वतो बलवती, सा हि श्रुतिः, योगस्तु वाक्यम् । तेन मण्डपाश्वकर्णादिपदेषु न मण्डपानकर्तृत्वादेरन्वयः, श्रुतिलिङ्गाधिकरणन्यायविरोधात् ।

अत्र, न बाध्यबाधकभावे सापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वे, एव तत्रम् । पदात्,

There Convention is indeed declared as the combined power functioning either on account of the unchallenged use in all the regions, or as denoting the forms of bull and others, as in the case of the words Akṣa (sense-organ) etc., and of the words Bull and others. Etymological usage, verily, is the functioning of the word, giving another sense by its component parts intended for some other meaning, as the word Soma having convention in respect of the moon, has its power to denote Śiva on the strength of the etymology — one who stays with Umā, or as in the case of the words Pācaka (a cook), Paṅkaja (a lotus) etc. It is for this reason, that the convention is the most powerful factor, that is (as infallible as) the Scripture, while etymological meaning is just a (purport-) sentence. Therefore, in respect of the words Maṇḍapa, Aśvakarṇa etc., there is no connection with being the agent of the drinking of Maṇḍa etc., on account of this being in contradiction with the maxim (specifying the respective importance) in the topic dealing with Śruti, logical mark, (etc).

Here again, apropos the relation of the stultified and the stultifier, the states of being dependent upon another

१ Ā drops वा २ Ā गवाकृति... ३ Ā यथोक्षादिपदानां ४ Ā क्लृप्तावयवशक्तिद्वारेण...

५ Ā पाचकपाठकादि... ६ Ā रूढिः सर्वबलवती ७ Ā मण्डपाश्वकर्णादिषु ८ Ā अत्र च

विलम्बोपस्थितिकत्वशीघ्रोपस्थितिकत्वे, इति केचित् ।

अत्र पङ्कजादिपदेषु पदत्वादेर्नियमत उपस्थितेः, तस्याश्च रूढि-
साध्यत्वात्, योगरूढ्याख्या, मुख्यवृत्तिः, इति भाट्टा नैयायिकाः, च
मन्यन्ते ।

प्राभाकरा वेदान्तिनः, च तन्न क्षमन्ते । यथा गोशब्दस्य नानार्थ-
त्वेऽपि भूरिप्रयोगवशात्, सास्त्रादिमदाकृतिविशेषस्यैव नियमत उपस्थितिः,
पदान्तरसमभिव्याहारादिना च शैरादेः, तथा पङ्कजपदस्यावयवशक्तैः
कुमुदपद्मयोरविशिष्टत्वेऽपि भूरिप्रयोगवशात्पञ्चे नियमोपपत्तेः । न च

and not being dependent upon anything, — this alone is the
determining factor. Some say (that the determining factor
is) the state of presenting itself with delay and the state
of presenting itself quickly from the words.

Here in the case of words Paṅkaja and others, as the
nature of lotus etc., presents itself as a rule, and as that is
capable of being established by convention, there is the
chief function called Etymology-cum-convention. — So think
the followers of Bhaṭṭa and the Naiyāyikas.

The followers of Prabhākara and the Vedāntins, how-
ever, do not tolerate that. Though the word Go conveys
many senses, the particular form possessing the dewlap
etc., alone, as a rule presents itself (to the mind), on
account of the very frequent use (of that word in that
sense), and that of Śara and others, by its being men-
tioned along with other words, in like manner. Though the
power of the parts of the word Paṅkaja equally concerns
Kumuda and Padma lotuses, it is rightly confined to the
Padma on account of the very frequent use (in that sense).

१ A पञ्चादेर्नियमतः २ A adds तृतीया after योगरूढ्याख्या ३ A रश्म्यादेः

४ A पञ्चत्वे

शब्दाद् वृत्त्युपस्थितस्यैव शाब्दबोधे भाननियमात्, पद्मत्वे वृत्त्यभावे तस्य शाब्दबोधे भानं न स्यात्, इति वाच्यम्, कर्त्रादिकारकस्य, अशाब्दस्यापि शाब्दबोधे भानाभ्युपगमात्, शाब्दबोधे नियतोपस्थितिकत्वस्यैव तदन्वय-नियामकत्वात् । अन्यथा, लक्षतावच्छेदकस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमेन 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इति तीरत्वादेर्भानं न स्यात् ।

[३०] अथवास्तु योगरूढिः, अपि तृतीया वृत्तिः, न नः किञ्चिद-पचीयते । जघन्यापि द्विविधा, लक्षणा गौणी च । तत्र शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा, यथा गङ्गायां घोषः, इत्यत्र प्रवाहशक्तस्य गङ्गापदस्य तत्संबन्धे

Nor again should it be said that there is invariably the apprehension regarding the meaning of words from the words associated with its functioning; there being no functioning in respect of the nature of Padma, there is no apprehension in regard to the meaning from the word, because apprehension is admitted in the meaning from the word, even of the causal factors the agent etc., although not expressed in (so many) words; in respect of the meaning from words only that which presents itself invariably determines the connection with it. Otherwise, by not admitting the state of functioning in respect of what characterises the thing to be indicated, there would not be the apprehension of the state of the bank etc., in the expression ' The cow-pen on the Ganges ' etc.

[30] Or, let there be even the third function ' Etymology-cum-convention; ' nothing is lost by us. The subordinate (function) also (is) two-fold—Lakṣaṇā and Qualitative (Lakṣaṇā). There ' Indication ' is the possible connection (with the denotative sense) as in the expression ' A cow-pen on the Ganges ', the word Ganges denoting the

तीरे वृत्तिः । एतस्याः साक्षात् शक्यवृत्तित्वेऽपि परम्परया पदवृत्तित्वम्, इति, अविरोधः । अत्र च, उद्देश्यान्वन्यानुपपत्तिर्बीजम् । शक्यवृत्तिलक्ष्य-माणगुणसंबन्धो गौणी । यथा 'सिंहो माणवकः' इत्यत्र सिंहपदस्य सिंहवृत्तिशौर्यादिगुणलक्षणया तद्वति माणवके वृत्तिः, इति । अत एव लक्षणा गौणीतो बलवती, गौण्या वृत्तिद्वयात्मकत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

‘ अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्ष्णोच्यते ।

लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगाद् वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता ॥ ’ (कुमारिल)

इति ।

[३१] अत्र, उपचाराख्या, अपरा जघन्या वृत्तिः, इत्येके—अनि-

current has the function regarding the bank — the connection with it. Though here this (Lakṣaṇā) has a direct function with the denotative sense, it is the function of the word indirectly, so there is no contradiction. And here the basic factor is the impossibility of the connection with what is to be pointed out. The Qualitative (Lakṣaṇā) is the connection with the qualities that are to be indicated by the denotative function. As in the expression 'Māṇavaka is a lion', there is of the word Lion the function in regard to Māṇavaka who is possessed of those qualities, by the indication of qualities, heroism and others residing in the lion. For this very reason, Indication is more powerful than the Qualitative, because the Qualitative is made up of two functions. As has been said—

‘ The apprehension not existing otherwise from the object denoted is called Lakṣaṇā. The function thereof is accepted as qualitative on account of its connection with the qualities to be indicated (or of what is to be indicated).’

(Kumārila).

[31] Some say that in such cases there is a different subordinate function called Metaphor. Metaphor is the func-

यतसंबन्धेनान्यत्र वृत्तिरुपचारः । निरुद्धसंबन्धेनान्यत्र वृत्तिर्लक्षणा । यथा 'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इत्यादौ पुरुषैः समं मञ्चसंबन्धोऽनियतः । गङ्गातीर-योस्तु नियत एव संबन्धः, इति—तत्, न । एवम्, अवान्तरभेदेऽपि लक्षणायामेवान्तर्भावात्, शक्यसंबन्धस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् । गौण्यास्तु वृत्तिद्वयात्मकत्वात्, न लक्षणायामन्तर्भावः । न च सादृश्यसंबन्धेन सिं-पदस्य माणवके वृत्तिः, लक्षणैव इति साम्प्रतश्च, सादृश्यस्य शब्दबोधे भानाभावप्रसङ्गात्, शक्यसंबन्धस्य स्वोपस्थापकत्वाभावात्, संबन्धिभाना-र्थमेव तस्य वृत्तित्वाम्युपगमात् । तस्मात्, लक्षणावैलक्षण्यादतिरिक्तैव

tion (of the word) elsewhere on account of its unregulated connection ; (while) Lakṣaṇā is the function elsewhere by an invariable connection. As in the case of expressions like ' The cots are shouting ' , the connection of the cots with the men is not invariable. But there is an invariable connection between the current of the Ganges and the bank. — This (reasoning) is not (right). Though there might be such minor differences in this way, they can be included in Lakṣaṇā itself, because the connection with the denotative sense is the same in both. But in the case of the Qualitative which has two functions it cannot be included in Indication. Nor again is it right (to say) that the word Lion having some function in respect of Māṇavaka on account of the connection of similarity is Lakṣaṇā itself ; because similarity cannot be apprehended when the word is understood ; a possible connection (with the denotative sense) would have nothing to establish itself, because its function is admitted to be solely for the purpose of the apprehension of something connected with it. Therefore the Qualitative function is quite different on account of its dissimilarity with Lakṣaṇā — this appears to be proper from every point.

वृत्तिगौणी, इति चतुरस्रम् । यत्

‘ यौगिको योगरूढश्च शब्दः स्यादौपचारिकः ।

मुख्यो लक्षणिको गौणः शब्दः षोढा निगद्यते ॥ ’

इति वैयाकरणैः षड्विधत्वंमुक्तम्, तन्मुख्यजघन्ययोरेवावान्तरभेदमादाय योजनीयम् । तथाहि—मुख्यो—रूढो यौगिको योगरूढः—इत्येकं त्रिकं मुख्यायाम् । लाक्षणिकः, औपचारिको गौणः, इत्यपरं त्रिकं जघन्यायामिति^१ ।

[३२] व्यञ्जनाख्या, अपरा वृत्तिः, इत्यालङ्कारिकाः । ते तु गौणीं लक्षणामध्ये, अन्तर्भाव्य, मुख्या लक्षणा व्यञ्जना चेति त्रैविध्यमाचक्षते ।

As to the six-fold division spoken of by the grammarians, viz. —

‘ A word may be (1) etymological, (2) etymological-cum-conventional, (3) metaphorical, (4) primary, (5) indicative and (6) qualitative — (thus) the word is described as six-fold. ’

that has to be explained by taking into account other subsidiary divisions of the primary and subordinate varieties themselves. To explain the same — (1) Primary conventional, (2) Etymological, (3) Etymological-cum-conventional, — this is one triad in the case of the Principal, (4) Indicative, (5) Metaphorical, (6) Qualitative — this is the second triad in respect of the Subordinate.

[32] There is another function called Suggestion — so (say) the rhetoricians. They indeed having included the Qualitative in Indication speak of the three-fold nature as (1) Denotation, (2) Indication, (3) Suggestion. There is Suggestion conveying various meanings in respect of many

व्यञ्जना च यत्र 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः' इति वाक्यप्रयोगानन्तरं 'दूरं मा गाः' इति, 'पण्यान्यपसार्यन्ताम्' इति, 'संध्योपास्यताम्' इत्यादि बहूनां बहुविधार्थप्रत्ययो भवति । तत्र च न शक्तिः, न वा लक्षणा, किं तु शब्द-स्यैवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामपरा व्यञ्जनाख्या वृत्तिराश्रयणीया । तद्भेदाच्च न वाक्यभेदः, शक्यलक्ष्यार्थभेद एव तदभ्युपगमात् । अत एव सा नार्थापत्तिः, नियतलिङ्गाभावात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां शब्दस्यैव तत्र कारणतावधारणात् । यथाकथंचिदर्थापत्तिसंभवे च शब्दप्रमाणोच्छेदापातात्, सर्वत्रैव तस्याः सुलभत्वात् । सा च शक्तिमूला लक्षणामूला व्यञ्जनामूला च, इत्याद्यवान्तरभेदमप्याहुः—

तत्, न । तस्या अर्थापत्तावन्तर्भावस्य व्यक्तिविवेकमहिम्ना दर्शित-

things, after the use of the sentence 'The sun has set', — 'Do not go far away', 'Let the articles of merchandise be removed', 'Perform the Sandhyā-ceremony' etc. In these cases there is neither the Denotative power nor Indication ; but another function called Suggestion has to be accepted in accordance with the (law of) presence and absence of the word alone. By that division, there is not the splitting of the sentence, because that is admitted only when there is the difference in the denotative and indicative meanings. For this very reason, it (Suggestion) is not Presumption, on account of the absence of a definite characteristic. For, the word alone is ascertained to be the cause there by the (law of) presence and absence. If Presumption is somehow possible, then there would be the total annihilation of the Word- (means of) proof—because that (Presumption) is available everywhere. They also speak of subsidiary divisions, viz. based upon Denotation, based upon Indication, and based upon Suggestion.

(Our reply is) — That is not so. Because it has been

त्वात् । शब्दो हि नियतसंबन्धेनैव व्यञ्जयति, अन्यथा, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च तेनैव संबन्धेन वक्त्रमिप्रायमेदानुमानं केन वार्यते ? स्वार्थानुमाने च व्यभिचारादीनामप्रसारात् । यदि च न, अर्थापत्तावन्तर्भवति तर्हि, अस्तु सापि शब्दवृत्तिः, इति न काप्यस्माकं क्षतिः ।

लक्षणापि त्रिविधा—अजहत्स्वार्था, जहदजहत्स्वार्था, जहत्स्वार्था च, इति । तत्राद्या, वाच्यार्थापरित्यागेनैवान्यत्र वर्तमाना रक्षितुं सर्व-जघन्यातो बलवती, यथा ‘काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्’ इति लोके, उपा-घातकत्वेन काकपदस्य काकतदितरेषु वृत्तिः । यथा वा ‘सृष्टीरुपदधाति’

shown in the *Vyakti-viveka* of (Rājānaka) Mahiman that it (Word) is included in Presumption. For, Word can suggest only on the strength of invariable connection ; otherwise there would be sheer anarchy. And further, on the strength of that very connection, who can keep outside, the inferences from the various intentions of the speaker ? In respect of Inference, there is no scope for violation etc. If again it cannot be included in Presumption, then let that again be a function of the Word ; we do not lose anything thereby.

Indication (is) also three-fold — (1) Ajahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is not adandoned), (2) Jahat-ajahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is partly abandon- ed and partly not abandoned), (3) Jahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is abandoned). There the first (Ajahat- svārthā), by the very fact of the non-abandonment of the denotative sense, leading to another (sense), equal to the denotative power, is the strongest of the subordinate ones— as in the expression — ‘ Let the curds be protected from the crows ’, used in the world, the word Crow has power to refer to the crow and others on account of their being the

इत्यत्र सृष्टिशब्दस्य मन्त्रोपाधेयेष्टकासु वृत्तिः सृष्टिमन्त्रबाहुल्येन, इति ।
 'शोणो धावति' इत्यादि तु नोदाहरणम्, तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन तत्रापि
 मुख्यत्वोपपत्तेः । अत एव,

‘चतुष्टयी शब्दानां वृत्तिः ।’ (म. १. १. २. शिव सू. २. १)

इति महाभाष्यकारैरुक्तम् । चतुष्टयं च जाति-गुण-क्रिया-द्रव्य-स्वरूपम् ।
 तत्र 'गौः' इत्यादौ जातिः । 'शुक्लो, नीलः' इत्यादौ गुणः । 'चल^३ः'
 इत्यादौ क्रिया । 'डित्थः' इत्यादौ द्रव्यस्वरूपमेव । लक्षणाङ्गीकारे च
 तद्विरुध्येत, वाक्यपदीये चैतद्विविच्य व्याख्यातम् । येषां तु समवायाङ्गी-

causes of injury. Or, in the expression — 'He lays on the Sṛṣṭis' — here the word Sṛṣṭi has power to refer to the bricks that are to be laid in conformity with the Mantras, on account of the preponderance of the Sṛṣṭi-mantras. Expressions like 'The Śoṇa runs' are however not an instance (of this kind of Lakṣaṇā); for, there also, their conveying the primary sense is proper on account of the relation of identity. For this very reason, it has been laid down by the venerable (Patañjali) author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, that

‘The function of words is four-fold.’

And the four-fold division refers to the nature of Genus, Quality, Action and Substance. In such cases, there is the genus (Bull-ness) in the expression — Bull etc. In expressions like — White, Dark, there is quality. In expressions like — Moving, there is action. In expressions like — Dīṭṭha (a proper name), there lies the very nature of the substance. If Indication were to be admitted (there), that would go counter to what has been stated above. This has been explained with proper scrutiny in the *Vākyapadiya* (of

१ Ḍ सृष्टिशब्दस्य सृष्टयसृष्टिमन्त्रोपाधेयेष्टकासु २ Ḍ शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिरिति
 ३ Ḍ चलति इत्यादौ ४ Ḍ drops च

कारः, तेषां तत्र जहल्लक्षणेति संतोष्यम् ।

जहदजहत्स्वार्था शक्यैकदेशपरित्यागेन शक्यैकदेशे वृत्तिः । इयमपि जहल्लक्षणातो गौणीतश्च बलवती, वाच्यैकदेशात्त्यात्, यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यादौ । अत्र हि तत्कालवैशिष्ट्यैतत्कालवैशिष्ट्योर्युगपदन्वये विरोधात् तदुपलक्षितदेवदत्तस्वरूपमेव शक्यैकदेशलक्षणया पदाम्यामुपस्थाप्यते । इयमेव 'भागलक्षणा' इत्युच्यते । न च विशेषणस्य बाधात्, तत्र, अनन्वयः; न तु विशेष्ये लक्षणा, इति वाच्यम्, परिभाषामात्रत्वापत्तेः,

Bhartṛhari). Those who admit the Samavāya relation, may remain contented by (calling it) Indication where the primary sense is abandoned.

Indication where the primary sense is partly abandoned and partly not abandoned, is the function possible in one part by the abandonment possible in another part. This also is stronger than the Jahat-lakṣaṇā and also than the Qualitative, because it is connected with a part of the denotative sense, as in the case of (the expressions) like — 'That is this Devadatta'. For here, there being contradiction regarding the simultaneous association with something particularised by that (past) time, and the same particularised by the present time, the very nature of Devadatta indicated thereby is brought forth by the two words through the possible Indication in one part. This same is spoken of as 'Part-Indication'. It should not be argued that owing to the qualifying being stultified, there is no connection there, but there is no Indication in the case of the qualified — because that would merely be indulging in a technical terminology, because it is admitted that only the counter-entity involving the connection is ushered by the functioning

अन्वयप्रतियोगिपदार्थमात्रस्य वृत्त्योपस्थित्यङ्गीकारात्, विशेष्यबाधेन विशेषणान्वयेऽपि लक्षणाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च, निराकाङ्क्षत्वात् तत्र लक्षणा, विशेष्ये तु साकाङ्क्षत्वात्, न लक्षणा, यथा 'गौः अनित्या' इत्यादौ, इति वाच्यम् । गोत्वविशिष्टेऽनित्यत्वान्वये गोत्वस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गात्, तदुपलक्ष्यते, इति वाच्यः । तथा च लब्धपदैव लक्षणा, 'एकस्य द्वयम्', इत्यस्यापि लक्षणासाध्यत्वात् ।

न च जहदजहत्स्वार्थभेदेन द्वैविध्यमेव लक्षणायाः प्रसिद्धम् । 'नित्यो गौः' इत्यादौ गोत्वमात्रोपस्थित्यर्थं लक्षणान्तरस्यापि संभवात्, भागलक्षणाया अपि प्रसिद्धत्वात्, परिभाषामात्रस्य वा, अप्रयोजकत्वात्,

power, and further there would be the undesirable result, viz. the absence of Indication, on account of the stultification of the qualified, even though there is the connection with the qualifier. It should not be further argued — there is Indication (in respect of the qualifying) owing to the want of expectancy; but in the case of the qualified there would be no Indication owing to its being possessed of expectancy, as in expressions like 'The cow is not permanent'. — There being the connection with the non-permanent nature in the entity particularised by cow-ness, the cow-ness also would perforce be likewise, and so that (cow-ness) also would be indicated, — thus it is the primary sense. Thus Indication has become firm; also the expression — 'Two in one', would be established by Lakṣaṇā.

Again not only the two-fold nature of Indication is known due to the division of Jahat-ajahat-svārthā; because in expressions like 'the permanent bull' there would be the possibility of another Lakṣaṇā also for the purpose of ushering only the bullness, the Part-Indication being also well

अस्ति तृतीया, अपि—जहत्स्वार्था-वाच्यार्थस्य सर्वाश्लयागेन, अन्यत्र वृत्तिः, यथा 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इत्यादौ । इयं च गौणीतो बलवती, सर्व-लक्षणातो दुर्बला, इतरवृत्तिसंभवे नाद्रियते, सर्वथा मुख्यार्थबाधात् ।

[३३] तत्, एवं सिद्धान्तमतानुसारेणैव निरूपिताः शब्दवृत्तयः । आसत्वेकतराणि तैर्द्वितीये ब्रह्मणि भवितुमर्हति । तत्र रुढेरसंभवः प्रथमं प्रतिपाद्यते, अन्यासां लक्ष्मूलत्वेन तन्निषेधादेव निषेधसंभवात् । सा हि व्युत्पत्तिस्तुना परिच्छिद्यते—कचित्प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गानुमानात्, यथा 'घट-मानय' इति वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं कश्चित् कम्बुग्रीवादिमन्तमर्थमानयति ।

known and mere different terminology not being capable of producing anything — there is also a third, Jahat-svārthā, functioning elsewhere by the total abandonment of the primary sense as in 'A cow-pen on the Ganges' etc. This (type of Lakṣaṇā) stronger than the Qualitative, but the weakest of all Lakṣaṇās is not favoured, when there is the possibility of any other functioning power, on account of the contradiction of the primary sense in every way.

[33] Thus have been pointed out the functioning powers of words, in accordance with the conclusive view itself (accepted by us). Not even one of these deserves to exist in respect of Brahman without a second. Apropos that, first is propounded the impossibility of convention. Other (powers) being based upon that (convention), there would arise the denial of them by the denial itself of that. That (convention) is analysed by one going deep into the matter. — Somewhere (this is achieved) from inference based upon the logical mark — the activity concerned. As for instance, regarding (the expression) 'Bring the jar', immediately after hearing the sentence, some one brings the object possessing a tortoise-like neck etc. Having actually noticed his process of

तस्यानयनक्रियां प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्य, तत्कारणत्वेन तस्य कृतिमनुमाय,
तस्याः कृतेः स्वकृद्विद्ययात्वेन प्रवर्तकज्ञानजन्यत्वमनुमिनोति । तच्च ज्ञानं
शब्दान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्, कारणान्तरस्य चानुपस्थितेः, तस्य
शब्दस्यैव घटकर्मकानयनकर्तव्यताप्रतिपादने सामर्थ्यं कल्पयति, तत
आवापोद्वापाभ्यां प्रत्येकसामर्थ्यं क्रमेण निश्चिनोति, इति शक्तिग्रहक्रमः ।

एवं 'दिष्ट्या वर्धसे' 'भद्र पुत्रस्ते जातः', इत्यादिवाक्यश्रवणसम-
नन्तरं श्रेष्ठमुखविद्याशादिलिङ्गेन हर्षमनुमाय, तस्य च कारणान्तरानु-
पस्थितेः, पुत्रजन्मनश्च मानान्तरेणाज्ञातत्वात्, तज्जन्यतां निश्चित्य, तज्ज्ञानं

bringing (the jar), having inferred the action as its cause,
one infers that action, as being produced by the promoting
knowledge on the strength of a similar type of action of
his own. And that knowledge, following the presence and
absence of words, there being no other cause forth-coming,
postulates the power of the word itself in establishing what
is to be done, viz. the bringing with a jar as its object, and
then one gradually concludes the power of each (of the
words) through the inclusion and the exclusion (of the
words concerned) — such is the order of the understanding
of the (word-) power.

In a similar manner, immediately on hearing the sen-
tence 'Congratulations!' 'O good one, a son is born to
you!' etc., having inferred the (rise of) joy through the cha-
racteristics, the blooming of the face etc., of the hearer and
there being no other cause forth-coming, the birth of the
son not being known by some other proof, having concluded
it (the joy) as being produced, having postulated this
sentence as the cause referring to that knowledge by apply-

१ A तच्च ज्ञानं शब्दं अन्वयः ... २ A... मुखविकासादि ३ A मानान्तरेण ज्ञातत्वात्
४ A तज्ज्ञानजन्यतां

प्रत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामिदं वाक्यं जनकमिति कल्पयित्वा, क्रमेण पूर्ववत् प्रतिपदशक्तिग्रहः । तद्वत्, अत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्त्यादिजनकत्वाभावात्, मानान्तरागोचरत्वाच्च, न तत्र शक्तिग्रहावसरः ।

[३४] क्वचिदुपमानात्, शक्तिग्रहः । यथा 'गोसदृशो गवयः' इति वाक्यं श्रुतवतो नागरिकस्य कदाचिदरण्यप्राप्तादन्तर् गोसदृशव्यक्त्यन्तरदर्शने पूर्वश्रुतवाक्यार्थस्मरणेन गोसादृश्याद् गवयैपदनिश्चयः ।

[३५] क्वचित्, वैधर्म्याद्—यथा 'धिकं करभम्, अतिदीर्घग्रीवं कठोरकण्ठकाशिनम्' इत्यादि निन्दावाक्यं श्रुतवतस्तत्सादृशव्यक्तिदर्शने

ing the rule of presence and absence—there is in order as before the understanding of the power of each word. Following the same line (*tadvat*), here the knowledge of Brahman cannot be the producing cause of activity etc., and that does not come within the province of any other proof; so, there is no scope for the understanding of the Denotative power in that case.

[34] Somewhere the understanding of Śakti is through analogy. As for instance, in the case of a city-dweller who has heard the sentence 'A Gavaya is like a bull.', there is the ascertainment (of the primary sense) of the word Gavaya, through resemblance to the bull, on the strength of the remembrance of the sentence heard before, when he perceives another individual like a bull, perchance after he had been to the forest.

[35] Somewhere (the understanding of Śakti is) through dissimilarity — as for instance, in the case of one who has heard the condemnatory sentence, — 'Fie upon this camel, with its very long neck, eating the rough thorns'

१ A ... प्रतिपदं शक्तिग्रहः

२ A adds वाच्यत्वं after गवयैपद

३ A तादृग्व्यक्तिदर्शने

पूर्ववत् करभण्दवाच्यत्वनिश्चयः । तदुभयं ब्रह्मणि न संभवति साधर्म्य-
वैधर्म्यशून्यत्वात्, सान्तरायोगाच्च ।

[३६] कश्चित्, आप्तवाक्यात्-यथा 'कम्बुग्रीवादिवान् घटपद-
वाच्यः' इति । तद्वत्, अपि, अत्र न संभवति, उद्देश्यांशोपस्थापकपद-
भावात्, तस्यैव, अधुना विचार्यत्वाद् ।

[३७] कश्चित्, प्रसिद्धार्थपदसामानाधिकरण्यात्-यथा हि 'सह-
कारतरो पिको रौति' इति स्तकर्तरि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे पिकपदवाच्यत्वनिश्चयः ।
यथा 'वज्रहस्तः सहस्राक्षः पुरंदरः' इत्यादौ वज्रहस्ताद्याकृतिविशिष्टे पुरं-

etc., there is the ascertainment of the primary sense of the word Karabha at the sight of the individual of that nature as before. Both of these are not possible in the case of Brahman, on account of its being void of similarity and dissimilarity, and on account of no other means of proof being available.

[36] Somewhere (the understanding of Śakti is) from the sentence of a reliable person — as for instance ' (The object) possessing a tortoise-like neck etc., is to be denoted by the word Ghaṭa '. It is not possible like that also here (in the case of Brahman), on account of the absence of a word establishing the matter to be mentioned, because that itself is the matter under consideration now.

[37] Somewhere (the Śaktigraha is) from the case-coordination of words with the meaning established, as for instance, in (the expression) ' Here a cuckoo (Pika) coos on the mango-tree ', — there is the ascertainment of the denotative sense of the word Pika, when the agent of the cooing is established by Direct perception. As in (the expression) ' Thunderbolt in hand, thousand-eyed, smasher of for-

दरादिपदवाच्यत्वाध्यवसायः—तद्वदपि नेह संभवति, निर्विकल्पके तस्मिन् सर्वस्यापि पदस्याप्रसिद्धार्थकत्वात् ।

[३८] कचिद् वाक्यशेषात्—यथा यववराहादिशब्दानाम्

‘ यदान्या ओषधयो म्लायन्ति, अथैतां मोदमाना एवावतिष्ठन्ति ।

वराहमनुधावन्ति । ’

इत्यादिवाक्यशेषात्, कङ्गुकाकादिव्यावृत्त्या वाच्यार्थविशेषनिश्चयः । यथा वा स्वर्गयूपाहवनीयादिशब्दानां ‘ यन्न दुःखेन संभिन्नम् ’ इत्यादि-वाक्यशेषात्, अलौकिकार्थविशेषनिर्णयः । तद्वदपि ब्रह्मणि न संभवति,

tresses’ etc., particularised by the form of having the thunderbolt in hand etc., there is the ascertainment of the denotative sense of the words, Purandara etc. — Here anything like that is not possible, because in the case of that (Brahman), which is void of any distinction, all the words have their meanings not established.

[38] Somewhere (the Śaktigraha) is from the remaining part of the sentence, as in the case of the words Yava, Varāha etc. From the remaining part of the sentence such as,

‘ When other herbs fade out, then these, verily, remain,
full of joy. (The cows) run after the Varāha (Boar) ’

there is the ascertainment of the particular denotative sense, by the exclusion of the Kaṅgu-seed, and crow etc. Or, as for instance, in the case of the words Svarga, Yūpa, Āhavanīya (fire of that name), there is the ascertainment of a super-mundane particular sense on account of the remaining part of the sentence — ‘ What is not mixed up with

१ A अथैते

२ A एवावतिष्ठन्ते

३ A वराहं गावोऽनुधावन्ति

४ इत्यादि dropped in A

वाक्यशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मविषयत्वासंभवात् । अन्यविषयवाक्यशेषेण च ब्रह्म-
विषयशक्त्यवधारणायोगात् ।

ननु ब्रह्मणि प्रकारान्तरासंभवेऽपि वाक्यशेषात् शक्तिग्रहो भविष्यति ।
तथाहि

‘ ब्रह्मविदामोति परम् ’ (तैत्ति. २. १)

इतिपरमपुंमर्थप्राप्तिसाधनं ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, इत्यभिहिते किं तद् ब्रह्म, इत्या-
काङ्क्षायां

‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ’ (तैत्ति. २. १)

misery’ etc., — anything like that too either, is not possible in the case of Brahman, because the remaining part also of the sentence cannot possibly have Brahman for its object. On the strength of the remaining part of the sentence referring to some other matter, it is not right to ascertain any denotative power referring to Brahman.

I say (says the objector) — There would be the comprehension of the denotative power from the remaining part of the sentence in the case of Brahman, even though any other method is impossible there. To explain the same — When it is stated that the knowledge of Brahman is the means for attaining the highest human purpose in (the passage)

‘ The Brahman-knower secures the Highest ’

(Taitti. II. 1)

with the expectancy to know what that Brahman is, (the Śruti) points out to the characteristic of Brahman as

‘ Existence, Knowledge, Infinite (is) Brahman ’.

(Taitti. II. 1)

इति ब्रह्मलक्षणमुपदिशति । तथा च सत्यादिपदोपस्थापिताद्वितीये वस्तुन्येव ब्रह्मपदशक्तिग्रहो भविष्यति, इति चेत्—न, सत्यादिपदेभ्योऽपि निर्विकल्पोपस्थितेरसंभवात् । तत्रापि वाक्यशेषानुधावने, अनवस्था ।

मां भूद् विधिरूपवाक्यशेषाच्छक्तिग्रहः, निषेधैरूपवाक्यशेषात् शक्तिग्रहो भविष्यति,

‘ तदेतद् ब्रह्म, अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म । ’

(बृह. २. ५. १९)

इति पूर्वादिनिषेधद्वारा निर्विकल्पकोपस्थितिसंभवात्, इति चेत्—न । तेन

And subsequently if there is the establishment of power regarding the word Brahman, verily, in the entity without a second, established by the words Satya etc., — (then our reply is) — No (that is not so), on account of the impossibility of the distinctionless (Brahman) being brought home even from the words Satya etc. There also would arise the fault of endlessness in running after another remaining part of the sentence.

If it be argued — Let there n t be Śaktigraha from the remaining part of the injunctive sentence, but there would be Śaktigraha from the remaining part of the prohibitory sentence, on account of the possibility of the distinctionless (Brahman) being brought home through the denial of being prior etc., as in the passage

‘ This is that Brahman, not prior, not posterior ; not inside, not outside ; — this Ātman is Brahman. ’

(Br̥ha. II. 5. 19)

— (our reply is) — No. There being the denial of some particularities by that (passage), there is no establishment of a distinctionless Brahman. If, however, there is the denial

१ Ā मा, अस्तु २ Ā drops शक्तिग्रह ३ निषेध...ग्रहो dropped in IO.

कियद्विशेषनिषेधे न निर्विकल्पकब्रह्मसिद्धिः । सकलविशेषनिषेधे च एद-
वाच्यत्वस्यापि निषेधात्, न तत्र शक्तिग्रहसंभवः ।

‘ यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते ’ (तैत्ति. २. ४)

‘ न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा । ’ (मु. ३. १. ८)

इत्यादिशस्त्रेण साक्षात्पदविषयतानिषेधाच्च । एतेन

‘ अस्थूलमनणु ’ (सुवालो. ३. २; बृह. ३. ८. ८; यो. शि. ३. १९)

इत्याद्यपि व्याख्यातम् ।

‘ यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभि-
संविशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्म । ’ (तैत्ति. ३. १)

इति वाक्यशेषात्, जगदुपादानत्वादिविशिष्टे शक्तिग्रहः संभवति, इति चेत्—

of all particularities, there would be no possibility of the Śaktigraha, on account of the denial even of the denotation of the word, and on account of the direct denial of (Brahman) being the object denoted by the word, in the Śāstra- (or Śruti-) passage

‘ From which the words turn away ’ (Taittī. II. 4)

‘ Which is grasped neither by the eye, nor by word ’

(Muṇḍa. III. 1. 8)

etc. Thus is explained away also (the passage)

‘ Neither gross, nor atomic ’ (Br̥ha. III. 8. 8)

etc. If it be argued — From the remaining part of the passage in

‘ From which these beings are originated, by which these when originated live, to which they go, into which they enter — know that fully, that is Brahman ’

(Taittī. III. 1)

the Śaktigraha is possible in the case of Brahman parti-

संभवतु, निर्विशेषस्य किमागतम् ?

[३९] अत एव न योगोऽपि तस्यावयवशक्तिरूपत्वेन रूढिमूलत्वात् । बृहि बृद्धाविति धातोरौणादिकेन मन्प्रत्ययेन ब्रह्मपदस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वाद्, योगवृत्त्या बृहद्वाचकत्वे तस्य बृहतः संकोचकाभावात्, देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वं पर्यवस्यति । तेन योगवृत्त्यैव सर्वपरिच्छेदशून्यं वस्तु ब्रह्मशब्देनोच्यते । तदुक्तं भाष्यकारैः—

‘ बृहतेर्धातोरन्वयानुगमाद् ’ (ब्र. सू. शां. भा. १. १. १)

cularised by being the material cause of the world, — (our reply is) — Let that be possible there (we have nothing to do with it). Where does the distinctionless thing come in here ?

[39] For the same reason the etymological (method) is also not possible. For, it is based on convention constituted of the denotative power of the parts. If it be argued — The word Brahman, being etymologically derived from the root Br̥ha meaning increase, addition, by the termination Man, as belonging to the Uṇādi-Sūtras, has the denotative sense of increase on the strength of the etymology, and there would be in it the absence of any limitation of space, time and the entity, on account of the absence of contraction of that big (thing, Brahman). Therefore, on the strength of the etymology itself, by the word Brahman is spoken of, an entity void of all limitations. So also is stated by the venerable author of the Bhāṣya (Śaṅkarācārya) —

‘ On account of the existence of the connection with the root Br̥ha ’ (Śa. Bhā. on I. 1. 1)

१. Ā अथ बृहिवृद्धाविति. २. Ā ‘ बृहबृहि बृद्धौ ’ इति. ३. Ā adds व after तस्य
३. Ā ...धातोरथानुगमात्

इति । तथा, आत्मपदस्य यौगिकत्वं पुराणे दर्शितम्—

‘यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह ।

यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते ॥’

इति । आप्नोतेर्वा, आददातेर्वा, अत्तेरततेर्वा रूपम्, आत्मेति । तथा अत्रापि प्रकृतोपयोगित्वात्, आस्यर्थ एव ग्राह्यः । तत्र संकोचकाभावात् सर्वव्यापकं सर्वपरिच्छेदशून्यं वस्तु, आत्मशब्देन योगवृत्त्या, उच्यते, इति चेत्—न, एवं सति ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः पर्यायतापातात्, अनन्तशब्देन सह पौनरुक्त्यात्, सत्यादिपदवैयर्थ्यापाताच्च । निर्विकल्पकस्य मानान्तरानुपस्थितत्वेन बुद्धावनारोहात्, तत्र योगवृत्तिविषयत्वाग्रहाच्च । एवं ज्ञाना-

Likewise, the etymological position of the word Ātman is pointed out in the Purāṇa —

‘Inasmuch as, he secures, he takes to, he eats the objects here, and in that there is his continuous existence, therefore, he is described as Ātman.’

This means that Ātman is the form from Āpnoti (√ Āp), Ādadāti (√ Dā with ā), Atti (√ Ad), Atati (√ At). Like that here also, the meaning of securing should be understood as it is useful for the matter in hand. There, on account of the absence of any contracting factor, by the word Ātman is pointed out on the strength of etymology the all-pervading entity, bereft of all limitations. — (Our reply is) — No. If this be the case, there would arise just the synonymous state of the words Brahman and Ātman, there would be the repetition with the word Ananta (Infinite), and also there would arise the meaningless state of the word Satya etc, as a distinctionless thing cannot be grasped by the understanding, there being no other means of proof available, and also on account of the absence of the grasp of

दिपदेऽपि यौगिकत्वं निराकार्यम् ।

[४०] अत एव शक्येन समं संबन्धाग्रहणात्, न लक्षणा, अपि । न हि लक्षणयैव लक्ष्यस्वरूपोपस्थितिः, तस्याः स्मारकत्वात्, स्मरणस्य च पूर्वज्ञानजन्यत्वनियमात् । यथाकथंचित्, अस्थूलादिवाक्यात्, निर्विशेषोपस्थितौ, अपि शक्यसंबन्धस्यापि तेनैव निराकरणात्, न सत्यादिवाक्येन ब्रह्मणो लक्ष्यत्वसंभवः । का वा, अत्र लक्षणा स्वीकर्तव्या ? न, अजहत्स्वार्था, विशिष्टोपस्थितिप्रसङ्गात्, 'तत्त्वमसि' आदि-वाक्यविरोधेन, अनन्वयापत्तेः । न, अपि, जहद्-अजहत्स्वार्था, तस्याः शक्यसंबन्धवति प्रमाणान्त-

the object of the etymological power. In this way, the etymological factor has to be discarded in the case of the words Jñāna and others.

[40] For this very reason, there (can not be) Indication also, owing to the impossibility of grasping the connection with a possible thing. Nor indeed is the forth-coming of the nature of the thing indicated by Indication alone; for, that is the cause of remembrance, and remembrance is invariably produced by the prior knowledge. Although, somehow or other, there might come forth (the idea, under standing of) the distinctionless, from the passage — Not gross, — and others, the possible connection (with the Lakṣya) being put out of question by itself, there is no possibility of Brahman being the thing indicated from the passage — Truth etc. What again is the Indication to be admitted here ? (It can) not (be) Ajahat-svārthā, because of the unwelcome result viz. the understanding of something particularised, and on account of there being the unwelcome non-connection, owing to the contradiction by the sentence— That thou art, etc. Neither again is Jahat-Ajahatsvārthā

रोपयिते सर्वसंबन्धशून्ये, अनवकाशात् । अत एव न जहत्स्वार्था, अपि, तदङ्गीकारे वा गङ्गापदलक्ष्यस्य तीरस्य, अगङ्गात्ववत्, सत्यादिपदलक्ष्यस्य, असत्यतादि स्यात्, वाच्यत्वस्य सर्वात्मना परित्यागात् । न, अपि गौणी तत्र संभवति, सर्वसादृश्यशून्यत्वात् । सिद्धान्तेऽपि प्रभ्वादिगुणयोगेन गौण्याः स्वीकारः संक्षेपशारीरककाराणां प्रौढिवादमात्रम्, इति संप्रदायः ।

[४१] न, अपि व्यञ्जनावृत्तिस्तत्र संभवति, तस्या अप्रामाणिकत्वात्, प्रामाणिकत्वे वा निःसंबन्धेऽप्रसरात्, इति । तस्मात्, अद्वितीयस्य

also ; although it is possible in the case of Devadatta etc., that are understood from the other means of knowledge and which can have a possible connection with that (Indication), it has no scope in the case of something void of all connection, and which cannot be understood from other means of knowledge. For this very reason, nor the Jahat-svārthā also; for, if that is accepted, the indicated sense of the word Truth etc. would be Non-truth etc., like the bank indicated by the word Gaṅgā conveying the non-Gaṅgā nature, because the primary nature is totally abandoned. Nor is the acceptance of the Qualitative (Indication) possible on account of its being void of all similarity. The acceptance of the Qualitative owing to the quality, being all-powerful etc., even according to our demonstrated doctrine, is but a show of his over-ingenuity by the venerable author (Sarva-jñātman) of the *Śaṅkṣepa-Śārīraka* — this is the traditional view.

[41] Nor, again, is possible there the Vyañjanā-power, because it is not supported by any means of proof. Even if it is supported by any means of proof, it would not be functioning owing to the absence of connection. Therefore,

ब्रह्मणः पदार्थत्वाभावात्, अपदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वायोगात्, पदार्थवाक्यार्थ-
योभेदेऽखण्डासिद्धेः, अभेदे च वाक्यार्थवैयर्थ्यात्, केनापि रूपेण न,
अद्वितीयब्रह्मात्मैक्यानुभवः संभवति । तदेवं स्वरूपतः प्रकारतो विषयतः
आश्रयतः फलतः कारणतश्च, अविद्यानिवर्तकज्ञानानिरूपणात्, अविद्या-
निवृत्त्युपलक्षित आत्मैव मोक्षः, इति न क्षोदक्षमं पश्यामः, इति, अनुपासि-
तगुरवो मन्दबुद्धयः स्वयं संदिहाना एव पूर्वपक्षयन्ति ते व्युत्पत्तिप्रकार-
दर्शनेनानुकम्पनीयाः कारुणिकैः, इति ।

[४२] अत्रोच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं ज्ञानस्वरूपं सत्यं मिथ्या वा, इति,

because Brahman without a second is not the meaning of the word, it has no connection with the import of the sentence, because there the undifferentiated nature is not proved on account of the difference between the meaning of the words and the meaning of the sentence ; and if non-difference is admitted, the meaning of the sentence would be purposeless — by no device whatsoever there is possible the realisation of the identity of Brahman without a second, with the Ātman. Therefore in this manner, from its very nature, the mode, the object, the resort, the effect, the cause, the knowledge removing the Avidyā not being pointed out, we do not see that the view that Ātman himself characterised by the removal of Avidyā is salvation, capable of being challenged. Thus dull-witted people, who have not properly learnt under their preceptors, themselves not quite clear in their minds put forth this prima-facie view, — they have just to be pitied by the kind-hearted by pointing out to them the proper method (of understanding).

[42] To this, we reply — As to what has been said — Is the nature of knowledge true or false ? — we do not see any fault in both the views in this case. Because sentiency,

तत्र नोभयत्रापि दोषं पश्यामः । सत्यस्यैव चैतन्यस्य प्रमाणजन्यापरोक्षान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तस्य, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वात्, वृत्तेश्च कारणतावच्छेदकत्वेन दण्डत्वादिवदन्यथासिद्धत्वेन कारणतानङ्गीकारात् । अवच्छेदकस्य कल्पितत्वेऽपि, अवच्छेद्यस्य वास्तवत्वं न विहन्यते । अत्र, यत्, रजतत्वेन भातं तत्, शुक्तिद्रव्यम्, इतिवत्, तार्किकैराकाशस्य शब्दग्रहणे कर्णशङ्कुलीसंबन्धस्य कल्पितस्यैवावच्छेदकत्वम्, अङ्गीकारात् । मीमांसकैश्च कल्पितह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिसंसर्गावच्छिन्नानामेव वर्णानां यथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वमिष्यते,

which is quite real and which is manifested by the direct realisation in the mind, produced by the means of proof, is the remover of Ajñāna because the function of the mind being characterised by the nature of the cause, like the nature of the staff (as in the case of *Dandī Devadattah*) is not accepted as the cause, because it is established otherwise. Even though the characterising factor is imagined, the real nature of the thing characterised is not vitiated. In such a case, as here — what appears as having the nature of silver, is the substance, conch-shell. Thus Logicians have admitted imaginary characterising connection with the cavity of the ear, in apprehending the sound from the sky. The Mīmāṃsakas admit the letters themselves as producing the right knowledge, — (letters) characterised by the contact with the imaginary shortness, longness etc., — why should not such a case be applicable to us as above? Nor again is that to be accounted for by admitting a real connection; as there exists the mere contact with the cavity of the ear, in its entirety, in the otherwise there would be here anarchy. And that also

१ Ā अवच्छेद्यवास्तवत्वम्

२ Ā drops अत्र

३ A अवच्छेदकत्वाङ्गीकारात्

Ā अवच्छेदकत्वाङ्गीकारात्

४ A यथार्थज्ञानकर्तृत्वमिष्यते

तद्वदस्माकं किं, न स्यात्? न च तत्र वास्तवसंबन्धेनोपपत्तिः, कर्णशङ्कु-
लीसंयोगमात्रस्य निरवयवे नभसि सर्वात्मना वर्तमानत्वेनातिप्रसङ्गकत्वा-
त्संबन्धान्तरमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । तच्च नभसि कल्पितमेव वास्तवसंबन्धान्तरा-
भावात् । एवं ध्वनिधर्माणां ध्वनिगतत्वेन भाने, वर्णानां विभूनामानुपूर्वि-
विशेषाज्ञानादतिप्रसङ्गेन, ततोऽर्थबोधासंभवात्, वर्णनिष्ठत्वेनैव ह्रस्वत्वादि-
भानमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्, तच्च कल्पितमेव । प्रत्युत, अन्यथाख्यात्यभ्युपगमात्
तेषामसतोऽपि संसर्गस्यावच्छेदकत्वम् । अस्माकं तु, अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्य-
भ्युपगमात्, असद्विलक्षणत्वेनार्थक्रियाकारित्वमुपपद्यत एव । अत एव
चैतन्येऽद्वये प्रमाणजन्यापरोक्षान्तःकरणवृत्तेरेवाज्ञाननाशकत्वाङ्गीकारेऽपि न

would be just imaginary on account of the absence of any other real contact in the sky. Likewise, when the ramifications of the sound are apprehended as belonging to the sound, there would be just anarchy on account of the non-comprehension of distinction as regards the order of priority, in the all-pervading letters, and therefore as there would be the impossibility of understanding the meaning, we have got to admit the comprehension of shortness etc., as residing in the letters themselves,— and that would be all imaginary. Further again, because they admit Anyathā-khyāti, according to their view, even a non-existing contact can be a characteristic. But in our view, because we admit the Anirvacanīya-khyāti, there would rightly be existing the power to bring into effect the effective action, on account of its being different from non-existence. For this very reason, there is no fault even if the direct realization in the mind produced by the means of proof is admitted to destroy the Ajñāna in the case of the non-dual Sentieny, because

१ A वास्तवसंबन्धान्तरासंभवात्

२ A ... आनुपूर्वी ...

३ A अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्यभ्युपगमात्

दोषः, पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाभावेऽपि व्यावहारिकसत्ताङ्गीकारात् । न च स्वप्नादिज्ञानतुल्यता दोषः, भावानवबोधत्वात् स्वरूपसत्यत्वं हि न प्रामाण्यप्रयोजकम्, त्वन्मते घटादौ तत्सत्त्वेऽपि प्रामाण्याभावात् । किंतु, अबाधितज्ञातविषयत्वम् । तच्च स्वप्नादिज्ञाने नास्त्येव । अत एव मिथ्याज्ञानविषयत्वात्, ब्रह्मापि स्वप्नादिवन्मिथ्येति परास्तम्, स्वरूपतो मिथ्यात्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । विषयतो मिथ्यात्वस्य बाधाभावादसिद्धेः । धूमभ्रमजन्यवह्नयनुमितेरपि, अबाधितविषयतया प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकाराच्च । कल्पितेनापि प्रतिबिम्बेन वास्तवविम्बानुमानप्रामाण्याच्च, स्वमार्थस्याप्यरिष्टादिसूचकत्वाच्च । क्वचित्तदुपल-

although there is no real nature, existence for practical purposes is admitted. Nor, further, is there the fault viz. its being similar to the knowledge in dreams etc., for, owing to the non-comprehension (of the object) its real nature is not the producer of its authoritative nature, as according to your view even though that exists in the case of a jar etc., there exists not its authoritative nature, but its referring to an unstultified object. And that surely exists not in the case of the knowledge in dreams etc. For this very reason, is discarded the view that Brahman also being the object of false knowledge is false like a dream etc., because from its very nature it is not the cause of false nature. And the false nature from the point of view of the object is not established owing to the absence of stultification. And because the unauthoritative nature is not admitted even of the inference about fire, produced by the illusion of smoke, because it concerns an object not stultified. And because the inference about a real object from the reflection although imagined is authoritative, and because the objects in the dream do indicate good fortune etc.. And

१ A drops पारमार्थिक ... दोषः

२ A सत्ताभावेऽपि

३ A भावानवबोधरूपसत्यत्वं ...

४ A अबाधितज्ञानविषयत्वम्

ब्धमन्त्रादेर्जागरेऽप्यनुवृत्तेरबाधाच्च । एवं मिथ्याभूतादपि ज्ञानात्पारमार्थिकी
ब्रह्मप्राप्तिर्न विरुध्यते । पारमार्थिकत्वे बाधाभावस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात् ।

[४३] एवं सप्रकारत्विनिष्प्रकारत्वविकल्पोऽप्यनुपपन्नः । सप्रकार-
त्वस्यानङ्गीकारपराहतत्वात् । न च निष्प्रकारकस्याज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमनुपपन्नम्,
अधिष्ठानप्रमात्वेनैवाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वात् । यत्र सप्रकारकमधिष्ठानं तत्र स-
प्रकारा प्रमा, अपेक्ष्यते । यत्र तु निष्प्रकारकमधिष्ठानं तत्र निष्प्रकारिकैव
प्रमा, अपेक्ष्यते तस्या एव तत्र समर्थत्वात् । न चैवं कार्यकारणभावद्वय-
कल्पने गौरवम्, अधिष्ठानप्रमात्वेनानुगतत्वात् । अधिष्ठानत्वं च भ्रम-

because the continuity of some chants etc., sometimes understood in dream, in the waking state stands unstultified. —Thus even from the knowledge that is dubbed as false, the attainment in reality of Brahman is not open to question, because the absence of stultification alone is the *sine qua non* of a thing being real.

[43] In this way, the alternatives, being possessed of a mode, or not being possessed of a mode also cannot stand. Being with the mode is out of question, because it is not admitted (by us). Neither is it improper for something not possessed of a mode to be the remover of Ajñāna, because the removing of the Ajñāna is due to the right knowledge itself about the basis thereof. Where there is a base with a mode, there is required the right knowledge with the mode. But where the base is without a mode, there is required (only) the modeless right knowledge itself, because that alone is competent (for the task) there. Nor in this manner would there be clumsiness in postulating two ideas about the relation of cause and effect. Because there is the persistence of the right knowledge of the base.

१ Ā सप्रकारस्या २ A अनङ्गीकारेण पराहतत्वात् ३ Ā सप्रकारमधिष्ठानं
४ Ā निष्प्रकारमधिष्ठानं ५ Ā निष्प्रकारिकैव ६ A कारणभावद्वयकल्पनागौरवम् ७ Ā अनुज्ञात्

जनकाज्ञानविषयत्वम्, अज्ञानविषयत्वमात्रं वा । न चैवं सति प्रमेयं द्रव्यम्, इत्यादिनापि घटाद्याकाराज्ञाननिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, अधिष्ठानविषय-प्रमात्ववत्, इति वाच्यम्, प्रमेयत्वस्य केवलान्वयिनोऽनङ्गीकारात्, न तज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वविषयत्वम् । ‘द्रव्यम्’ इति ज्ञानस्य च घटत्वादिसामान्य-विषयत्वाद्, व्यक्तिमात्रविषयत्वेऽपि न विशिष्टविषयत्वम् । एवम् ‘इदम्’ इति ज्ञानस्यापि पुरोदेशवृत्तिव्यक्तिमात्रविषयत्वम्, न घटत्वादि-विषयत्वम्, उत्तरकाले संशयदर्शनात् । तेन ततो न विशिष्टविषया, ज्ञाननिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, समानप्रकारविशेषणप्रक्षेपेऽपि प्रमेयवानितिज्ञानात्

The nature of the base has for its object the Ajñāna, producing the illusion or it is merely of the nature of the object of Ajñāna. Nor again should it be argued — if that be the case there would be the unwelcome result, the removal of Ajñāna of the form jar and others even from (the knowledge) what is to be known is a substance etc., like the right knowledge of the object of the *Adhiṣṭhāna* — because the nature of being the object of knowledge is not admitted in only the object having a positive (affirmative - connection, that knowledge cannot cover all objects. The knowledge, ‘ (this is) a substance ’, concerning itself with the generality jariness etc., does not concern a particular object although it concerns only the individual. Likewise even in the case of knowledge, ‘ this ’, — it concerns only the individual situated in front, and does not concern jariness etc., because a doubt is entertained later on. Therefore on account of this there is no unwelcome contingency of the removal of Ajñāna about particularised objects ; (and) there would be the unwelcome contingency of the removal of Ajñāna concerning all objects, from the cognition (I)

सर्वविषयाज्ञाननिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । घटत्वादेरपि प्रमेयत्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्य घटत्वादिप्रकारकत्वात् । अत एव सामान्यधर्माप्रकारकेतिविशेषणप्रक्षेपेऽपि न निस्तारः । प्रमेयो घट इत्यादिज्ञानात् घटाद्याकाराज्ञाननिवृत्त्यभावापातात्, अविषयत्वप्रकारविषयत्वप्रकारकत्वादेरनुगतस्याभावाच्च । अथ, एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया विशिष्य कार्यकारणभावः कल्पनीयः, घटाज्ञानत्वेन नाश्यता घटत्वप्रकारकप्रमात्वेनैव नाशकता, एवं सर्वत्रापि, इति चेत्, तर्हि सर्वत्र कार्यकारणभावानां भिन्नत्वाद्यत्र यावता विशेषणेन विना न निर्वहति तत्र

know the object, even though the qualifying factor, viz. a similar mode is thrown in. Even in the case of jar-ness etc., which can be the object of knowledge, the knowledge is possessed of the mode jar-ness etc. For this very reason, even though the qualifying factor as not having the mode of the genus-quality is thrown in, there is no clearing away of the field. Because from the knowledge 'the object of knowledge is the jar' etc., there would follow the absence of the removal of Ajñāna having the form of a jar etc., and there would be the absence of continuity of being the mode and the object, and mode and the non-object etc. If it is argued — in order to get rid of this fault a particularised relation of cause and effect should be entertained, (so that) there would be the perishable nature on account of the Ajñāna about a jar and the destructive nature by the nature itself of the right knowledge with the mode jar-ness, (and) this (would be the state of things) everywhere; — (our reply is) — then in that case, the relation of cause and effect being different everywhere, (the reasonable view should be) where (the 'cause and effect' relation) does not become completely effective without which qualifying factor, there only that much

१ A drops अविषयत्वप्रकार ... Ā ... अविषयत्वाप्रकार ...

२ A भिन्नत्वादपि यत्र

तावदेवोपादातव्यम् । अत्र च ब्रह्माज्ञाननिवृत्तित्वेन ब्रह्मप्रमात्वेनैव कार्य-
कारणभावोपपत्तौ न ब्रह्मत्वप्रकारकेति विशेषणमुपादेयम्, गौरवात्, अनु-
पयोगात्, विरोधात्, च । अत एव व्यवहारत्वेन व्यवहर्तव्यज्ञानत्वेन
कार्यकारणभावे व्यवहर्तव्यत्वस्यानुगतस्याभावात् घटव्यवहारत्वेन घटज्ञान-
त्वेनेत्यादिविशेषपर्यवसाने, घटज्ञानव्यवहारत्वेन घटज्ञानत्वेनैव कल्प्यते
कार्यकारणभावो न तु घटज्ञानत्वेन, गौरवात्, अनुपयोगात्, विरोधात्,
च, इति । घटज्ञानस्यैव स्वव्यवहारहेतुत्वेन स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः, इति,
अन्यदेतत् । अथवा सामान्यधर्ममात्राप्रकारकसमानविषयप्रमात्वम्, अज्ञान

should be accepted. And here in this case, the relation of cause and effect being properly accounted for by the right knowledge of Brahman itself owing to the removal of Ajñāna about Brahman, the qualifying factor, having the mode of being Brahman, should not be accepted on account of its being clumsy (to do so), on account of its serving no purpose and on account of the contradiction. For this very reason, on account of the absence of the continuity of the nature of being fit for practical dealings in the relation of cause and effect, due to the knowledge of (things) fit for practical dealings on account of its having practical dealings, when it culminates into something particular owing to its possessing the knowledge of 'a jar' etc., owing to the practical dealing with the jar, the relation of cause and effect is entertained by the possession of the knowledge of the jar itself, owing to the practical dealing associated with the knowledge of a jar; not on account of the possession of the knowledge of a jar, on account of its being clumsy (to do so), on account of its serving no purpose, and on account of the contradiction. That the knowledge of a jar itself establishes its self-illuminating nature owing to its being the cause of practical dealings regarding itself — this is quite another matter. Or, the right knowledge about the

निवृत्तौ प्रयोजकम् । अत्र प्रमेयमिति ज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिनिवारणाय सामान्येति । प्रमेयो घट इत्यादावव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रेति विशेषणम् । तेनेदं विशेष-
प्रकारके निष्प्रकारे चानुगतम् । न च सामान्यमात्रप्रकारके ज्ञानेऽव्याप्तिः,
इदम्, अनिदं वा, प्रमेयम्, अप्रमेयं वा, इत्यादेरसंख्येयदर्शनात्,
सामान्यमात्रप्रकारकज्ञानानङ्गीकारेण तद्वारणस्यानौचित्यात् । अत्र च,
अप्रामाण्यशङ्कानास्फुटितत्वं प्रमाविशेषणं सर्वत्र द्रष्टव्यम् । तच्च, अप्रामाण्य
शङ्कासामग्र्यसमवहितत्वं देवविशेषात्तदुक्तत्वं वा, तेन नासंभावनादि-
कलुषितज्ञाने व्यभिचारः । न हि प्रतिबन्धवशेन कार्यमजनयतो हेतोर-

same object possessing only the generality-nature without any particular mode, is the cause of the removal of Ajñāna. Here, the expression 'generality' is put in to ward off the fault of being over-extensive, in the case of the knowledge '(This is) the object of knowledge'. (The expression) 'only' is put in as the qualifying factor, in order to ward off the fault of being less extensive in (cognitions) like 'a jar is the object of knowledge'; so that 'this' would be continuing in something modeless and in that having a particular mode. Nor does this involve being less extensive in the case of cognition which has the mode of generality only, because there is no doubt perceived such as 'this' or 'not this', 'object-of-knowledge' or 'no-object-of-knowledge', because when you do not admit the cognition having the mode only of generality, it is improper to ward it off. And here, however, the qualifying factor 'right knowledge', not challenged by any doubt about its unauthoritative nature should be understood everywhere. And that is, not being affected by the paraphernalia of doubt about its unauthoritativeness or its not being associated with a particular fault, so, there would not be any violation in

१ A निष्प्रकारके

A सामान्यधर्ममात्रप्रकारके

२ A सामान्यधर्मप्रकारके

३ A सामान्यधर्ममात्रप्रकारके

हेतुत्वं भवति ।

[४४] यत्तु सत्तावधारणरूपस्य, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वाभ्युपगमात्, अनभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानस्य च तद्रूपत्वाभावात्, उक्तविशेषणमन्तरेणापि न व्यभिचारः, इति तदसत् । एककोटिकज्ञानस्य सत्तावधारणरूपज्ञानात्, अन्यूनानधिकविषयस्य प्रमाणजनितस्य किं नाम सत्तानवधारणरूपत्वम्, येन न व्यभिचारः ? इति । निश्चयत्वाभावः, इति चेत्, न । संशयभिन्नत्वस्य जातिविशेषस्य वा निश्चयत्वस्य, अत्राप्यङ्गीकारात् । संशयादिविरोधित्वं निश्चयत्वम्, तच्च, अत्र, नास्ति, उत्तरकाले संशयादिदर्शनात्, इति चेत्,

respect of cognition soiled by improbability etc. For surely a cause not producing the effect under the force of obstruction does not cease to be a cause.

[44] As to (what is stated about) the cognition having a definite form about the existence because it is admitted as the remover of Ajñāna; and because the cognition which has not attained to the state of repetition not being possessed of that form, there would be no violation of the rule even without the qualifying factor spoken of — that is wrong. What kind of non-ascertainment of the existence can there be in the case of cognition pointing out to only one end, produced by means of proof, having an object neither more nor less, from the cognition having a definite form of existence, so that there would be no violation of the rule? If (you say that there is) the absence of certainty, (our reply is) — no. For, here also has been admitted the certainty as being different from doubt or as having a particular genus. Certainty is being opposed to doubt etc., — that however exists not here, owing to the doubt etc., being noticed later on, — if (you argue like that), then you have come to the right path. And we do not see

तर्हि, आयातं मार्गे । तच्च, अस्मदुक्ताप्रामाण्यशङ्कानास्कन्दितत्वातिरिक्तं न पश्यामः, इति, अलमव्युत्पन्नविडम्बनया ।

[४५] ननु, इदं तार्किकमतसिद्धनिर्विकल्पकेऽतिव्याप्तम्, तत्र, उक्तरूपसत्त्वात्, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वाच्च । न तत्र मानाभावात्, विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन कारणत्वात्, 'घटोऽयम्' इति विशिष्टज्ञानेऽपि विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुतां, विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं 'दण्डी पुरुषः' इत्यादि-ज्ञानदृष्टान्तेनानुमीयते । तच्च, ज्ञानम्, अनवस्थाभयात्, अविशिष्टमेव सिध्यति, इति चेत्, न । प्रत्यक्षानुमितत्वव्यतिरेकेण विशिष्टज्ञानत्वस्य कार्यताव-

that it is different from being unchallenged by any doubt about the unauthoritative nature spoken of by us — enough of these stupid vapourings of an uncultured one !

[45] Now, I say (says the objector) — this (your view) is over-extensive in respect of the indeterminate established by the view of the Logicians, because that possesses the form spoken of and has the capacity to remove Ajñāna. In that connection, owing to the absence of (other) means of proof, the cognition of the qualifying attribute being the cause with reference only to the particularised cognition, even in the case of the particular knowledge in the form 'This is a jar', there is not the nature of the cause by its being the qualifying knowledge itself; that it is produced by the knowledge of the qualifying attribute is inferred by the illustrative instance of the cognition in the form 'A man possessed of a staff' etc. And if it is argued that that cognition becomes established as unparticularised itself, otherwise there would be the danger of endlessness — (our reply is) — no. No means of proof other than Direct Perception and Inference exists for the nature of the particularised cognition being characterised by the nature of the product. And

च्छेदकत्वे मानाभावात् । तस्मिन् सत्यपि प्रत्यक्षत्वादिरूपेण कार्यकारण-
भावस्यावश्यकत्वात्, तस्य च विशेषणविशेष्येन्द्रियसंनिर्कर्षादिरूपेण क्लृप्त-
त्वादेव, न, अलौकिकं कार्यकारणभावान्तरं कल्पनीयम् । तस्य च नित्या-
नुमेयत्वाभ्युपगमात्, न मानान्तरसंभावना, अपि । यदि च तार्किकैः
सहैकव्यङ्ग्येक्षितम्, तदा, अपरोक्षस्वरूपा, इति प्रमा विशेषणीया । तार्किक-
सिद्धनिर्विकल्पस्य नित्यानुमेयत्वेन, अपरोक्षस्वरूपत्वाभावात् । अस्मन्मते तु
तस्याः साक्षात् साक्षिवेद्यत्वात्, न कोऽपि दोषः ।

[४६] तदयं निर्गलितार्थः— सामान्यधर्ममात्राप्रकारकसमानविषय-

even though it is there, the relation of cause and effect in the form of Direct Perception etc. being essential, and that being postulated, verily, in the form of the qualifying and the qualified, the close contact with the sense-organs etc, another unusual relation of cause and effect need not be thought of. And that being admitted as always inferable, there can not be the possibility of another means of proof also. If you, however, desire its having the same form, in company with the Tārkikas, then you will have to qualify 'the right knowledge' as 'having a nature directly perceivable'. Because the 'indeterminate' established by the Logicians being always inferable has not a directly perceivable nature. According to our view, however, there is no blemish whatsoever, because that is directly cognisable by the Witness.

[46] Therefore, this is what the whole sense boils down to. The nature of directly perceivable right knowledge which is possessed of only the attribute of generality, without any particular mode, and is not associated with particular blemishes referring to the common object, is

कदोषविशेषासहकृतापरोक्षप्रमात्वम्, अज्ञाननिर्वर्तकत्वमज्ञाननिर्वर्तकतावच्छेदकम् । अपरोक्षत्वं च स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च विवक्षितम्, इति न, अनुमानादौ निर्विकल्पके चातिव्याप्तिः ।

ननु ब्रह्मणो निर्धर्मकत्वात् तत्र विषयताया अप्यनुपपन्नत्वात्, तद्विषयज्ञानत्वमपि दुर्लभम् ; विषयता हि कर्मता, तदङ्गीकारे तस्य क्रियाफलशालित्वेन घटादिवज्जडत्वापत्तेश्च, तद्विषयतासंभवेनैव ज्ञानं तदज्ञाननिर्वर्तकमिति चेत्, न । समानविषयत्वस्य निर्वर्तकतावच्छेदकत्वात्, अन्यथातिप्रसङ्गात्, तद्विषयज्ञानाजनने तत्र वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेश्च । न तत्,

being the remover of Ajñāna, characterising being the remover of Ajñāna. Being directly perceivable is meant to be understood from its nature and its object, and so it cannot be over-extensive respecting Inference etc. and the indeterminate.

(If the objector argues)—if Brahman is not possessed of Dharmas and the nature of object also is impossible there, the knowledge of its object also is difficult to have ; for, being the object is the state of Karman ; if that is admitted, then that being habituated to giving the fruit of action, it would perforce be non-sentient like jar etc.. If it is argued that its knowledge, verily, possibly referring to its object would be the remover of that Ajñāna — (our reply is) — no. Because only something having a common object is characterised by the nature of being the remover ; otherwise, there would be all anarchy. And there would be the absurdity of the Vedānta passages not being the authority, by the non-production of cognition about that

१ A अज्ञाननिर्वर्तकतावच्छेदकम्

३ A विषयतया

५ A तद्विषयकज्ञानाजनने

२ A वा अतिव्याप्तिः

४ A क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वेन

६ A न च तस्य A न च तत्र

अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वम्, तेन च तत्, अज्ञाननिवर्तकतामात्रेण तद्विषयमुपचर्यते, इति वाच्यम् । अन्योन्याश्रयत्वाद्, तद्विषयत्वेन तदज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वम्, तेन च तद्विषयत्वमिति । न च तद्विषयतामात्रेण, अज्ञाननिवर्तकं क्वापि सिद्धम् । तस्यैवाधुना विचार्यत्वात् । कल्पिता विषयता न कर्मत्वमाहति, इति चेत्, न, वास्तवविषयतायाः कुत्राप्यनङ्गीकाराद् व्यावहारिकत्वस्य सप्तानत्वात् ।

[४७] अत्र ब्रूमः — ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानविषयतासंभवेऽपि ज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मविषयता वर्तते, सा च तद्विम्बग्राहकत्वं वा, अन्यदेव वा किञ्चिद-निर्वचनीयम् । न च द्रव्यातिरिक्तस्य जन्यधर्मानाश्रयत्वाद्, अजन्यत्वे च,

object. Further, you cannot say that it has the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna and by that very nature, being the remover of that Ajñāna, its being the object is stated metaphorically. Because there is the fault of mutual interdependence — there is the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna owing to its being the object of that; and by that (being the remover of Ajñāna) it is the object of that. Further, nowhere is it established that one is the remover of Ajñāna, merely by being the object. Because that itself is now being considered. If it be argued that the nature of being an object which is imagined, cannot lead to its being the object — (our reply is) no; because nowhere have we admitted the real nature of the object, its being there for mere practical dealings is common (to both).

[47] In this connection we say — Though it is impossible for Brahman to have the nature of the object of knowledge, the knowledge has Brahman for its object, and that (having Brahman for its object) is either the nature of perceiving the original object or quite something else in-

१ A अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वमात्रेण

२ A तद्विषयत्वमुपचर्यते

३ A तद्विषयतामन्तरेण

४ A अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वं

५ A ज्ञानविषयताया असंभवेऽपि

अतिप्रसङ्गात्, अनिरूपणाच्च कथं ज्ञाननिष्ठा विषयता, इति वाच्यम्, ज्ञान-
स्याप्यन्तःकरणपरिणामत्वेन द्रव्यत्वात्, द्रव्यत्वाभावेऽपि जन्यधर्माश्रयत्वे
विरोधाभावाच्च, द्रव्यादिपरिभाषाया अप्रयोजकत्वाच्च । विषयतैव चाकारः
प्रतिविषयं विलक्षणः । अत एव ब्रह्माकारापरोक्षप्रमात्वेनैव, अज्ञाननिवृत्ति-
कारणतायामनतिप्रसक्त्यां संभवन्त्यां न सामान्याप्रकारका, इति विशेषणम-
पेक्षितम्, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वस्वरूपाकारापरोक्षप्रमात्वस्य सर्वत्रानुगमाच्च । न
च 'इदम्' इत्याकारं ज्ञानं 'घटाकारम्' इति शङ्कितुमपि शक्यम्,
आकारभेदस्य स्फुटतरसाक्षिप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अन्यथा, तयोर्ज्ञानयोरेकप्रकार-

describable. Nor should it be argued — How can the nature of an object be residing in knowledge on account of something apart from a substance, not being the resort of the Dharmas produced? And if they are not produced there would be just anarchy, and that cannot bear scrutiny — for, the knowledge also is a substance because it is a transformation of the inner sense-organ, and even though it has no nature of a substance, there can be no contradiction regarding the resort of the Dharmas produced, and the terminology 'substance' etc. serves no purpose. The nature of an object is some form, and that too is different for each object. Therefore, because of the removal of Ajñāna not over-extensive being quite possible by the direct right knowledge itself in the form of Brahman, the qualifying attribute — not having the mode of generality — is not wanted as the direct right knowledge having the form of the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna persists everywhere. And further, it is not possible even to think of the cognition in the form 'this' as 'having the form of jar', because the difference in form is directly perceivable by the Witness quite distinctly. Otherwise it would be possible to state shame-

त्वस्यापि निस्त्रयेण वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । तत्र चानुभव एव शरणम् । तच्च प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यम् ।

[४८] अस्तु वा ब्रह्मण्यपि कल्पिता विषयता । न च कर्मत्वेन जडत्वापातः, इति वाच्यम्, स्वसमानसत्ताकविषयताया एव कर्मत्वापादकत्वात् । सा च घटादौ संभवति । उभयोरपि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वेन तुल्यत्वात् । ब्रह्मणि तु परमार्थसति व्यावहारिक्यपि विषयता परमार्थसत्त्वाभावेन न समाना, इति किमनुपपन्नम् ? एतेन

‘ तं त्वौपनिषदम् ’

(बृह. ३. ९. २६)

इति श्रुतिरप्यनुगृहीता भवति ।

lessly that both these cognitions have just only one mode. In such cases, realisation alone is the (last) resort. And that is equally available in the present case.

[48] Or, let there be an imagined nature of object even in the case of Brahman ; but it should not be argued that the nature of Karman involves (Brahman's) being non-sentient, because only the nature of object which has a common existence with itself, produces the nature of Karman, and that is possible (only) in jar and others, because even both of them stand on the same footing, existing for practical dealing. But in the case of Brahman which has ‘ real existence ’, the nature of being an object even concerned with practical dealing, is not common as there is the absence of ‘ real existing nature ’ — thus what is not accounted for here ? Thus (by taking such a view), the Śruti (passage)

‘ Him, (the Puruṣa) propounded in the Upaniṣads ’

(Br̥ha. III. 9. 26)

would also be properly respected.

अथवा चैतन्यविषयतैव जडत्वापादिका, न तु वृत्तिविषयतापि ।

‘ यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते ’ (तैत्ति. २. ४)

‘ न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा ’ (मु. ३. १. ८)

‘ तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि ’ (बृह. ३. ९. २६)

‘ नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम् ’ (शाखा. ४)

‘ वेदेनैव यद् वेदितव्यम् ’ (बृह. ५. १)

इत्याद्युभयविधश्रुत्यनुसारेण कल्पनात् ।

यत्तु फलव्याप्यत्वम् एव, अस्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निराकृतम् । ब्रह्मण्यज्ञान-
नाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता, इत्युक्तत्वात्, फलव्याप्यत्वमेव जडत्वापादक-

Or, being the object of sentiency itself is the producing cause of non-sentiency, but not also being the object of the functioning. Because that would be the idea in conformity with the Śruti-passages propounding both these, such as —

‘ From whom words turn away ’ (Taitti. II. 4)

‘ It is neither perceived by the eye, nor by words ’
(Mu. III. 1. 8)

‘ But I am asking you about that Puruṣa propounded
in the Upanisads ’ (Br̥ha. III. 9. 26)

‘ One who does not know the Vedas, cannot think of
that vast one ’ (Śātyā. 4)

‘ What is fit to be known only by the Vedas ’
(Br̥ha. V. I)

As to what they say that the Śāstra-authors have disproved merely its being pervaded the fruit ; some argue that being pervaded by the fruit itself, is the producing cause of non-sentient nature, because it has been stated that for the destruction of Ajñāna about Brahman is needed invariable association with its functioning — (to this we

मित्याहुः, तत् न । प्रमाणजन्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्यैव शास्त्रे फलत्वव्यपदेशात्, तदव्याप्यत्वस्यैव जडत्वापादकत्वे ब्रह्मण इव साक्षि-
भास्यानामपि जडत्वं न स्यात् । चैतन्यकर्मता तु चिद्भिन्नत्वावच्छेदेन सर्वत्रैवेति, सैव जडत्वप्रयोजिका । उदाहृतकारिकायामपि चैतन्यभात्रपरमेव फलपदम्, इति द्रष्टव्यम् । न तु वृत्तिविषयत्वे । तदुपरक्तचैतन्यविषय-
त्वमपि नियतम्, वृत्तेश्चिदाकारगर्भिण्या एवोपपत्तेः । तदुक्तम्—

‘ वियद्वस्तुस्वभावानुरोधादेव न कारकात् ।

वियत्संपूर्णतोत्पत्तौ कुम्भस्यैवं दशा धियाम् ॥

reply) that is not so. Because the sentient nature itself manifested by the functioning of the mind, and produced by the means of proof, is designated in the Śāstra as the nature of the fruit; and if not being pervaded by that itself is the producing cause of non-sentient nature, there would not be the non-sentient nature of entities appearing to the Witness also, like that of Brahman. The activity of sentiency does exist, however, everywhere, characterised by the difference from ‘Cit’, and that same is the producing cause of non-sentient nature. Even in the Kārikā, given as an instance, the word fruit must be understood as pointing out only to the sentiency, but not to being the object of the functioning. There does exist invariably the nature of the object of sentiency affected by it, because the functioning rightly takes its place as involving the form of the ‘Cit’ within. It has been said —

‘ In the case of the origination of the complete sky, verily, it exists in conformity with the nature of the Viyat-entity itself, not from any producing cause; the same obtains in the case of the jar, on account of the perception of the ideas.’

घटदुःखादिरूपत्वं धियो धर्मादिहेतुतः ।

स्वतःसिद्धार्थसंबोधन्यातिर्वस्वनुरोधतः ॥

(बृह. वा. का. ५४३-५४४)

इति । तथा च चैतन्यविषयत्वेन जडत्वं दुर्वारमेव । वृक्ष्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्य स्वयमेव चैतन्यरूपत्वात्, न तद्व्याप्यता फले फलान्तरानुपपत्तेः । तद्भिन्नानां तु स्वतो भानरहितानां तद्व्याप्तिरवश्यमेवाश्रयणीया, इति न कोऽपि दोषः । तदुक्तम्—

‘ परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता ।

संवित् सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ॥ (पञ्च. ८.११)

इति ।

The nature of jar, pain etc., is caused by the Dharma etc., of the Understanding. The invariable association with the comprehension of the self-established entity is in conformity with the entity.’ (Br̥ha. Vā. Kā. 543-544)

In the same manner, the non-sentient nature being the object of the sentiency cannot, verily, be avoided ; as the sentiency affected by the functioning, having itself the form of sentiency, cannot be pervaded by it, (the existence of) another fruit in a fruit being out of question. In the case, however, of those that are different from it and are by themselves lacking comprehension, the invariable concomitance with it has got necessarily to be resorted to, — thus there is no fault whatsoever. As has been said —

‘ What Samvit has been agreed to as the fruit in the case of outside objects of knowledge, that same here is the thing to be known on the strength of the Vedānta-passages.’ (Pañca. 8. 11)

[४९] ननु, एवं कल्पितविषयतावत् कल्पितप्रकारोऽपि किमिति नाङ्गीक्रियते? तथा सति न, उक्तकार्यकारणभावादिकल्पनाक्लेशः, इति । मैवम् । प्रकारस्य भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वात्, विशेषणत्वेन ज्ञान-विषयत्वमवश्यं वाच्यम् । तथा च ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयानिवर्तकत्वात्, तस्य प्रकारस्यानिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, केवलचैतन्यागोचरस्य केवलचैतन्यगोचराज्ञान-निवर्तकत्वायोगाच्च । अन्यानुपरक्तचैतन्यभानस्यैव पूर्वोक्तरूपेण ज्ञाननिवर्त-कत्वात्, विषयतायास्तु तज्ज्ञानभासकसाक्षिवेद्यत्वेऽपि तज्ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्, अन्यानुपरक्तचैतन्यगोचरत्वमुपपद्यते, इति वैषम्यम् । तस्मादुपपद्यते ब्रह्म-

[49] I say (says the objector)—why then is not admitted the imaginary mode also like the imaginary nature of the object in this way ? In that case, there would not be any trouble about imagining the nature of cause-and-effect etc., spoken of—(our reply is) — Not so. As the mode has for its counter-entity, the particular nature of what is being presented, the object of knowledge has got to be spoken of as particularised And further, the knowledge not being the remover of its object, there would not be the removal of its mode — an undesirable contingency. And in the case of what is not perceivable by the pure sentiency, there could not be the possibility of its being the remover of the Ajñāna perceivable by the pure sentiency ; and because only the presentation by the sentiency not tinged by anything else, has the capacity of removing the Ajñāna in the afore-said manner. In the case of being the object, however, the state of being perceivable by sentiency not tinged by anything else is proper, because though it is fit to be known by the Witness who presents that knowledge, it is not the object of that knowledge — that is the difference (between the *viśaya* and *prakāra*). Therefore, it is proper that the

विषयता निष्प्रकारकज्ञानस्य । अत एव चाद्यक्षणे वृत्तितद्वतोः साक्षिभास्य-
त्वेऽपि न वृत्तेर्निर्विकल्पकत्वविरोधः । तस्याः पदार्थशोधकर्तृकसंस्कृतशब्द-
जन्यायाः, अद्वितीयचैतन्यमात्राकारत्वाद्, इयमेव प्रमाणफलावस्था, उच्यते ।
द्वितीयक्षणे तु चिन्मात्राकारग्रहणलब्धबलया वृत्त्या चिन्मात्रगोचराज्ञानं
निवर्त्यते, रज्ज्वाकारग्राहिण्या वृत्त्येव तदज्ञानम् । ततोऽहंकारजीवब्रह्म-
विभागाद्यध्यासनिवृत्तिः, उपादाननाशस्यैवाव्यवधानोपादेयनाशप्रयोजक-
त्वात्, अज्ञानस्यैव च तदुपादानत्वात् । ततस्तेन सहैव वा तदनन्तरं वा
तदुपादेयचैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः । एवम्, इन्द्रियदेहाद्यध्यासानामपि

modeless knowledge can have Brahman for its object. For this very reason, although at the first moment, the functioning and the object functioning are fit to be presented by the Witness, there is no contradiction of the functioning with the indeterminate nature. Because that (functioning) being produced from the words fortified by logical reasoning investigating the meaning of the word, has the form of mere Sentiency without a second, this same is spoken of as the state of the result of the means of proof. At the second moment, however, by the functioning gathering strength by the grasping of the form of mere 'Cit' is removed the Ajñāna, associated with the pure 'Cit', as by the functioning of grasping the form of the rope, the Ajñāna concerning it. Thereupon follows the removal of the super-imposition of the divisions, Ahamkāra, Jīva, Brahman etc, because the destruction itself of the constituent cause is the cause of the destruction of the unscreened constituents, and Ajñāna itself is the constituent cause of that (super-imposition). Thereupon (follows) along with that, or subsequent to that, the removal of the manifesting functioning of the sentiency, which is the constituent of that. Thus comes about also the removal of the super-impositions of the body, sense-organs

निवृत्तिः । एवं तदुपरि कस्याप्यवच्छेदकस्याभावादनुपहितचैतन्यं जीव-
ब्रह्मजगद्विभागशून्यं कवलीकृताज्ञानतत्कार्यं स्वप्रकाशपरमानन्दरूपतया
सर्वदा भासमानमेव तिष्ठति, सैव मोक्षावस्था, इत्युच्यते । अज्ञानस्य चाना-
दित्वेनाजन्यत्वात्, पुनरनाद्यज्ञानान्तरस्य चानङ्गीकारात्, एकस्या एवा-
ज्ञानव्यक्तेः सर्वोपादानभूताया आत्यन्तिकनिवृत्तौ, तत्कार्यप्रमात्रादिप्रप-
ञ्चस्य, आत्यन्तिकनिवृत्त्या न संसारस्य पुनरावृत्तिः ।

[५०] एतेन तज्ज्ञानं स्वनिवर्त्यम्, अन्यनिवर्त्यं वा, इति विक-
ल्पोऽपि निरस्तः, तस्य स्वकारणनाशनिवर्त्यत्वात् । उपादानकारणनाशस्य
कार्यनाशकत्वे सर्वेषामविवादात् । दृश्यत्वेन रूपेण, अविद्यया सह स्वनिव-

etc. Thus, over and above that, there being no limiting factor, only the unscreened Caitanya remains, void of the divisions Jīva, Brahman and the world, with the Ajñāna and its products all swallowed up, and flashing up always in the form of selfillumination and the highest bliss, — this same is spoken of as the Salvation-state. As Ajñāna, again, being beginningless is not something produced, and another beginningless Ajñāna is not admitted; when the only one Ajñāna-individual, which is the constituent cause of every-thing is totally removed, the paraphernalia, its effect, knower etc. also being totally removed, there is no return again of the Samsāra.

[50] By this argument is removed also the doubt whether that knowledge is removable by itself or by some-thing else, because that is fit to be removed by the destruc-tion of its cause. It is a matter beyond dispute for all, that the destruction of the constituent cause causes the destruc-tion of the effect. There is no blemish either even though (it is held that) it is fit to be removed by itself along with the Avidyā in its form as the perceivable. If there is the

त्यत्वेऽपि न दोषः । निवर्त्यतानिवर्तकतयोरवच्छेदकैक्ये क्षणभङ्गो भवेत् ।
अत्र चोक्तप्रमाविशेषत्वेन निवर्तकता, दृश्यत्वेन निवर्त्यता, इति नोक्तदोषः ।

ननु तर्हि, स्वप्नाद्यध्यासादिकारणीभूताज्ञानस्य जागरादिश्रमाणा-
ज्ञानेन निवृत्तौ, पुनः स्वप्नाद्यध्यासो न स्यात्, उक्तयुक्तेस्तुल्यत्वात् । तत्र,
अनेकाज्ञानस्वीकारे, आत्मन्यपि तथा संभवेन मुक्त्यनाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् ।
ननु, अनयैवानुपपत्त्या तत्राज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्नाङ्गीक्रियते । एकस्यामेव रज्ज्वा-
ज्ञातायां सर्पभ्रमेण धराभ्रमतिरोधानवज्जागरादिभ्रमेणापि स्वप्नादिभ्रम-
तिरोधानमात्रं क्रियते । अज्ञाननिवृत्तिस्तु ब्रह्मात्मैक्यविज्ञानादेवेति न

identity of the limitations of the nature of thing to be removed and that of the remover, there would be the viola-
tion of the rule about moments. In this case, there is the
removing nature on account of the particularised right
knowledge mentioned before and the nature of being fit to
be removed on account of its being perceivable, — so there
is no fault referred to.

(The objector says) — Well then, when the Ajñāna
which is the cause of the super-imposition in dream etc., is
removed by the knowledge of the means of proof, the
waking state etc., there would not be again the super-impo-
sition in dream etc., because the reasoning adumbrated (by
you) is the same. If it is admitted that there are many
Ajñānas there, the same is possible in the case of Ātman as
well, and so there would be the unwelcome result — the
absence of relief in Salvation. (Another objector says) —
It is for this very absence of propriety, that the removal of
Ajñāna is not accepted there. Like the screening of illusion
about a stream of water by the illusion about the serpent
on one and the same unknown rope, here is effected merely
the screening of the illusion about dream etc., even by the
illusion about the waking state etc. The removal of Ajñāna,

मुक्तौ, अनाश्वासप्रमङ्गः । मैवम् । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानादपि, अज्ञाननिवृत्तिसंभावना न स्यात् । कुत्रापि ज्ञानात्, अज्ञाननिवृत्तेरदर्शनात्, इति वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि हारितम् ।

अत्र ब्रूमः — नोभयथाप्यनुपपत्तिः । तथाहि—जागरादिज्ञानात् स्वप्नाद्यध्यासादिनिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमपक्षे मूलाज्ञानस्यैव विचित्रानेकशक्तिस्वीकारात्, एकशक्तिनाशेऽपि शक्त्यन्तरेण स्वप्नान्तरादीनां पुनरावृत्तिः संभवति । सर्वशक्तिमतो मूलाज्ञानस्यैव निवृत्तौ तु कारणान्तरासंभवात्, तादृशस्य च द्वितीयस्यानङ्गीकारात्, न, अहंकाराद्यध्यासानां पुनरुपपत्तिः

however, is from the realisation itself of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, and so there is not the unwelcome result,—the absence of relief in Salvation. (The first objector says) — Not thus. Even from the realisation of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, there is not the possibility of the removal of Ajñāna. Because nowhere indeed is seen the removal of Ajñāna from the knowledge. Thus (you are in the state of a person described as one by whom) ‘the capital itself is defrauded, of one who was hankering after the interest’.

Here we say — Even under both conditions there is no impossibility. To explain the same — Even according to the view which admits the removal of the super-imposition in dream etc., from the knowledge in the waking state etc., because the original Ajñāna itself is held to be possessed of many various powers, even when one power is destroyed, by another power is possible the repetition again of other dreams etc. But when the original Ajñāna possessed of all powers is removed, there being no other cause possible, because a second (Ajñāna) like that not being admitted, there cannot be again the origination of the super-imposi-

संभवति, इति, अपुनरावृत्तिसिद्धिः । रज्जुज्ञानादिना, अज्ञाननिवृत्त्यङ्गी-
कारेऽपि न कोऽपि दोषः । चिन्मात्रस्यैवाज्ञानाश्रयत्वविषयत्वसंभवात् ।
जडे प्रमाणप्रयोजनाभावेन तदनङ्गीकारात् ।

न च, अज्ञानस्य चिन्मात्राश्रयत्वे कथमन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपेण ज्ञानेन
तन्निवृत्तिः, भिन्नाश्रयत्वात् ? ज्ञानस्य च जन्यत्वेन चिन्मात्राश्रयानुपपत्तेः,
तस्य कूटस्थस्वभावत्वात्, अज्ञानस्य च, अनादित्वेन कौटस्थ्याव्याघात-
कत्वात्, इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । चैतन्यान्तःकरणयोस्तादात्म्याध्यासेन,
अन्तःकरणधर्मस्यापि चैतन्यधर्मत्वानपायात् । तदुक्तं पञ्चपादिकाकृद्भिः—

tions of Ahaṁkāra etc. Thus is established the non-return
again. There is again no blemish either, even if the
removal of Ajñāna by the knowledge of the rope etc., is
admitted. Because only the pure 'Cit' can possibly be the
resort of the object of Ajñāna. That is not accepted to
exist in the non-sentient owing to the absence of the means
of proof and the purpose.

Further, it should not be argued that if Ajñāna has
the pure 'Cit' as its resort, how can take place its removal
by the Jñāna in the form of the functioning of the mind,
having a different resort? And Jñāna being a product
could not possibly have the pure 'Cit' as its resort, because
that 'Cit' has an immutable nature, and Ajñāna being
beginningless cannot destroy its immutable nature, as we
have stated accordingly. (Our reply is) — In the case of
the Caitanya and the mind, owing to the super-imposition
of identity, even the attributes of the mind cannot be going
away from the attribute of sentiency. It has been said by
the venerable author (Padmapādācārya) of the *Pañca-*
pād-kā —

‘ आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः,
अभेदेऽपि चैतन्यात्पृथगिव भासन्ते ’

इति । तार्किकैरपि कर्णशङ्कुल्यवच्छिन्नाकाशेन स्वसमवायसंबन्धेन महाका-
शाश्रितशब्दग्रहणमङ्गीक्रियते । उपहितेऽपि स्वरूपैक्यानपायात्, इति ज्ञाना-
ज्ञानयोः समानाश्रयत्वोपपत्तिः ।

न च ज्ञानस्य कापि, अविद्यानिवर्तकत्वाददर्शनात्, ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽपि
तत्कल्पनं न स्यात्, इति वाच्यम् । न हि, अनुमानाद् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य, अज्ञान-
निवर्तकत्वं वयं साधयामः, येन व्याप्तिग्रहार्थम्, उदाहरणापेक्षा भवेत्,
किं तु श्रुत्या श्रुतार्थापत्त्या च, इति ब्रूमः । तत्र श्रुतिस्तावत् ।

‘ Bliss, realisation of the object, eternal nature — these
are the attributes (of Caitanya); though identical they
appear to be as though apart from Caitanya. ’

Even the Logicians admit the comprehension of the sound
resorting to the great Ākāśa through its intimate connec-
tion with the Ākāśa limited by the hollow of the ear.
Although screened, the identity of the natures does not
disappear, — thus is accounted for, the state of having a
common abode in the case of Jñāna and Ajñāna.

Further, it should not be argued by you — Jñāna is
nowhere seen as the remover of Avidyā, so it cannot be
thought of in that capacity even in the case of the know-
ledge of Brahman. (Our reply is) — Not indeed do we
establish the knowledge of Brahman being the remover of
Ajñāna from Inference, in which case there would arise
the necessity of an illustrative instance for the sake of
grasping the invariable concomitance ; but we say (that it
is established) by the Śruti and by Verbal Presumption.
In that connection, there is the Śruti-passage for the matter
of that,

‘ तमेव विदित्वा तिमृत्युमेति ’ (वा. सं. ३.१.१८; श्वेता. ३.८, ६.१५)
 मृत्युः, अविद्या, इति शास्त्रे प्रसिद्धम् । तथा तत्त्वभावात्
 ‘ भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ’ (श्वेता. १.१०; ना. प. ९.९)

स्मृतिश्च—

‘ दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।
 मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥ ’ (भ. गी. ७.१४)
 ‘ ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मनः ।
 तेषामादित्यवज्ज्ञानं प्रकाशयति तत्परम् ॥ ’ (भ. गी. ५.१६)

इत्यादि । एवं

‘ ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ’ (मुण्डक. ३.२.९)

‘ Having known that alone, one goes beyond death. ’

(Vā. Sa. XXXI. 18; Śvetā. III. 8, VI. 15)

— Death (is) Avidyā; this is well-established in the Śāstra. Likewise, through the nature of reality,

‘ There is the removal of the world-illusion at the end further again ’ (Śvetā. I. 10; Nā. Pa. IX. 9)

And (there is the following) Smṛti (passage)

‘ For this my divine illusion constituted of ‘ guṇas ’ (is) difficult to surmount; who take refuge in (or, worship) me alone, they cross over this illusion. ’ (Gītā VII. 14)

‘ But (in) whose (case) that ignorance of the soul is destroyed by knowledge, their knowledge like the Sun reveals (or causes to shine forth) that Supreme. ’

(Gītā V. 16)

etc. To the same effect (are the passages),

‘ One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself ’

(Muṇḍaka. III. 2. 9)

‘ तरति शोकमात्मवित् ’ (छा. ७. १. ३)

‘ तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते ।

योगी मायाप्रमेयाय तस्मै ज्ञानात्मने नमः ॥ ’

इति ।

‘ अविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि ’ (प्रश्नो. ६. ८)

इत्यादि श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्च । ब्रह्मज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मभावः श्रूयमाणः, तद्व्यवधायका-
ज्ञाननिवृत्तिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, इति ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिं गमयति ।

‘ अनृतेन हि^१ प्रत्यूढाः ’ (छा. ८. ३. २)

‘ नीहारेण प्रावृताः ’ (ऋ. सं. १. ८२. ७)

‘ The knower of Ātman crosses over grief. ’

(Chā. VII. 1. 3)

‘ A how to that Jñānātman known through his wonderful power, with whom established in the heart, the Yogin crosses over the wide-spread Avidyā. ’

etc. And also the Verbal Presumption in

‘ You make one cross the farthest end of Avidyā. ’

(Praśno. VI. 8)

and other passages. Because identity with Brahman from the realisation of Brahman, spoken of in the Śruti-passages, cannot be accounted for without the removal of the intervening Ajñāna, — it points out to the removal of Ajñāna by the Realisation. From (the passages in) the Śrutis and Smrtis such as —

‘ Enveloped, verily, by Untruth ’ (Chā. VIII. 3. 2)

‘ Covered up with mist ’ (Ṛ. Sa. I. 82. 7)

‘ अन्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव ’

अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ’ (भ. गी. ५. १५)

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभ्योऽज्ञानमेव मोक्षव्यवधायकमवगन्तव्यम् ।

[५१] किं च भगवतो नीलाचलनाथस्य भजनाञ्जननिर्मलीकृत-
ज्ञानचक्षुः प्रत्यक्षेणैव, अज्ञाननिवृत्तिमनुभवति । तत्र का विप्रतिपत्तिः ?
यदि हि कस्यचिदपि तत्त्वावबोधे जाते, न, अज्ञानं निवर्तेत ततो व्यभि-
चारात्कारणता न स्यात्, न तु क्वापि तथादर्शनमस्ति, एकस्यैव तत्त्व-
ज्ञानेन, अज्ञाननिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । जीवान्तरप्रतिभासस्य च स्वात्मिकजीवा-
न्तरप्रतिभासतद्विभ्रममात्रत्वात् । जीवन्मुक्तौ तु, उपपत्तिं वक्ष्यामः । एतेन

‘ Your heart became something else ’

‘ Knowledge is covered up with ignorance; by that
are bewildered the creatures. ’ (Gītā V. 15)

etc., it is known that Ajñāna alone comes in the way of
salvation.

[51] And further, one whose Jñāna-eye is rendered
pure through the collyrium in the form of devotion to the
divine Lord of the Nila mountain experiences the removal of
Ajñāna by Direct Perception itself. What (room for) any
different opinion there ? If, however, in the case of some
one Ajñāna could not be turning away when the knowledge
of Reality is produced, then there (Jñāna) would not be
the cause on account of the violation of the rule on that
account; but that is nowhere seen, because it is admitted
that there is the removal of Ajñāna by the right knowledge
of oneness alone. Because the presentation of Jīva as
different is just mere illusion like the appearance of another
Jīva in dream etc. We shall speak later on of its validity
in the case of the Living-Liberation. By this (argument)

अज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम्

अनादिभावत्वात् ।

भाववत्

इति परास्तम्, उक्तश्रुतिस्मृत्यादिबाधितत्वात् । कीदृशं च भावत्वम्, अज्ञानस्याविनाशित्वे प्रयोजकम्, सत्त्वमभावत्वलक्षणं वा? आद्यं सदसद्विलक्षणेऽज्ञानेऽसिद्धम्, तस्य सर्वप्रमाणाबाध्यत्वस्वरूपस्य सत्त्वायोगात् । द्वितीयं तु न, अविनाशित्वप्रयोजकम्, अनुकूलतर्काभावात्, प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतत्वाच्च सत्त्वस्यैवात्म्याविनाशित्वप्रयोजकत्वाच्च ।

is brushed away (contention) —

Ajñāna is not to be removed by Jñāna

Because it is possessed of a beginningless nature,

Like the (existence) positive nature

because it is contradicted by the Śruti and Smṛti passages mentioned above. Further (we ask you) — What kind of positive nature is there which makes the Ajñāna indestructible— (is it) existence, or a characteristic of the nature of negation? Apropos the first (alternative), it is not established in the case of Ajñāna, which is different from (both) Sat and Asat, because it cannot be associated with existence being of the nature which cannot be stultified by all means of proof. Apropos the second (alternative), it cannot be the producing cause of an indestructible nature, because there is no suitable logical reasoning, and is driven away by an unfavourable logical reasoning, and because only the 'Sattva' (existent nature) can be the (effective) cause of the indestructible nature of Ātman.

१ A ब्रह्मवत् Ā आत्मवत् २ Ā Added उच्यते after प्रयोजकम्

३ A सत्त्वमभावविलक्षणं ४ A सर्वप्रमाणबाध्यत्व ... ५ A सत्त्वस्यैवाविनाशित्व ...

Ā ... विनाशित्वे प्रयोजका ...

न च, आत्मातिरिक्ते सत्त्वाभावेन व्याप्तिग्रहावसरः, सत्त्वाभावस्य विनाशित्वप्रयोजकत्वेन व्यतिरेकिणस्तस्य सिद्धेः । एवं दृश्यत्वपरिच्छिन्न-त्वजडत्वादिना, अपि, अज्ञानस्य विनाशित्वनिश्चयः ।

‘भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः’ (श्वेता. १. १०; ना. प. ९, ९)

इत्यादिवाक्यैः कण्ठोक्तमेव विनाशित्वप्रतिपादनाच्च । न च श्रुतिविषयत्वे ब्रह्मवत्, अबाध्यत्वप्रसङ्गः, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्य, एव, अबाध्यत्वप्रयो-जकत्वात् । श्रुतेश्च प्रयोजनवति मानान्तरानधिगते तात्पर्यम्, उपक्रमादि-षड्विधलिङ्गेनावधार्यते । अज्ञानस्य च, अहमज्ञ इति साक्षिसिद्धत्वात्, तत्प्र-

Further, it is not that there is no scope for the comprehension of the invariable concomitance on account of the absence of the Sat-nature in anything apart from Ātman, because the absence of the Sat-nature is established as being apart because it produces the destructible nature. Thus, it is concluded that the Ajñāna is destructible, even on the ground of its being perceivable, limited and non-senti-ent. And it is proclaimed to have a destructible nature (dis- tinctly and) singly in so many words by passages like —

‘At the end — the removal of Viśva-illusion further again’ (Śveta. I. 10; Nā. Pa. IX. 9)

Neither can there be the undesirable contingency, that it would not be stultified like Brahman, if it were the province of Śruti, because only being the province of the purport of the Śruti is the cause of non-stultification. And in the case of the Śruti with a definite purpose, its purport in respect of what is not known by other means of proof is ascertained by the six-fold characteristics — Introduction etc.. As Ajñāna, however, is established directly by the Witness in the form ‘I am ignorant’, there is no purpose

१ A व्याप्तिग्रहानवसरः २ वाक्यैः ... साधारणमिष्यते । * dropped in A
३ कण्ठतः in A

तिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाच्च न श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वम्, वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या तु ब्रह्मण्येव तात्पर्यनिश्चयात् । एवं च सति, साक्षिसिद्धस्यैव भावरूपाज्ञानस्य, अभावविलक्षणत्वादिकम्, अनुमानादिना साध्यते, इति न कोऽपि दोषः । ‘शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानवानयम्’ इति मिथ्यासंसर्गस्यापि तच्चज्ञानविषयत्ववत्, अस्माकं किं न स्यात् ?

एतेन मानविषयत्वेऽज्ञानस्य मानानिवर्त्यत्वम्, मानाविषयत्वे तु स्वप्रकाशत्वानङ्गीकारात् शशविषाणादिवत्, अलीकत्वम्, इत्यपास्तम् । स्वरूपतो मानाविषयस्यापि साक्षिसिद्धत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तस्य च भ्रमप्रमा-साधारणत्वात् । तदुक्तम्

served in propounding that. And so it cannot be the province of the purport of the Śruti, because the purport (of the Śruti) is ascertained in respect of Brahman alone in the manner to be stated later on. It being so in the case of Ajñāna possessed of a positive nature and, verily, established by the Witness, is established by Inference etc., its being different from negation etc., and so there is no flaw whatsoever. Even a false connection like ‘This one is possessed of the knowledge of silver in the conch-shell’ becomes the province of the real knowledge, (then) why should not that obtain in our case ?

By this (reasoning) Ajñāna not being capable of being removed by some proof if it is the object of the means of proof, and if it is not the object of the means of proof, it is possessed of a false nature, like the horn of a hare etc., because its self-illuminating nature is not admitted — all this is brushed aside. Even though it is not the object of the means of proof by its very nature, its being established by the Witness is admitted, and it shares in the features of illusion and right knowledge. As has been stated —

‘अविद्याया अविद्यात्वे इदमेव तु लक्षणम् ।
मानार्थसहितत्वमसाधारणमिष्यते ॥
अविद्यास्येत्यविद्यायामेवासिद्ध्या प्रकल्पते ।
ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या त्वविवेच्यं न कथञ्चन युज्यते ॥’

(बृह. वा. कारिका. १८१, १७६)

इति च । तस्मात्, अविद्याया अपि रज्जुभुजङ्गवत्, आत्मन्यारोपितत्वात्,
आत्मस्वरूपज्ञानेन तन्निवृत्तिरुपपद्यते, इति ।

[५२] त्वदुक्तम्, तज्ज्ञानं परोक्षम्, अपरोक्षं वा, इति तत्राप-
रोक्षम्, एव, इति वदामः । तत्र कारणासंभव उक्तः, शब्दस्य परोक्षज्ञान-
जननस्वाभाव्यात्, कारणान्तरस्य च, अत्रासंभवात्, इति ।

‘This, verily, is the characteristic pointing out to the Avidyā-nature in the case of Avidyā, not tolerating the scrutiny by the means of proof, and desired as a peculiar feature.

The Avidyā in the case of a person is imagined the Avidyā itself by non-establishment. This Avidyā, however, functions nowhere from the point of view of Brahman.’

(Brha. Vā. Kārikā. 181, 176)

Therefore, Avidyā also being super-imposed upon the Ātman like the serpent on a rope, its removal by the knowledge of the nature of the Ātman stands to reason.

[52] It has been said (by you) — Is that Jñāna direct or indirect ? — We say (respecting this), it is direct alone. (The objector says) — The impossibility of there being a means of knowledge has already been stated by us, because the word has the nature of producing indirect knowledge ; and here there is no possibility of any other cause.

१ A मानाघातासहिष्णुत्वमसा ... २ नाविद्यारयत्यविद्यायामेवासित्वा प्रकल्प्येत
३ A रज्जुभुजङ्गमिवत् ४ A यत्तु उक्तम् ५ A कारणासंभव

अत्र केचित् तार्किकेभ्यो बिभ्यतः शब्दात्परोक्षज्ञानमेवाङ्गीकृत्य भावनासहकृतान्मनसोऽपरोक्षज्ञानमाचक्षते ।

अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते—शब्दात्, आपाततः परोक्षज्ञानमेव जायते करणस्वाभाव्यात् । उत्तरकालं तु श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनादिसंहितात्, शब्दात्, एव, अपरोक्षज्ञानमुदेति, संस्कारसहकृतेन्द्रियादिव प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति ।

तत्र, आद्यः पक्षस्तावदयुक्तः, भावनाजन्यत्वे ज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्, कामातुरस्य कामिनीं भावयतो व्यवहितकामिनीसाक्षात्कारवत् ।

ननु न भावनाजन्यत्वं तत्र, अप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकम्, किन्तु बाधित-

In this connection, some, afraid of the Logicians, admitting only the indirect knowledge (as produced) from the word, speak of direct knowledge from the mind, associated with the Bhāvanās.

Others, however, think — From the word is produced prima facie only the indirect knowledge, that being the nature of the instruments (of knowledge). Later on, however, from the word itself associated with hearing, thinking, meditating etc., arises the direct knowledge, as from the sense-organs associated with the impressions, recognition.

Now the first alternative (that the knowledge is indirect) is, for the matter of that, improper. Otherwise, if that Jñāna is produced by the Bhāvanās it would be unauthoritative — an undesirable result, like the clear perception of the beloved who is away in the case of a love-sick person pondering over the beloved.

I say (says the objector) there,— being produced by the Bhāvanā is not the cause of the unauthoritative nature

१ Ā ... निदिध्यासनसंस्कारसंहिताम् २ A इन्द्रियादिवत् ३ Ā adds सर्वदा after कामातुरस्य

विषयत्वम् । भावनानपेक्षेऽपि शुक्तिरजतादिभ्रमे बाधादेव, अप्रामाण्य-
स्वीकारात् । ब्रह्मणि तु सर्वमानागोचरे बाधासंभवात्, तद्भावनानाज्ञानजन्य-
स्यापि प्रामाण्यं न व्याहन्यते । न च व्यवहितकामिनीविभ्रमादौ दोषत्वेन
भावनायाः क्लृप्तत्वात्, तज्जन्यत्वे ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य दोषजन्यत्वेन भ्रमत्वं
भविष्यति । बाधितविषयत्ववत्, दोषजन्यत्वस्य, अपि भ्रमत्वप्रयोजकत्वात् ।
तथा च मीमांसाभाष्यकृद्भिः

‘ यस्य च दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येतिप्रत्ययः ।

स एवासमीचीनो नान्यः ’

(मी. भा. १. १. ६)

but having its object stultified. In the case of the illusion of silver etc., in the conch-shell, without even requiring any Bhāvanā, its unauthoritative nature is admitted as due to the stultification itself. In the case of Brahman, however, which is beyond the ken of all means of proof, as there is no possibility of any stultification, the authoritative nature of the (result) produced by the knowledge of the Bhāvanā does not become vitiated. And further, on account of the Bhāvanā being found out as a flaw in the case of the illusion about the distant beloved etc., there would not be in the case of the realisation of Brahman any illusory nature due to its being produced by a flaw, even when produced by that. For, like the nature of the object stultified, being produced by some flaw also, is the cause of the illusory nature. To the same effect is stated by the venerable author of the commentary on Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā

‘ In whose case, there is the instrument of knowledge which is full of flaw, and where there is the conviction that it is false — that alone is untrustworthy, not any other. ’

(Mī. Bhā. I. 1. 6.)

इति । तद्वार्तिककारैश्च

‘तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।

अथान्यथा तु हेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ’

(मी. वा., चो. सू. कारिका ५३)

इति तुल्यवदेव, अप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकद्वयम्, उक्तम् । तस्मात्, बाधाभावेऽपि दोषजन्यत्वात्, अप्रामाण्यम्, एव, इति वाच्यम् । भावनायाः क्वचित्, दोषत्वेऽपि सर्वत्र दोषत्वानिश्चयात् । अन्यथा, शङ्कपीतत्वभ्रमकारणीभूतस्य पीतद्रव्यस्य स्वविषयज्ञानेऽपि, अप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वं स्यात् । क्वचित्, कश्चित्,

and also by the venerable author of the Vārtika—

‘Therefore, the authoritative nature of the knowledge arises from its being constituted of enlightenment. Anything else, however, is brushed aside because it is a faulty knowledge arising from some cause.’

(Mī. Vā. Co. Sū. Kārikā. 53)

—here two causes of the unauthoritative nature have been given as being equally potent. Therefore, even though there is the absence of stultification, one must speak of the unauthoritative nature when it is produced by some flaw. Though Bhāvanā is possessed of a flaw at times, it cannot be conclusively spoken of as being faulty everywhere. Otherwise, in the case of a yellow substance which is the cause of the illusion about the yellowness in the conch, it would be the cause of producing unauthoritative nature even in respect of the knowledge about its own object. And there would be the supposition of the stultification of the object itself producing the flaw simply because some flaw is admitted to exist somewhere. And further also, there would be the admission of the authoritative nature of inference and

दोषः, इत्येवाङ्गीकारात्, विषयबाधेनैव दोषजन्यत्वप्रकल्पनाच्च । दुष्टकरण-जन्यस्य, अपि, अनुमानादेर्विषयाबाधेन प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाच्च । अन्यथा, परिभाषामात्रापत्तेः । मीमांसाभाष्यवार्तिककाराभ्यामपि बाधितविषय-व्याप्यत्वेनैव दुष्टकरणजन्यत्वमप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वमुक्तम्, न स्वातन्त्र्येण । तस्मात्, भावनाजन्यमपि ब्रह्मज्ञानमबाधात्प्रामाण्यं लप्स्यताम्, इति ।

मैवम्, परोक्षज्ञानजन्यभावनया अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वासंभवात् । न हि बह्व्यनुमितिज्ञानं सहस्रकृत्व आवृत्तम्, अपि बह्विषयात्काराय कल्पते । ह्रस्वप्रमाणसामग्रीमन्तरेण जायमानस्यैव ज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यनियमात् ।

others, even though produced by the faulty instruments of knowledge, because there exists the non-stultification of the object. Otherwise, the whole thing would merely boil down to technical terminology. The venerable authors of the Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya and Vārtikas also have spoken of what is deduced by the faulty instruments of knowledge as the cause of unauthoritative nature, because that is, verily, in invariable concomitance with the object that is stultified, and not in an independent manner. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman even though arising from Bhāvanā may have the authoritative nature because it is not stultified.

(Our reply is) — Not so, the Bhāvanā produced by the indirect knowledge cannot possibly produce direct knowledge. Not indeed does the inferential knowledge about fire, although repeated a thousand times, lead to the direct presentation of the fire. Because it is a rule that only that knowledge which is being produced without the paraphernalia necessary for the right knowledge is unauthori-

अन्यथा, 'चैत्यं वन्देत् स्वर्गकामः' इत्यादि पौरुषेयवाक्यानामपि विषय-
बाधाभावात्, अप्रामाण्यं न स्यात् । न हि चैत्यवन्दनं स्वर्गसाधनं भवति,
इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानमस्ति, अलौकिकहिताहितसाधनताया वेदैकमेयत्वात्,
तत्र मानान्तराप्रसरात्, पुरुषवचसां च मानान्तरमूलत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यात् ।
तत्र मूलाभावात्, अप्रामाण्यम्, पुरुषस्य भ्रमप्रमासंभवात्, इति चेत्,
प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यम् ।

न चात्र शब्दप्रामाण्यस्य मूलत्वात्, न, अमूलतेति वाच्यम्,
संवादात्प्रामाण्याङ्गीकारे पूर्वतन्त्रोपपादिततत्त्वतस्त्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । आवश्यक-

tative. Otherwise, even in the case of the sentences uttered by human beings, such as 'One should bow down to the shrine, desirous of securing heaven' there would not be the unauthoritative nature owing to the absence of the stultification of the object. For, not indeed is there any means of proof (to ensure) that the salutation to the shrine is a means of securing heaven, because the means for supra-mundane welfare and the absence thereof, are to be known only from the Vedas, there being no room for any other means of proof; while in the case of words uttered by human beings, they are authoritative only when they are based upon some other means of proof. If it be argued that the unauthoritative nature exists there on account of the absence of any base, because of the possibility of illusory knowledge, in the case of human beings, (our reply is) — the same obtains even in the present case.

It should not be argued (by you), that in the present case, there is no baselessness as the Word-proof is the base, because if the authoritative nature is admitted as being

१ A आलौकिकहित ... २ A मानान्तराप्रसङ्गात् ३ A मूलाभावादेव

४ A भ्रमप्रमादादिसंभवात् ५ A adds भावनायाः after तुल्यम्

त्वेन शब्दस्यैवात्र प्रामाण्यस्योचितत्वाच्च । अन्यत्र, अदृष्टमपि फलान्यथानुपपत्त्या, अत्रैव प्रामाण्यं कल्प्यते, इति चेत्, न । अपूर्वप्रमाणान्तरकल्पने मानाभावात्, फलस्य च क्लृप्तप्रमाणेनैवोपपत्तेः । परोक्षभावनाया अपरोक्षविषयत्वम्, तस्याः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं च, अन्यत्र, अदृष्टचरम्, अपि त्वया कल्पनीयम् । तदुभयकल्पनात्, वरं क्लृप्तप्रामाण्यस्य शब्दस्यैवापरोक्षविषयत्वमात्रकल्पनम् । धर्मिकल्पनातो धर्मकल्पनाया लघुत्वात् ।

[५३] अस्तु तर्हि मन एवात्र प्रमाणम् । तर्त्तिक भावनासहकृतं

due to mutual discussion (etc.,) there would be the undesirable contingency of violating the self-authoritative nature profounded in the previous (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) Doctrine, and because here, it is right that there should be the authoritative nature of the word itself, as it is necessary. If it be said that, here we suppose that there is the authoritative nature, although not seen elsewhere, on account of the result not capable of being accounted for otherwise,— (our reply is) No ; there is no proof for the supposition of some other unusual means of proof, as the result can be accounted for by the means of proof (already) admitted. You also will have to suppose that the indirect Bhāvanā is concerned with a direct object, and any other means of proof in that case is not seen elsewhere. Instead of supposing the two (things mentioned above), it is better to suppose that the word itself is concerned only with the direct object, where the authoritative nature is taken for granted ; because the supposition about Dharmas is less clumsy than that about the Dharmin (the entity possessed of Dharmas).

[53] Well then, let the mind itself be (regarded as) authoritative here (says the objector)— (our reply is)— Is it associated with Bhāvanā or merely on its own ?

केवलं वा ? आद्ये पूर्वोक्त एव दोषः । यदसाधारणं कारणमासाद्य मनः प्रमां जनयति तस्य प्रमाणान्तरत्वनियमात् । अन्यथा, चक्षुरादिव्याप्तिज्ञानादिसहकृतस्य मनस एव सर्वत्र प्रामाण्यसंभवे प्रमाणान्तरोच्छेदापत्तेः । चक्षुरादीनामेव सर्वत्र, असाधारण्यात्प्रामाण्यम्, इत्यभ्युपगमे भावनाया अपि तुल्यत्वम् । न द्वितीयः—वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणात् पूर्वमपि केवलमनसो विद्यमानत्वेन ब्रह्मणश्च सर्वदा संनिहितत्वेन साक्षात्कारः स्यात् । तथा च श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनादिसाधनानामानर्थक्येन तत्प्रतिपादकचतुर्लक्षणी-मीमांसारम्भो न स्यात् । (किं^३ च भावनासापेक्षत्वे शब्दस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः ।

Apropos the first (alternative), there accrues the flaw already spoken of before. For, the rule is—the special cause, resorting to which the mind produces right knowledge, has another means of proof (to prove it). Otherwise, if the mind alone associated with the knowledge of the invariable concomitance with the eye and others, is possibly authoritative everywhere, there would ensue the destruction of all other means of proof,—an undesirable result. If it is admitted that even the eye and others are possessed of the authoritative nature owing to some peculiar nature everywhere, the same thing obtains in the case of Bhāvanā as well. Neither is the second (alternative possible). Because the mere mind exists even prior to the hearing of the Vedānta-passages and as Brahman is always near at hand, there would always be the realisation. And because the means, hearing, thinking, meditating etc., would be useless, there would not be the beginning of the Mīmāṃsā in four chapters propounding them. (And further, the Word would have perforce to be admitted as unauthoritative if it were to depend upon Bhāvanā. For, dependence upon but not resorting to the nature of the cause pointed

शब्दप्रमात्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणतानाश्रयसापेक्षत्वं हि, अप्रामा-
ण्यप्रयोजकम्, चक्षुरादावपि तादृशमेव, अप्रामाण्यम् ।)

किंच तस्य प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वेन तर्कालोकादिवत् न प्रमाणान्तरत्वं
संभवति, असाधारणविषयाभावात्, सिद्धान्ते सुखदुःखेच्छादीनां मनोधर्माणां
करणव्यवधानाभावेनैव साक्षिवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्, न च ब्रह्मैवासाधारणो
विषयो मनसः, इति

‘ यन्मनसा न मनुते ’

(केनो. १. ५)

इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधात् ।

ननु

out by the nature of the effect, limited by the right know-
ledge produced of word is the cause of the unauthoritative
nature ; (and) in the case of the eye and others, there is
the same type of unauthoritative nature.)

Further, as that (Manas) has the capacity to favour
(or strengthen) a means of proof, there is no possibility of
another means of proof, as in the case of Inference, light
etc., because, on account of the absence of any uncommon
object, as the attributes of the mind, pleasure, pain, desire
etc., are admitted, in the Siddhānta view, as to be known
by the Witness, verily, in the absence of the intervening
instruments (of perception). Nor again (is) Brahman
itself the peculiar object of the mind, because that would
be in contradiction with the Śruti (passage)

‘ What one thinks of not by the mind ’ (Keno. I. 5)

and others.

I say (says the objector) — Even, in the Siddhānta
view, there is equally the contradiction with the Śruti
(passages)

- ‘ यद्वाचानभ्युदितम् ’ (केनो. १. ४)
 ‘ न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा ’ (मुण्डक. ३.१.८)
 ‘ यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते ’ (तैत्ति. २. ४. ५)

इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधः सिद्धान्तेऽपि समः, इति चेत्,

- ‘ नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम् ’ (शाट्या. ४)
 ‘ वेदैर्नैतत् यद्वेदितव्यम् ’ (बृह. ५. १)
 ‘ तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि ’ (बृह. ३. ९. २६)

इत्यादिश्रुतिबलेन निषेधश्रुतीनां मुख्यवृत्त्यविषयत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः । मनसि च मुख्यामुख्यभेदाभावात् ।

‘ What is not spoken of by words ’ (Keno. I. 4)

‘ It is neither grasped by the eye, nor by words also ’

(Muṇḍaka. III. 1. 8)

‘ Whence words retreat ’

(Taitti. II. 4. 5)

and others — (our reply is) — On the strength of the Śruti (passages)

‘ One who is a non-knower of the Veda, knows not that big one ’ (Śātyā. IV)

‘ This what is fit to be known by the Veda ’

(Br̥ha. V. 1)

‘ I ask about that Man propounded in the Upaniṣads ’

(Br̥ha. III. 9. 26)

and others, the condemnatory Śruti passages can be rightly accounted for, as not being within the province of their primary (denotative) power, there being the absence of the division, principal and subordinate in the case of the mind.

‘ सर्वे वेदा यत्रैके भवन्ति ’ (चित्यु. ११. १)

‘ स मानसीन आत्मा ’ (चित्यु. ११. १. २)

‘ मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम् ’ (बृह. ४. ४. १९)

इत्यादिश्रुतेः, का गतिरिति चेत्, शृणु । मानसीनत्वं मनस्युपाधायुपलभ्यमानत्वम्, न मनोजन्यसाक्षात्कारविषयत्वम् । ‘मनसैव’ इति तु कर्तरि तृतीया आत्मनोऽकर्तृत्वप्रतिपादनार्था मनसो दर्शनकर्तृतामोह न करणताम् । औपनिषदसमाख्याविरोधात् । असाधारणेन हि व्यपदेशा भवन्ति, व्यवहारे मानसीनसमाख्यानवत् ।

[५४] अत एव प्रमाश्रयत्वादपि न मनसस्तत्र कारणतावकाशः

If (you ask) — What happens then to the Śruti (passages) such as

‘ Where all Vedas become one ’ (Cittyu. XI. 1)

‘ That Ātman belongs to the mind ’ (Cittyu. XI. 1. 2)

‘ It has to be perceived by the mind alone ’

(Br̥ha. IV. 4. 19)

— (our reply is) — Listen. Mānasīnatva (means) what is fit to be found in the limiting adjunct, the mind, and not being the object of the direct perception produced by the mind. Manasaiva — (here) the instrumental case denoting agent, intended to propound the nature of the non-doer in the case of Ātman, speaks of the mind being the agent of perception, and not its being the instrument, on account of the contradiction with the well-known view of the Upaniṣads. References (names) are in conformity with (some) uncommon (characteristic) like the expression Mānasīna in practical use.

[54] For this very reason, there is no scope for the

‘ कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृति-

हीर्षाभीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव ’ (बृह. १. ५. ३; मैत्रा. ६. ३०)

इति श्रुतौ मृद्घट इतिवत्, उपादानकारणत्वेन मनःसामानाधिकरण्य-
प्रतिपादनात् । ‘ दण्डो घटः ’ इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यादर्शनेन निमित्त-
कारणत्वाभ्युपगमेनोपपत्तिः, निमित्तकारणताग्रहणार्थम्, अवश्यकल्प्ययो-
रन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः समवायिकारणविषयत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात्, समवायिकारणा-
न्तरोपस्थित्यभावात् । आत्मनश्च

‘ साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ’ (श्वेता. ६. ११; ब्रह्मो. १६)

mind to be the instrument, even on the ground of its being
the resort of right knowledge. In the Śruti (passage)

‘ Desire, thought, doubt, faith, non-faith, firmness,
slackness, shame, understanding, fear — all this is the mind
only ’ (Br̥ha. I. 5. 3; Maitrā. VI. 30)

the mind is described in case-co-ordination, as being the
constituent cause, as in (the expression) ‘ the clay-jar ’.
As no case-co-ordination is seen in ‘ the staff, the jar ’ (in
such cases, the position) is to be accounted for, by admitting
the nature of the Instrumental cause ; the presence and
absence (of factors) which have necessarily to be under-
stood for the purpose of understanding the nature of the
Instrumental cause, are themselves properly the province
of the constituent cause, there being no other constituent
cause in evidence. And the Ātman is described as attri-
buteless in the Śruti (passage)

‘ The Witness, Sentient, Pure and Attributeless ’

(Śvetāl. VI. 11 ; Brahmo XVI)

इतिश्रुत्या निर्गुणत्वप्रतिपादनात् । दृश्यानां द्रष्टृधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः, दृश्यानां घटादीनां स्वरूपतो धर्मत्वेन वा, तादात्म्याभावस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात्, काम-संकल्पादीनां च स्वप्रकाशत्वाभावेन दृश्यत्वात् द्रष्टृधर्मत्वाभावनिश्चये,

‘ मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम् ’ (बृह. ४. ४. १९)

‘ यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ’

(कठो. २. ३. १४; बृह. ४. ४. ७)

‘ तीणा हि तदा सर्वान् कार्मान् हृदयस्य भवति ’ (बृह. ४. ३. २२)

इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्मनोधर्मत्वमेव कामादीनां निश्चीयते । मनस्तादात्म्याध्यासाच्च तद्धर्माणाम्, अपि, आत्मन्याध्यासिको व्यवहारः ।

as the Perceivables cannot rightly be the Dharmas of the Perceiver, as, in the case of the perceivables, jar and others either from their nature, or from their being the Dharmas, the absence of their being identical (with Ātman) is all-established ; and when ‘ Desire, thought etc. ’, are definitely ascertained as not being the attributes of the Perceiver, as they are perceivable, owing to their not possessing the self-illumining capacity, it is concluded that ‘ Desire etc. ’ are just the Dharmas of the mind, by the Śruti (passages)

‘ It is fit to be perceived only by the mind ’ (Br̥ha. IV. 4. 19)

‘ When all the longings which had resorted to the heart of this one are cast away ’

(Kātho. II. 3. 14; Br̥ha. IV. 4. 7)

‘ Verily, then he has crossed over all the longings in the heart ’

(Br̥ha. IV. 3. 22)

and others. And on account of the superimposition of the identity of the mind (on the Ātman), there is the statement of its attributes also involving superimposition on the Ātman (as is clear) from the Śruti (passages)

‘ बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव आराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः ’ (श्वेता. ५. ८)

‘ स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्यायतीव

सधीः स्वप्नो भूत्वमं लोकमतिक्रामति ’

(बृह. ४. ३. ७)

इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

‘ विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च ’

(तैत्ति. २. ५)

इतिश्रुतौ विज्ञानशब्दवाच्यस्य मनस एव प्रथमान्तपदनिर्देश्यत्वे कर्तृत्व-
श्रवणाच्च ।

‘ मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति ’ (बृह. १.५.३; मैत्रा. ६.३०)

इत्यादौ कारणत्वमपि श्रुतम्, इति चेत्—न । इन्द्रियातिरिक्ते मनसि

‘ By the attribute of the Buddhi, and also by the attribute of the Ātman he is perceived even as the lowest — having the measure just of the point of the awl ’

(Śvetā. V. 8)

‘ He, remaining uniform, moves about in both the worlds, as though meditating ’

(Br̥ha. IV. 3. 7)

‘ With the understanding, having become the dream, he goes beyond this world ’

(Br̥ha. IV. 3. 7)

and others. In the Śruti (passage)

‘ The Vijñāna spreads the sacrifice, and also spreads about the Karman ’

(Taitti. II. 5)

the mind itself, denoted by the word Vijñāna, although referred to by a word in the nominative case, is described as the agent. If it be argued, that it is stated in the Śruti as being the Instrument as well, as in the (passage)

‘ He, verily, perceives by the mind itself, hears by the mind ’

(Br̥ha. I. 5. 3; Maitra. VI. 30)

and others, (our reply is) — No, because that Śruti passage purports to point out only to the existence (of the

विप्रतिपन्नान्प्रति तदतिरिक्तमनःसद्भावमात्रे तस्याः श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यात्, न तु करणत्वेऽपि, एवकारानन्वयापत्तेः, चक्षुरादीनामपि करणस्यान्वयव्यतिरेक-
सिद्धत्वेन तद्व्यवच्छेदेन नियमानुपपत्तेः, हेतुमात्रेऽपि तृतीयास्मरणात् ।
मनसः करणताप्रसिद्धिस्तु निर्धर्मकस्वप्रकाशस्य, आत्मनोऽसङ्गस्य स्वतो
विषयोपलभ्यायोग्यस्य स्वतादात्म्याध्यासेन तदाकारवृत्तिभिर्विषयोपलम्भ-
द्वारत्वादेव, न तु चक्षुरादिवत् तदस्थित्वेन, इति, आस्तां तावत् । स्वप्रका-
शप्रक्रियायां विस्तरेणैतदुपपादयिष्यामः ।

[५५] अस्तु तर्हि प्रथमं परोक्षं ज्ञानं जनयतोऽपि शब्दस्यैव सह-

mind) as apart from (the sense-organs), for (the benefit of those) who hold conflicting opinions about the mind which is apart from the sense-organs ; (the Śruti passage is not intended) to point out to its being the instrument ; other-
wise its connection with the Eva (alone) would not be properly explained ; even in the case of the eye and others, their being the instrument is established by the (law of) presence and absence, and so, no rule can be rightly laid down, when they are separated from it, and the Instrumental case is known to be used (lit. remembered), to point out only to the cause. The well-known fact of the mind being the instrument, however, is, verily, due to the fact that the Ātman, without any Dharmas, and self-illuminating, unattached, himself incompetent to experience the objects, (of senses), experiences the objects, by functioning in the form (of the mind) due to the super-imposition of his oneness on it ; and not by remaining indifferent like the eye and others —Let this suffice for the present ; we shall propound this at length in (our work) ' Prakāśaprakriyā ' (or, in connection with the technique of ' self-illumination ').

[55] (The objector says) — All right then ! Let it be that the word itself, although producing indirect know-

कारिविशेषलाभेन पश्चात्, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्, इति—तत्, न, अर्थ-
जरतीयन्यायापातात् । शब्दस्य परोक्षज्ञानजननस्वाभाव्ये सहकारिसहस्रे-
णापि तदन्यथाकरणयोगात्, आगन्तुकस्य स्वभावत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

[५६] यत्तु दृष्टान्तत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुदाहृतम्, तत्र किं विवक्षितम् ?
अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वभावस्य चक्षुषः संस्कारसहकारेण परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्,
अथवा, संनिकृष्टविषयेऽपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वभावस्य चक्षुषः संस्कारसहकारेणा-
संनिकृष्टेऽपि तत्तांशे, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्, किं वा संस्कारनिरपेक्षत्वेन
ज्ञानं जनयतोऽपि चक्षुषः संस्कारसापेक्षत्वेऽपि न, अप्रामाण्यम्, इति ?

ledge at first, would produce direct knowledge afterwards,
through the assistance of the particular associates. (Our
reply is)—No, that (it) not so, because in that case,
there would come in the 'maxim of the half-old woman'.
If the word has the nature of producing the indirect know-
ledge, that cannot be pushed away from it by even a
thousand associating agencies, because an accidental charac-
teristic cannot be the nature (of a thing).

[56] As to 'recognition' cited forth as the illustra-
tive instance (we ask you)—What is it that is intended to
show up there? (1) Is it that the eye, which has the
nature of producing direct knowledge, can produce the in-
direct knowledge, with the co-operation of the impression
(*samskāra*), or (2) is it that the eye, having the nature of
producing direct knowledge in respect of the object near at
hand, is the producing cause of the direct knowledge in
respect of an object of the portion, viz. the nature of that,
not near at hand with the co-operation of the impression, or
(3) is it that the eye although producing the knowledge
independent of the impression is not unauthoritative even
when it depends upon the impression ?

१ A तदपाकरणयोगात् २ Ā ... ज्ञानजननस्वभावस्य ३ Ā reads वा
४ Ā ... ज्ञानजनन ... ५ Ā संस्कारसापेक्षत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यम्

तत्र न, आद्यः, प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अपरोक्षत्वात्, तत्तांशे चक्षुषोऽजनक-
त्वाच्च ।

अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि, तत्तांशेऽपरोक्षत्वानङ्गीकारात्, तदंशे
संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वेन स्मृतित्वस्यैवाभ्युपगमाच्च । एतेन प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः
संस्कारजन्यत्वे स्मृतित्वापातात् संस्कारजस्मरणमेव विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन तत्का-
रणम्, इत्यपास्तम्, संस्कारजन्यत्वांशे स्मरणत्वाङ्गीकारात्, स्मृतिहेतुत्वेना-
वश्यकल्पोद्बुद्धसंस्कारादेव प्रत्यभिज्ञोत्पादसंभवे, अन्तरा स्मृतिकल्पनानव-

In this connection, the first (alternative) cannot stand
because recognition is direct and the eye cannot produce
the portion involved in that.

For this reason, not even the second (alternative can
stand) because in respect of the portion involving the
nature of that, directness is not admitted, and only the
nature of remembrance is admitted in respect of that
portion while it is produced only from the impressions.
Thus recognition produced by the mental impressions would
be having the nature of remembrance, and so the view viz.
the remembrance produced from the impressions is its cause,
on account of the knowledge of the qualifying factor
alone, is brushed aside. Because the nature of remem-
brance is admitted in respect of the portion produced by
the mental impressions ; and because there is no scope for
the supposition of remembrance intervening between, when
there is the possibility of the production of the recognition
from the mental impressions rising up and that have neces-
sarily to be postulated as being the cause of remembrance,
and in accordance with the maxim ' Let it be in accordance

१ A संस्कारजं स्मरणमेव

२ A विशेषज्ञानत्वेन

३ A प्रत्यभिज्ञानोत्पादसंभवे

4 प्रत्यभिज्ञानोत्पत्तिसंभवे

काशात् 'तद्धेतोरेव तदस्तु किं तेन' इतिन्यायात्, स्मरण इव प्रत्यभिज्ञायामपि पूर्वानुभवान्वयव्यतिरेकयोस्तुल्यत्वाच्च । प्रमात्वाप्रमात्ववत्, अनुभवत्वस्मरणत्वयोरेकज्ञानवृत्तित्वे विषयकृतांशभेदात्, न विरोधः । स्मृति-त्वानुभवत्वयोर्जातित्वानङ्गीकारात् ।

अत एव न तृतीयः । न हि चक्षुषः स्वविषये संस्कारसापेक्षत्वमस्ति येन सापेक्षत्वलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं स्यात्, किन्तु स्वस्वसहकारिसमवधानात्स्वे स्वे विषये युगपज्ज्ञानं जनयतोश्चक्षुःसंस्कारयोरार्थसमाजेनानुभवस्मरणात्मकैकज्ञानजनकत्वं पर्यवस्यति । अन्यथा, संस्कारसहकारेण चक्षुषोऽसंनिकृष्ट-

with the cause. What is the matter about it?' — as in the case of remembrance, so even in the case of recognition the presence and the absence of the previous experience are equal in the picture. As in the case of the nature of right knowledge and the nature of wrong knowledge there is no contradiction in the case of experience and remembrance having the power to produce the same knowledge, on account of the difference in the portions affected by the objects of knowledge. Because remembrance and experience are not admitted as being possessed of a generality.

For this very reason (cannot stand) the third (alternative) — Not indeed exists for the eye the dependence upon the mental impressions in respect of its own object, so that there could have been the unauthoritative nature, characterised by dependence, but there comes in ultimately in the case of the eye and the mental impression producing a simultaneous cognition in their respective objects by taking into account their respective associates, the nature of the producer of only one knowledge involving experience and remembrance by the combined objects. Otherwise, if the eye produces the cognition even in respect of an object not at hand with the co-operation of the mental impression,

विषयेऽपि, ज्ञानजनकत्वे रजतसंस्कारसहकारेणासंनिकृष्टेऽपि रजते चाक्षुष-
ज्ञानापत्तेः, अन्यथाख्यातिस्वीकारप्रसङ्गः । रजतचाक्षुषत्वेन रजतसंयोगत्वे-
नैव कार्यकारणभावनियमे तद्देशकालसंबन्धरूपायां तत्तायामपि तुल्यम्,
प्रत्यक्षस्य विद्यमानोपलम्भत्वनियमात् । किन्तु भिन्नजातीयज्ञानहेतुत्वेन
कृत्तयोरपि चक्षुःसंस्कारयोः, अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम्, एकज्ञानहेतुत्वं प्रत्य-
भिज्ञायां कृत्तम् । इदम्, एव, अन्यथाख्यातिवादनिराकरणेन, अनिर्वच-
नीयार्थमिथ्याज्ञानोत्पत्तिं व्यवस्थापयद्भिः पञ्चपादिकाकारैर्दृष्टान्तितम् ।
न, एतावता सापेक्षस्यापि प्रामाण्यं भविष्यति । इह च पूर्वम्, अपरोक्ष-

there would be the undesirable contingency of the ocular cognition in respect of the silver even though it is not nearby through the co-operation of the impression of silver; or there would perforce be the acceptance of 'Akhyāti'. When the relation of cause and effect is regulated by the ocular perception of silver through the connection itself with the silver, that is the same in respect of the cognition of thatness having a connection with the particular space and time, because Direct Perception is as a rule the cognition of what actually exists. But in the case of the eye and the mental impression, although accepted as the cause of the cognition of the different generality, has been postulated, in respect of the recognition, the nature of being the cause of one cognition, in conformity with the law of presence and absence. This itself has been given as an illustrative example by the venerable author (Padmapāda) of the *Pañcapādikā* establishing the production of the false knowledge known as 'Anirvacanīya', by the refutation of the view of 'Anyathākhyāti'. But, by this there cannot be the authoritative nature of something which is even dependent upon something else. Here, however, in the

ज्ञानासमर्थस्यैव शब्दस्य विचारजनितसंस्कारविशेषसहकारेण, अपरोक्ष-
ज्ञानजनने सापेक्षत्वलक्षणप्रामाण्यस्वभावभङ्गयोः प्रसङ्गो वज्रलेपायते ।
तस्मात्, शब्द एव विचारात्पूर्वमूर्ध्वं च स्वतः प्रमाणभूतो विषयमहिम्ना
साक्षात्कारं जनयति, इति युक्तमाश्रयितुम् । नच स्वभावभङ्गदोषः, मनस
इव परोक्षापरोक्षज्ञानजननस्वभावाङ्गीकारात् । यथा मनः क्वचित्परोक्षं ज्ञानं
जनयति, क्वचिच्च, अपरोक्षम्, इत्युपेयते परैः, तद्वदस्माकं शब्देऽपि किं न
स्यात् ?

ननु तत्र, अवच्छेदकद्वैविध्यमस्ति । मनस्त्वेन परोक्षज्ञानजनकता,

case of the word, formerly quite incompetent to produce direct knowledge, (now) producing the direct knowledge through the special co-operation of the impression produced by thoughts, the undesired contingency of there being the authoritative nature depending upon something else, and the loss of the nature become all the more inevitable and unshakable. Therefore, it is better to accept the position that the Word itself self-authoritative, prior and posterior to pondering, produces direct realisation by virtue of the special importance of the object. Further, there is no flaw of the loss of the nature, because as in the case of mind, the nature of producing indirect and direct cognition is admitted. As is admitted by the opponents that the mind sometimes produces indirect knowledge and sometimes direct knowledge, why may not that obtain in the case of the Word in our case ?

Now I say (says the objector), there exists a two-fold nature of a limiting characteristic. (1) In the capacity of the mind, there is produced the indirect knowledge. (2) There is produced the direct knowledge in the capacity of

इन्द्रियत्वेन चक्षुरादिवत्, असाधारणेनापरोक्षज्ञानजनकता । इन्द्रियत्वं च शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणाभावसमानाधिकरणज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वम्, स्मृत्यजनकवृत्तिज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वम्, वा । तत्, चक्षुरादाविव मनस्यपि वर्तते । एवं शब्देऽपि द्वैरूप्यं वाच्यम् । एवं परोक्षज्ञानजनकता-वच्छेदकम्, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकतावच्छेदकम्, इति ।

[५७] उच्यते— विषयाजन्यज्ञानजनकत्वेन वा, ज्ञानकरणत्वेन वा, शब्दस्य परोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वं योग्यपदार्थनिरूपितत्वं पदार्थभेदपरशब्द-त्वेन, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकता । ‘ धार्मिकस्त्वमसि ’ इत्यादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय,

the sense-organs having a peculiar nature, like the eye etc. And the nature of sense-organs depends upon the connection with the mind which is the cause of cognition, having the same substratum with the absence of special qualities arising from (the means of proof) other than Word, or it depends upon the connection with the mind which is the cause of cognition, with its functioning not caused by remembrance. And that exists in the case of the mind also as in the case of the eye and others. Thus even in the case of the Word, a two-fold form should be stated, thus — (1) being characterised by the nature of producing the indirect cognition; and (2) being characterised by the nature of producing the direct cognition.

[57] (To the above objection) it is stated in reply (by us as under) — In the case of the Word, either through being the producer of cognition not produced from the object or through being the instrument of cognition, there is the nature of producing indirect cognition ; there is the nature of producing direct knowledge, through the word pointing out to the identity with the object ‘ you ’ after a

१ A ततः चक्षुरादिवि A तत् चक्षुरादेरिव २ A स्वाविषयाजन्य
३ A ... ज्ञानजनकता ४ A धर्मस्त्वमसि

आद्यं विशेषणम्, इतरविशेषणव्यावर्त्यं तु स्पष्टम् । एतत्, च 'दशमस्त्वमसि' 'राजा त्वमसि,' इतिवाक्याद् 'दशमोऽहमस्मि' 'राजाहमस्मि,' इत्यादिसाक्षात्कारदर्शनात्; अन्यथा, 'नाहं दशमो नवमोऽहमस्मि' 'नाहं राजा व्याध एवास्मि', इत्यादिसाक्षात्कारिभ्रमनिवृत्तिः, ततो न स्यात् । साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविरोधिज्ञानत्वेनैव विरोधित्वकल्पनात् ।

[५८] न च तत्र वाक्यात्पदार्थमात्रोपस्थितौ मानसः संसर्गबोधः, इति वाच्यम् । सर्वस्मिन्नापि वाक्ये तथा संभवेन शब्दप्रमाणमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः, असाधारणमनःसहकारित्वेन पदार्थज्ञानस्य प्रमाँणान्तरत्वावश्यकत्वाच्च, यद-

proper scrutiny of the objects. The first qualifying attribute is for the sake of warding off the violation in respect of expressions like 'you are religious'; being turned away by the other qualifying attributes is obvious (enough). And that is so, because from passages like 'you are the tenth', 'you are the king', there is seen the direct realisation, such as 'I am the tenth', 'I am the king' etc., otherwise there would not be from them, the direct discarding of the illusion, such as 'I am not the tenth; I am the ninth', 'I am not the king, I am the hunter', because it is postulated that in the case of a direct illusion there should be contradiction by the direct contradictory knowledge itself.

[58] It should not be argued that there is no comprehension there of the contact with the mind, when the unqualified object is brought to view from the sentence (uttered), because in the case of all sentences that possibility exists, and so would follow the undesirable contingency of the means of proof 'Word' being just scotched off; and because in the case of cognition of an object through the peculiar co-operation of the mind being another means of

१ Ā इत्यादिवाक्याद् २ Ā एवाहमस्मि ३ Ā साक्षात्कारभ्रमे साक्षात्कार-
विरोधि ... ४ Ā न्तरावश्यकत्वाच्च

साधारणं कारणमित्यादिन्यायात् ।

अत एव वाक्यात्परोक्षज्ञानानन्तरं मानसज्ञानान्तरमेव भ्रमनिवर्तकम्, इत्यपास्तम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तत्र वाक्यस्यैव कारणतावधारणात् । अन्यथा, वाक्यश्रवणात् पूर्वमेव सामग्र्याः संभवेन मनसा चक्षुरादिना वा साक्षात्कारजननप्रसङ्गात् । वाक्यमपि तत्र सहकारीति चेत्, तर्हि, आयातं वाक्यस्यैव प्रामाण्यम्, मनसोऽसाधारणसहकारित्वात् । तस्मात्, शब्द एव साक्षात्कारहेतुः । यथा च परोक्षत्वव्याप्यमेकं मानसत्वम्, अपरोक्षत्वव्याप्यम्, अपरम्, तद्वत् शब्दत्वमपि द्विविधम्, तेन न साङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गः ।

proof has to be necessarily there, in conformity with the maxim ' What is peculiar, is the cause ' etc.

For this very reason (the view) that after the indirect cognition from the sentence, another mental cognition is the cause of turning away illusion is brushed aside, because there the sentence itself is ascertained to be the cause in conformity with (the law of) presence and absence. Otherwise, with the whole paraphernalia existing even prior to the hearing of the sentence, there would be the undesirable contingency of the mind or the eye and others, producing the direct realisation. If you say that the sentence also is the co-operating agency there, then it follows that the sentence itself has the authoritative nature, the mind being (just) a peculiar co-operator. Therefore the Word itself is the cause of direct realisation there. As the nature of the mind pervaded by the indirect is one, that one pervaded by the direct is another, so the nature of the word also is two-fold; hence there would be no confused mixing up (either).

१ A यदसाधारणकारणमिति २ A मानसं ज्ञानान्तर ... ३ A तत्र तत्र
४ A adds इन्द्रियत्वम् after अपरम्

[५९] ननु, एवं विशेषरूपेण कारणतासंभवेऽपि चक्षुरादीनां षण्णां चक्षुष्ठादिविशेषकारणतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानां यथा सामान्यकारणतावच्छेदकम्, अपरमिन्द्रियत्वम्, इष्टम्, एवं शब्देऽपि, सामान्यकारणावच्छेदकं षडिन्द्रियानुगतं वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथा शब्दजन्ये ज्ञानेऽपरोक्षसामान्यमाकस्मिकं स्यात्, शब्दे तत्प्रयोजकाभावात् । तथा च, व्यापकाभावे तद्व्याप्यशब्दापरोक्षम्, अपि न स्यात्, चाक्षुषत्वादिवत् ।

उच्यते — परोक्षत्वानधिकरणज्ञानकरणत्वमेव सप्तस्वनुगतम्, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकतावच्छेदकं तव षट्स्वनुगतम्, इन्द्रियत्वमिव विशेषज्ञान-

[59] I say (says the objector) — Even though being the cause is possible in a special form as in the case of the six (sense-organs) the eye and others, limited by the characteristic of being a special cause — the nature of the eye etc.,—there is the characteristic of being the general cause and there is desired another (characteristic) — the nature of the sense-organ. Likewise, even in the case of the Word, you have to state a characteristic involving a nature of a general cause in conformity with the six sense-organs. Otherwise, in respect of the cognition produced by the Word, the direct generality would be an accidental feature, there being no producing cause of that in the word. And similarly, in the absence of the more extensive, there would not be the direct cognition from the Word, pervaded by it, like the perceptibility of the sight etc.

(To the above objection) it is stated (by us in reply) — Being the instrument of knowledge not having the base of indirect knowledge only, is found in seven (entities) like the nature of the sense-organs characterised by being the producing cause of direct knowledge existing in the six

कारणतायाः सामान्यकारणतावच्छेदकत्वं तव मम च समानम् । अन्यथा, सामान्यरूपेणोन्द्रियाणां कारणत्वासिद्ध्या ज्ञानजनकमनःसंयोगविशेषाश्रयत्वेन कारणता न स्यात् । तेन चक्षुष्वादिविशेषरूपेण गृहीतकारणानामिव चक्षुरादीनां केनचिदुपाधिनैवोक्तिः शब्देऽपि न व्याहन्यते ।

[६०] न चैवं शब्देऽपि, इन्द्रियव्यवहारापत्तिः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकारणतावच्छेदकस्यैवेन्द्रियव्यवहारहेतुत्वात्, इति वाच्यम् । इन्द्रियाणामतीन्द्रियत्वेन तत्र लौकिकानां प्रत्यक्षव्यवहाराभावात् । परीक्षकाणां च स्वस्वपरि-

admitted by you. The nature of the cause of the special cognition being the characteristic of the nature of the general cause, obtains equally in your view as well as in my view. Otherwise, if the sense-organs are not established as the cause in a general manner, there would not be the nature of the cause by resorting to particular contact with the mind producing the cognition. Therefore, the statement that the eye and others that are accepted as the causes in the special form — the nature of the eye etc., — by some limiting adjunct or other — this is not vitiated in the case of the Word also.

[60] It should not be argued that in that case, the Word would have the functioning of the sense-organs, foisted upon it, because something characterising the nature of the cause of the direct perception is the cause of the functioning of the sense-organs. (Our reply to this is) — Because the sense-organs are super-sensuous, there is the absence of only popular direct functioning in their case and the scrutineers carry on their dealings in their own technical terminology. Even though in the case of that (Vyavahāra) of the nature described, there is the particular feature of its not being heard, there is no flaw because it is admitted that it is the cause of the practical dealing. And further, the nature described is not the cause of the

भाषया व्यवहारात् । अश्रावणत्वविशेषेऽपि तस्योक्तरूपस्य वा तद्व्यवहार-
प्रयोजकत्वाङ्गीकारात् । न तेषु मानाभावः,

‘ दशमे पुरुषे प्राणा आत्मैकादशः ’ (बृह. ३. ९. ४)

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिप्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्, वचनादानगमनविसर्गानन्दाख्यकार्य-
पञ्चकान्यथानुपपत्तेश्च । तथा च, अविरोधलक्षणे चतुर्थपादे व्युत्पादितं
भगवता सूत्रकारेण,

‘ त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ’ (ब्र. सू. २. ४. १७)

इति । साङ्ख्यैरप्युक्तम्—

‘ अभिमानोऽहंकारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

इन्द्रियैकादशकैश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकं चैव ॥

functioning of the sense-organs, because it does not cover
the five organs of action. There is no absence of proof in
respect of them, because that has been propounded by the
Śruti and Smṛti passages,

‘ There are these ten Prāṇas in a man, the Ātman is the
eleventh ’ (Brha. III. 9. 4)

and because the five-fold action known as speaking, grasp-
ing, going, evacuating, sexual-joy cannot be accounted for
otherwise. Further in that same way has been described
in the fourth part, named ‘ Avirodha ’, by the Revered
author of the Sūtras —

‘ Those sense-organs, on account of that appellation
other than the best. ’ (Bra. Sū. II. 4. 17)

The Sāṅkhyas also say —

‘ Egoism is the Ahaṁkāra ; from it the two-fold crea-
tion proceeds, (the creation) concerning the sense-organs is
the eleven-fold host ; there are also the five-fold subtle
elements.

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ ' (सा. का. २४-२६)

इति । अस्यार्थः — प्रकृतेः प्रथमकार्यभूतात् महासत्तासामान्यात्मकात् महतोऽहंकारो नाम पदार्थो जातः, इत्युक्तम्

‘ प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारः ’

(सा. का. २१)

इत्यत्र । अधुना, अहंकारस्य लक्षणमुच्यते,—अभिमानः, इन्द्रियोपनीतेऽर्थे,

The eleven-fold host constituted of the Sattva-quality proceeds from the Vaikṛta Ahamkāra. The subtle elements proceed from the elements (Tāmāsa Ahamkāra) etc. That is constituted of the Tamas. From the Tejas proceed these both varieties.

The organs of knowledge are known as the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. They speak of the organs of action as speech, hands, feet, the organ of excretion, and the organ of generation.

(Sā. Kā. 24-26)

The meaning of this is — From the Mahat which existed as the first effect of the Prakṛti constituted of the generality ‘ the great existence ’ was produced the entity called Ahamkāra. — This has been stated in the passage

‘ From the Prakṛti, the Mahat; from that the Ahamkāra. ’

(Sā. Kā. 21)

Now is stated the characteristic of Ahamkāra — Abhimāna (egoism) in respect of the entity here put forth by the sense-organs, — I am the authorised master, I am indeed powerful, these objects are for my sake alone, there is

अहमत्राधिकृतः, शक्तः खल्वहं, मदर्थं एवामी विषयाः, मत्तो नान्योऽत्रा-
धिकृतः कश्चित्, अतोऽहमस्मि, इति योऽभिमानः सोऽहंकारव्यापारत्वाद-
हंकारस्य लक्षणम् । तेन, अभिमानहेतुः, अहंकारः । सामानाधिकरण्यं च
कार्यकारणयोस्तादात्म्यविवक्षया । स च त्रिविधो भवति—कारणीभूत-
गुणत्रयभेदात्, सात्त्विको राजसस्तामसश्च । सात्त्विक एव वैकृतवैकारिका-
भ्यामुच्यते, राजस एव तैजसशब्देनोच्यते, तामसो भूतादिशब्देन । ततश्च
सात्त्विकात्, अहंकारात्, एकादशेन्द्रियसर्गः, यस्मात्स लघुः प्रकाशकश्च ।
तामसात्, अहंकारात् शब्द-स्पर्श-रूप-रस-गन्धाख्यपञ्चतन्मात्रसर्गः, यस्मात्स
तामसः, गुरुत्वात्, आवरणात्मकत्वाच्च । राजसस्य तु स्वतन्त्रकार्याभावात्,

no authorised master elsewhere than I, thus am I — the Abhimāna (self-importance) of this nature, engaged in activities associated with Ahaṁkāra, is the characteristic of Ahaṁkāra. Therefore, Ahaṁkāra is the cause of self-importance. And the case-coordination is used with a desire to point out identity of cause and effect. And it is three-fold — (1) constituted of the Sattva, (2) constituted of the Rajas, and (3) constituted of the Tamas, from the three-fold distinction of the Guṇas that are the cause. The Sāttvika itself is spoken of as Vaikṛta and Vaikārika, the Rājasa itself is spoken of by the word Taijasa; the Tāmasa by the word Bhūta etc.. And from that Sāttvika-Ahaṁkāra (proceeds) the creation of the eleven sense-organs, because that (Sāttvika-Ahaṁkāra) is light and illumining. From the Tāmasa-Ahaṁkāra (proceeds) the creation of the five subtle elements called sound, touch, form, taste and smell, because that (Tāmasa is) heavy and constituted of the covering nature. The Rājasa, however, having no independent function, merely acts as the co-operating

१ A नान्योधिकृतः

२ A drops च

३ A वैकृतवैकारिकशब्दाभ्या

४ A सात्त्विकाहंकारात्

उभयसहकारित्वमात्रम्, स्वतो निश्चलयोः सत्त्वतमसोः स्वकार्यं प्रति चाल-
कत्वाद्वजसः ।

‘ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु क्षवरणमेव तमः । ’

(सा. का. १३)

इत्युक्तत्वात् । कारणानुविधायि च कार्यम् । एषां च परस्परविरोधिनाम्,
अपि एककार्यकारित्वं न विहन्यते, तैलवर्तिवह्निषु परस्परविरुद्धत्वेऽपि,
एकप्रकाशकारण्यकार्यदर्शनात् । तच्चोक्तं

‘ प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ’

(सा. का. १३)

तस्मादेष विभागः । तत्र सात्त्विकाहंकारोपादानकत्वम्, इन्द्रियत्वम्, तन्नये,
इन्द्रियसामान्यवृत्त्यतिरिक्तप्राणानङ्गीकारात्, न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः ।

agency with the both, because the Rajas (quality) pushes
on in respect of their functions the Sattva and Tamas
(qualities) that are by themselves inactive. Because it
has been stated

‘ Sattva is desired to be light and illumining, the Rajas
strengthening and active, the Tamas alone heavy and
screening. ’

(Sā. Kā. 13)

And the effect follows in the wake of the cause. And even
in the case of these, opposed to one another, their perform-
ing the same action is not vitiated, because the oil, wick and
fire, although opposed to one another, are seen to produce
one activity, viz. light. And that has been stated —

‘ Like the lamp there is the functioning in effect. ’

(Sā. Kā. 13)

Therefore, this is the division. There the sense-organs
have the Sāttvika Ahankāra as the constituent cause ; and
according to the view no other Prāna apart from the general
functioning of the sense-organs being not admitted, there is
no over-extension in that case. Because it has been stated

‘ सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ’ (सा. का. २९)

इत्युक्तत्वात् । तन्मात्राणां भूतानां च तामसाहंकारकार्यत्वात् ।

[६१] ननु सिद्धान्ते

‘ अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयं प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक् ’

(छा. ६. ५. ४; ६. ६. ५)

इति श्रुतौ भौतिकाहारोपष्टम्भ्यत्वश्रवणात्, समानजातीयेषु च तत्संभवात्
मृन्मयम् इत्यादेरेव मृदन्तरेणोपष्टम्भदर्शनाद्

‘ अग्निं वागप्येति....चक्षुरादित्यं....दिशः श्रोत्रम् ’ (बृह. ३. २. १३)

इति च भूतेषु लयश्रवणात्, लयस्य च, अकारणे, अनुपपत्तेः, भूतगुण-

‘ The general functioning of the sense-organs — five
airs, Prāṇa etc. ’ (Sā. Kā. 29)

The subtle elements and the elements are the effect of
Tāmasa-Ahaṁkāra.

[61] I say (says the objector) — In the Śruti-passagc,
according to the Siddhānta-view —

‘ My dear, the mind, verily, is constituted of food
(earth); Prāṇa, constituted of water ; speech of Tejas ’

(Chā. VI. 5. 4 ; VI. 6. 5)

being strengthened by the material food is stated there ;
and that is possible only when they belong to the same
genus ; from (the expressions like) ‘ constituted of earth ’
(in the case of the entities constituted of earth) is seen the
strengthening by another piece of clay, and in the passage

‘ Speech merges into the Fire, the eye into the Sun, the
ear in the Quarters ’

(Br̥ha. III. 2. 13)

the Śruti speaks of the merging in the elements and the
merging cannot be accounted for without there being a
cause, — and so, it is established that the sense-organs are

व्यञ्जकत्वे च, आलोकादिवत् भौतिकत्वम्, इन्द्रियाणां सिद्धम् । यथा च श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसनघ्राणानां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धग्राहकत्वात्, एकैकशस्तु तत्तद्वत्त्वेम् । तथा पञ्चगुणग्राहकत्वात्, मनसोऽपि पञ्चगुणवत्त्वम्, यदिन्द्रियं यद्गुणग्राहकं तदिन्द्रियं तद्गुणवत्, इति व्याप्तेः । तथा च मनसः पञ्च-भूतात्मकत्वम्, अन्येषां च, एकैकभूतात्मकत्वं पर्यवस्यति ।

[६२] न च मनसः स्पर्शवत्त्वेन, आरम्भकत्वप्रसङ्गः, चक्षुरादि-तुल्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्, आरम्भवादानङ्गीकाराच्च । न च सर्वविशेषगुणशून्ये परमाणवाभौतिके किञ्चन मानमस्ति, *तत्साधकानुमानानामाभासत्वात्,

made up of the material elements for the manifestation of the qualities of the elements like light etc. As the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose enable one to grasp respectively sound, touch, form, taste and smell, they belong to those (Gūṇas) respectively; likewise the mind also is possessed of five attributes, because it enables one to grasp these five attributes because of the invariable concomitance (expressed in the formula) ' which sense-organ enables one to grasp which quality, that sense-organ is possessed of that quality '. Thus likewise, it would follow that the mind is constituted of the five elements, and the others are constituted of one element each.

[62] You cannot say that because the mind is possessed of the qualities of touch etc., there would be the undesirable contingency of its being the cause, because it is admitted to be on the same footing as the eye and others, and also because the Ārambha-doctrine is not admitted by us. Further again, there is no proof whatsoever (to admit) the existence of the atom not constituted of the elements and void of all particular qualities, because the inference proving that, are fallacious and that is known by the ' I '

अहंप्रत्ययेन च स्वप्रकाशकेवलात्मगोचरेण सर्वदेहव्यापित्वेन च तस्य ग्रहात् ।
एतच्च सर्वमुक्तं वार्तिके—

‘ स्वप्राप्त्यर्थसजातीयमिन्द्रियं स्यात्प्रदीपवत् ।
रूपस्यैवावभासित्वान्न चेत्स्याच्छ्रोत्ररूपवत् ॥
न चेदर्थसजातीयं सर्वार्थग्रहणं भवेत् ।
एकैकस्येन्द्रियस्येह मनोबुद्ध्योर्यथा तथा ॥
सर्वभूतात्मकत्वात् सर्वार्थग्रहणं तयोः ।
मनोबुद्ध्योरिति ज्ञेयमन्यथा तदसंभवात् ॥
त्वगादिज्ञानव्यक्तीनां बुद्धिः सामान्यमिष्यते ।
प्राण एव क्रियाशक्तिः सामान्यं तद्रुच्यते ॥

idea itself, which comes within the province of the self-illuminating pure Ātman and pervading the whole body. And all this has been stated in the Vārtika —

‘ The sense-organ would be like a lamp, homogeneous with the object to be grasped by it. If it were not like that, on account of the manifestation of the form alone, it would be like grasping the form by the ear.

Here, in the case of each independent sense-organ, there would be the grasping of all the objects, like that of mind and intellect, if there be no homogeneity of objects (to be grasped)

In the case of these two — mind and understanding — as they are constituted of all the elements, the grasping of all the objects is to be understood ; otherwise that would be impossible.

The understanding by the individual agents of knowledge, like the skin etc., is believed to be of a general nature, like that in the case of Prāṇa alone, where the power of activity is spoken of as a general one.

शब्दादिभोगसिद्ध्यर्थं श्रोत्राद्या ज्ञानशक्तयः ।

तद्वत्कर्मोपभोगार्थं वागाद्याः कर्मशक्तयः ॥ ’

इति ।

(बृह. वा. २. ४. ३६४-३६८)

‘ यावद्बुधिरसंव्याप्तिः शरीरे तावदेव तु ।

बुद्धेः सामान्यवृत्तेस्तद्व्याप्तिरादेहसंक्षयात् ॥

योग्येन्द्रियस्य वा यस्य ततोऽन्यत्रापि लक्षिता ।

वृत्तिस्तस्येव सा ज्ञेया न स्वभावविपर्ययः ॥

(बृह. २. ४. ३४५-३४६)

इत्यादि च । अत्र मनोबुद्ध्योः, इति, एकस्यैव संकल्पाध्यवसायलक्षणवृत्ति-
भेदाद् द्वैविध्याभिधानम् । चक्षुःश्रवसां चक्षुषा श्रवणदर्शनात् पूर्वोक्तव्याप्ति-

The powers of knowledge — the ear and others are, for the sake of the attainment of the enjoyment of words etc., likewise the powers of action — speech etc., are for the sake of the enjoyment of Karmans. ’ (Br̥ha. Vā. II. 4. 364-68).

And also the following —

‘ As long as there is the pervasion by blood in the body, so long alone is the pervasion by the understanding, functioning generally, till the destruction of the body.

What functioning is noticed in the case of an appropriate sense-organ or even elsewhere than that, that is to be known belonging to itself and it is not the change in its nature. ’ (Br̥ha. Vā. II. 4. 345-346)

etc. Here, though one and the same, the mind and the understanding are mentioned as two, on account of the difference of functioning characterised by thought and decision. In the case of the eye and the sound, it might be feared that there would be the violation of the invariable concomitance mentioned before, if the eye were to perceive

भङ्गमाशङ्क्य उक्तं 'योग्या' इति । तत्र, एकस्मिन्नपि गोलके स्वस्व-
कार्यसमर्थम्, इन्द्रियद्वयम्, अङ्गीक्रियते, इत्यर्थः । ज्ञानेन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियोश्च
ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिभेदेन वैलक्षण्यमुक्तम् । तथा चैकादशखनुगतं किंलक्षण-
मिन्द्रियं व्यवहारोपपादकम् ? सात्त्विकाहंकारोपादानत्वलक्षणत्वस्य भवद्वि-
रनङ्गीकारात्, इति ।

[६३] उच्यते—प्राणोत्तरत्वे सति, अपञ्चीकृतभूतोपादानकत्वमेव
सामान्यत इन्द्रियलक्षणम् ।

‘ अन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ’

(ब्र. सू. २. ४. १७)

the 'hearing' — so the expression *Yogya* (appropriate) has been put in. There, in one and the same ball-like object are admitted two sense-organs competent to perform the respective functions — this is the sense. And the difference between the organs of knowledge and the organs of action is stated in conformity with the difference between the powers of knowledge and action. That being the case, persevering in the eleven (sense-organs), possessed of what characteristic is a sense-organ concerned with practical dealings? Because by your honour, verily, is not admitted the *Sāttvika Ahaṁkāra* as having the characteristic of the constituent cause.

[63] (To the above objection) it is stated by us in reply) — The definition of the sense-organ in general is — 'being other than *Prāṇa*, being the state of the constituent cause of the elements not mixed up five-fold'. The first qualifying attribute is there because *Prāṇa* is not admitted as a sense-organ, in accordance with the *Sūtra*

‘ Elsewhere, because of its being the most important ’.

(Bra. Sū. II. 4. 17)

इति सूत्रेण प्राणस्येन्द्रियत्वानङ्गीकारात्, आद्यविशेषणम् । शब्दस्पर्शरूप-
रसगन्धानां च पञ्चीकृतभूतस्वरूपत्वादेव न तदुपादानकत्वम् । तत्र सत्त्वांश-
प्रधानापञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतकार्यम्, अन्तःकरणम् । तद् वृत्तिभेदाद् द्विधा,
आख्यायते, बुद्धिर्मनश्चेति । रजोऽंशप्रधानापञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतकार्यं प्राणः ।
स च वृत्तिभेदात्पञ्चधा आख्यायते, प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समानः
इति । प्राणमनसोरेकात्मकत्वाङ्गीकरणपक्षेऽपि, न, एतादृशविभागे विवादः,
ज्ञानशक्तिक्रियाशक्तिशब्दाभ्यां सत्त्वरजसोरेवाभिधानात् । एवं सत्त्वप्रधाना-
पञ्चीकृताकाशकार्यं श्रोत्रं तदपि चक्षुरादिवद् गत्वैव ग्राहकं 'दूरे शब्दः'

As for sound, touch, form, taste, smell, they are not the constituent cause because they have their very nature of the five-fold compounded elements. There, the inner sense-organ is the effect of the five great elements not compounded in its form, with the Sattva-portion prominent. And that is known as two-fold, understanding and mind, on account of the difference in functioning. There, the Prāṇa is the effect of the five great elements not compounded, with the Rajas-portion prominent in it. And that is known as five-fold, Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna, on account of the difference in functioning. Even according to the view which admits Prāṇa and the mind to be one, there is no dispute regarding such a division of that; because by the words Jñāna-śakti and Kriyā-śakti, only the qualities Sattva and Rajas are denoted. Thus, the ear is the product of the Ākāśa not compounded five-fold, with Sattva prominent in it; that too, like the eye and others, comprehends, verily, by going out, on account of the actual perception in the form 'the sound is at a distance'. The Ākāśa, however,

१ A adds इति after ... नङ्गीकारात् २ A आद्यं विशेषणम् ३ Ā अपञ्चीकृत
४ Ā drops क ५ Ā adds दूरं after चक्षुरादिवद्

इत्यादिप्रत्ययात्, न तु तार्किकवत् नित्यमाकाशं अस्माकम् । एवं तादृश-
वायुकार्यं त्वक् । तादृशतेजःकार्यं चक्षुः । तादृशापकार्यं रसनम् । तादृश-
पृथिवीकार्यं घ्राणम्, सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशकत्वात् कार्याणां ज्ञानेन्द्रियत्वम् । एवं
किञ्चिद्रजोमिश्रितसत्त्वप्रधानादपञ्चीकृताकाशात्, उत्पन्नम्, इन्द्रियं वाक् ।
एतस्यांश्च शब्दव्यञ्जकेन्द्रियत्वेन श्रोत्रवत्, आकाशजत्वमेव । केचित्^१

‘ तेजोमयी वाक् ’

(छा. ६. ५. ४)

इत्यादिश्रुतिदर्शनेन वाचस्तैजसत्वमाहुः । तत्, न । तत्र तेजःशब्दस्य
घृतादिस्निग्धपार्थिवद्रव्यवाचकत्वात्,

‘ तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा विधीयते ’

(छा. ६. ५. ४)

in our view is not eternal as in the view of the Logicians. Thus the skin is the product of that kind of Vāyu. The eye is the product of that kind of Tejas. The tongue is the product of that kind of water. The nose is the product of that kind of earth. The products are the organs of knowledge on account of the Sattva possessing the illumining nature. Thus, Vāk is the sense-organ produced from the Ākāśa not compounded five-fold, with the Sat-quality, mixed up slightly with the Rajas, being prominent. Moreover, in respect of this (Vāk) it is the product of the Ākāśa like the ear, because it is the sense-organ manifesting the sound. Some talk of the Vāk as possessed of the Tejas-element on the strength of the Śruti passage

‘ Vāk is constituted of Tejas. ’

(Chā. VI. 5. 4)

— That is not so. There the word Tejas denotes an oily earthly substance like ghee etc., because there is the introductory statement

‘ Tejas (food) is enjoyed in three ways ’ (Chā. VI. 5. 3)

१ Ā adds ओत्रं after आकाशम् २ A तत्तत्कार्याणाम् Ā तत्कार्याणाम्
३ A एतस्यां च ४ Ā आकाशजन्यत्वमेव ५ Ā केचित्तु

इत्युपक्रमात्,

‘ तेजो वै घृतम् ’

इति श्रुत्यन्तरान्, तेजोभूतस्य अशितुमशक्यत्वाच्च,

‘ अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः ’

(छा. ६. ५. ४)

इति, अत्रापि मनसः केवलपार्थिवत्वाङ्गीकारापाताच्च ।

तस्मात्, अस्मदुक्तमेव साधु । एवं तादृशवायुकार्यं हस्तेन्द्रियम्, आदानादिक्रियाया वाय्वात्मकत्वात् ।

‘ त्रयं वा इदं नामरूपं कर्म ’

(बृह. १. ६. १)

इति श्रुतौ प्राणस्य कर्मात्मकत्वामिधानात् प्राणवाय्वोश्च संवर्गविद्यादिषु तादात्म्योपदेशात् । तादृशतेजःकार्यं पादेन्द्रियं पादचिकित्सायाश्चक्षुरा-

and another Śruti

‘ Tejas, verily, is ghee

because it is impossible to eat what is Tejas ; otherwise, even in the case of the Śruti-passage

‘ O dear, mind is constituted of food ’ (Chā. VI. 5. 4)

the mind will have to be admitted as having only an earthly nature.

Therefore, what has been stated by us is correct. Similarly the sense-organ — the hand — is the product of that kind of Vāyu, because the function, grasping etc., is constituted of Vāyu ; because in the Śruti-passage

‘ This triad is the Name, Form and Karman ’

(Br̥ha. I. 6. 1)

the Prāṇa is mentioned as being constituted of Karman, and Prāṇa and Vāyu are described as one in the Samvarga-Vidyā etc.. The sense-organ — the foot — is the product of that kind of Tejas, it being known that the treatment meted out to the foot contributes to the health of the eye,

रोग्यत्वेन विदितत्वात्, तयोरेकजातीयत्वम् । तादृशापकार्यं पाय्विन्द्रियं
स्निग्धत्वात् । तादृशपृथिवीकार्यं, उपस्थेन्द्रियं कठिनत्वात् । विस्तरेण, एतत्
प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिः सिद्धान्तबिन्दौ । पञ्चदशप्रकरण्यां चायं क्रमः सर्वोऽप्य-
मिहितः,

‘ वियत्पवनतेजोऽम्बुभुवो भूतानि जज्ञिरे ।

सत्त्वांशैः पञ्चभिस्तेषां क्रमाद्विन्द्रियपञ्चकम् ॥

श्रोत्रत्वगक्षिरसनघ्राणाख्यमुपजायते ।

तैरन्तःकरणं सर्ववृत्तिभेदेन तद् द्विधा ॥

मनोविकल्परूपं स्याद् बुद्धिः स्यान्निश्चयात्मिका ।

रजोऽंशैः पञ्चभिस्तेषां क्रमात्कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाभिधानानि जज्ञिरे ॥

तैः सर्वैः सहितैः प्राणो वृत्तिभेदात्स पञ्चधा । (पञ्च. १.१८-२२)

the two are homogeneous. The organ of evacuation is the product of that kind of water, because that is of a liquid nature. The organ of generation is the product of that kind of earth, because that is of a stiff nature. This has been propounded in detail by us in *Siddhāntabindu*. And this complete order has been also mentioned in the *Pañcadāśī* —

‘ The elements sky, wind, lustre, water and earth were produced; from their five Sattva-portions came out in order the five sense-organs called ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. By all of them is produced the Antaḥkaraṇa — it is two-fold in conformity with the difference in functioning.

The mind is of the form of thinking, the Understanding is of the nature of resolve. By their five Rajas-portions are produced respectively the organs of action named as speech, hands, feet, organ of evacuation and organ of generation. The Prāṇa associated with all those is five-fold on account of the difference in the functioning. ’ (Pañca. I. 18-22)

१ ऀ चक्षुरारोग्यवत्वेन २ ऀ चैतत् ३ ऀ सहितैः

इति । तत्, एवमवान्तरभेदेऽपि, अपञ्चीकृतभूतोपादानकत्वस्य सामान्य-
लक्षणसंभवान्नास्माकं मते काचिदनुपपत्तिः, इत्यास्तां तावत् । तस्मात्, न,
अपरोक्षज्ञानकारणत्वेन शब्देऽपि, इन्द्रियव्यवहारापत्तिः ।

[६४] न च, एवं शब्दत्वस्य परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वाभ्यां साङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गः,
इति वाच्यम्, उपाधिसाङ्कर्यवद् जातिसाङ्कर्यस्यापि, अदूषकत्वात्, परोक्ष-
त्वापरोक्षत्वयोरेकज्ञानवृत्तित्वेन प्रमात्वाप्रमात्ववत्, जातित्वासंभवाच्च,
कार्यतावच्छेदकत्वकारणतावच्छेदकत्वानन्यथासिद्धत्वानुगतप्रत्ययाभावेन,
अपि जात्यङ्गीकारेऽतिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च, इन्द्रियजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन परोक्ष-

Therefore, there might be subsidiary divisions, but as the general characteristic of being the constituent cause of the elements not compounded five-fold is possible, there is nothing untenable in our view. —Let that go as it is. Therefore, there would not be the unwanted practical dealing associated with the sense-organs even in the case of the Word on the strength of its being the cause of direct knowledge.

[64] Further, it should not be argued that in this way there would be an undesirable mixing up, if the nature of the Word possesses direct as well as indirect nature, because the mixing up of the generalities also, like the mixing up of the limiting adjuncts, is no flaw ; and also there is no possibility of the nature of generality, because the direct nature and the indirect nature are the functions of only one knowledge, as in the case of the nature of right knowledge and the nature of wrong knowledge ; and if generality were to be admitted there would be just anarchy, on account of the absence also of a continuing experience impossible to be proved otherwise, characterised by the nature of the effect. Further, it should not be argued by you that the

१ A सामान्यलक्षणस्य संभवात् २ A adds सति after एवं ३ A adds असन्मते after ... वृत्तित्वेन ४ A ... सिद्धानुगत

त्वंजातिः सेत्स्यति, इति वाच्यम्, तस्य त्वन्मते नित्येश्वरज्ञानवृत्तित्वेन, अस्मन्मते सुखादिभाम हनित्यसाक्षिचैतन्यवृत्तित्वेन कार्यतानवच्छेदकत्वात् । मीमांसकमते गुणगतजात्यनङ्गीकारात् ईश्वरज्ञानस्य च, अपरोक्षत्वानङ्गीकारे तत्सिद्धिरेव न स्यात्, क्षित्याद्युपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानवत्त्वेनैव तदनुमानात् । न च जन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं जातिरस्तु, तत्र बाधकाभावात्, इति वाच्यम् । अस्तु वा मा, अस्तु तत्र का नो हानिः ? प्रत्यक्षत्वं तु नित्यज्ञानसाधारणं न जातिः, इत्युक्तम् ।

[६५] ननु, तवापि, अर्थनिष्ठं, अपरोक्षत्वं दुर्निरूपम् । तथा हि—

genus, being indirect, would be established by the limiting adjunct, viz. being produced by the sense-organs, because that is not the limiting adjunct of the nature of effect owing to its being the function of the knowledge of the eternal Īśvara according to your view ; according to our view it is the function of the eternal Witness, Sentience, manifesting pleasure etc. According to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, on account of the generality associated with the Guṇas not being admitted, if the knowledge of Īśvara is not admitted to be direct, there would not be the establishment itself of that, because that is inferred on account of his being possessed of direct knowledge as being the material cause of the earth etc. Further, you should not say — Let then the direct perception produced be the generality, there being no contradiction. — Let it be there or let it not be there. What loss is there for us ? It has been (already) stated that direct perception being common to eternal knowledge is not generality.

[65] Surely, for you also it is difficult to point out to the direct perception referring to an object. To explain the same — Not for the matter of that can there be the

न तावदपरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वम्, अन्योन्याश्रयात्, ज्ञानापरोक्षत्वस्य, अद्यापि, असिद्धत्वाच्च । नापि

‘ यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म ’

(बृह. ३. ४. १)

इति श्रुतिप्रतिपादितं स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यरूपत्वम् । वस्तुगत्या तद्रूपविवक्षायाम्, सर्वेषामेव पदार्थानां वस्तुतस्तद्रूपतया, अपरोक्षताप्रसङ्गात्, वास्तवापरोक्षतायाश्च व्यवहारेऽप्रयोजकत्वात्, अकल्पिततादृशस्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमे च ‘ दशमस्त्वमसि ’ इत्यादौ तदभावात् । नापि संविदभिन्नत्वेन भासमानत्वम्, घटादौ तदभावेन परोक्षताप्रसङ्गात् । न च चैतन्यसत्तयैव

nature of the object of direct perception on account of there being mutual inter-dependence and because, that the knowledge is direct has yet to be proved. There cannot be also the nature of the self-illuminating Sentieney propounded in the Śruti-passage,

‘ What is Brahman, from definite direct perception. ’

(Brha. III. 4. 1)

If it is intended to point out that nature in the nature of things, — all the objects, verily, being possessed of that form as a matter of fact would be associated with direct perception — (that would be) an undesirable contingency ! And further, a real direct perception cannot produce anything in respect of practical dealings. And if we admit that kind of nature not super-imposed, that is absent in (the statements like) ‘ You are the tenth ’. Nor again could there be the manifestation as not different from Samvit ; (if that be the case) that being absent in jar and others, there would be indirect perception (in respect of them) — an undesirable contingency ! Further, you cannot say that the direct perception also belongs to jar and others, because it is direct for sentieney like Sattā by the Sattā itself of

सत्त्वे चैतन्यापरोक्षतयैवापरोक्षता, अपि घटादीनाम्, इति वाच्यम्, चैतन्यापरोक्षताया एव स्वरूपातिरिक्ताया अनिरूपणात् । स्वरूपमात्रेण तदङ्गीकारे च, सर्वत्र सत्ताव्यवहारवत्, अपरोक्षव्यवहारोऽपि स्यात् ।

[६६] ननु निवृत्ताज्ञानत्वमेव चैतन्यस्यापरोक्षत्वम्, तच्च क्वचित्स्वत एव सुखादिसाक्षात्कारे, क्वचित् मानजन्यवृत्तिविशेषेण, यथा घटादिसाक्षात्कारः, इति नातिप्रसङ्गः, इति चेत्,—एतावता हि, निवृत्तिज्ञानचैतन्यस्वरूपामिन्नत्वेन भासमानो विषयः स्वगोचरज्ञाने, अपरोक्षमादधाति, इति फलितोऽर्थः । तथा सति, तद्गोचरज्ञानस्य वैयर्थ्यमेव तत्फलस्य पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् । आवृत्तविषयस्य वा मानजज्ञानमन्तरेण कथं निवृत्ताज्ञान-

Sentiency. Because the direct perception itself associated with Caitanya cannot be described as apart from its nature. And if that is admitted as its mere nature, as there is everywhere the functioning of the Sattā, there would be the functioning of direct perception also.

[66] If it is argued that the removal of the nature of Ajñāna itself is the direct perception of the Caitanya, and that again is in some places by the direct realisation of pleasure etc., of its own accord, and in some places by virtue of the particular functioning due to the means of proof like the realisation of the jar and others so there would not be over-encroachment — (our reply is) — even so, the object manifested as not different from the nature of the Caitanya with the Ajñāna removed does partake of the direct perception in respect of the knowledge concerning it — that would be the ultimate meaning got at ; if that be the case, the knowledge concerning it is definitely useless because the result of that (knowledge) has been already produced. In the case of the object screened, how can there be the

१ A चैतन्यापरोक्षतयापरोक्षता
फलम् after तत्फलस्य

२ A अपरोक्षता व्यवहारोऽपि

३ A adds

त्वम्? मानं स्वयम्, अपरोक्षतारहितम्, उत्पन्नविषयस्याज्ञानं निवर्त्य पश्चात्तादृशस्वरूपविषयत्वेन, अपरोक्षतां लभते, इत्यपूर्वं पाण्डित्यं प्रकटयन्, अनुमानादिकं कथमेवं न भवतीति पृष्टः किं व्याचष्टाम्? आस्तिकः सन् स्वभाव एवायम्, इति कथं ब्रूयात्? तस्मात्, वृत्तीनां यद् अज्ञाननिवर्तनावच्छेदकं रूपं तदेवापरोक्षत्वम्, इह प्रस्तुतम् । तच्च न चैतन्यस्य वास्तवापरोक्षत्वलभ्यम्, इति तत्र हेत्वन्तरं वाच्यमेव । अत एव, अपरोक्षपदार्थाभेदपरेरशब्दत्वेन, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वम्, इत्यपास्तम्, वास्तवापरोक्षस्वरूपविषयत्वस्य 'तच्चमसि' इत्यादिवाक्ये संभवेऽपि 'दशमस्त्वमसि' इत्यादाव-

removal of the Ajñāna, without the knowledge produced by the means of proof? That the means of proof itself without any direct perception after removing the Ajñāna in respect of an object that is produced afterwards becomes possessed of the direct perception, being the object of that special nature — thus disclosing your wonderful scholarship, if you are asked how in that case do not come in Inference and others, what reply can you give? Being one who agrees to the orthodox doctrine (of Vedaprāmānya) — how can you say that it is the very nature? Therefore, it is put forth here that the nature of the functioning characterised by the removal of Ajñāna — that itself is the direct nature. And that cannot be had through the real direct perception of the Caitanya and so some other cause has got to be stated in that connection. The view that direct knowledge is produced by the words directly referring to the oneness of the objects is thus brushed aside, because though being the object of real direct nature is possible in passages like 'That thou art,' it is impossible in (passages) like ' You are the tenth ', and because the removal of Ajñāna is absent prior

१ A इत्यपूर्वपाण्डित्यम् २ A drops न भवतीति ३ A व्याचष्टे

४ A निवर्तकतावच्छेद ... ५ A drops पर

संभवात्, निवृत्ताज्ञानस्य च शाब्दबोधोधात्पूर्वमभावात्, यदा कदाचित्, निवृत्ताज्ञानत्वविवक्षायां च 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यादिवाक्यानामपि, अपरोक्षस्वरूपविषयतया, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वपातात् ।

‘ यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ’ (तैत्ति. ३. १)

‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम् ’ (तैत्ति. २. १)

इत्यादिवाक्यानामपि, अपरोक्षस्वरूपविषयतया, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वेन महा-
वाक्यवैयर्थ्यापाताच्च । न च प्रमात्रभेदविषयत्वेनापरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वं ‘ सर्व-
ज्ञत्वेविशिष्टोऽसि ’ इत्यादिवाक्यादपि तथा प्रसङ्गात् । ‘ ईश्वरो मदभिन्नः,

to the knowledge from the Word — if the removal of Ajñāna is expected to be achieved sometime, then sentences like ‘ the mountain is possessed of fire ’, would perforce have to be admitted to produce the direct knowledge, because the object possesses the nature of direct perception. And even pas-
sages like

‘ From whom, verily, these beings are produced ’

(Taïtī. III. 1)

‘ Truth, Knowledge, Infinite ’

(Taïtī. II. 1)

etc., producing the direct knowledge being the object of the nature of direct perception, there would perforce be useless-
ness of the great passages ; nor can it be said that they produce the direct knowledge because they are objects not different from the knower ; otherwise, that will perforce have to be admitted even in the case of a sentence like ‘ You are endowed with omniscient nature ’ and likewise the same will have to be admitted from the Inference (as) —

Īśvara is not different from me,

Because of being possessed of sentiency,

Like myself.

१ Ā निवृत्ताज्ञानत्वस्य २ Ā drops अपि ३ Ā ... ज्ञानजननापातात्
४ Ā drops अपि ५ A सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशि...

चेतनत्वात् मद्भूत' इत्यनुमानादपि तथा प्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मात्, अस्मदुक्तमेव साधु, योग्यपदार्थनिरूपितत्वं' पदार्थाभेदपरशब्दत्वेन, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकता, इति ।

[६७] न च, एवं सति विचारात्पूर्वमपि शब्दस्य, अपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वसंभवे तेनैव, अज्ञानतत्कार्यनिवृत्त्युपपत्तौ किं विचारणा? इति वाच्यम्, तस्यासंभावनादिप्रतिबद्धत्वे तदानीं स्वकार्याजनकत्वात् । विचारेण तु प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तौ शब्दजन्यस्य निर्विकल्पापरोक्षज्ञानस्याप्रतिबद्धत्वेन स्वकार्यजनकत्वात् । तत्रायं क्रमः — फलपर्यन्तब्रह्मविद्योद्देशेन विहित-यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानात्, नित्यानित्यविवेकप्रतिबन्धकश्चित्तदोषः प्रतिहन्यते । ततो

Therefore, what has been stated by us alone is correct — there is the productive capacity for the direct knowledge on account of the words pointing out to the identity with the object (denoted by the word) 'You' referred to by the appropriate sense of the word.

[67] This being the case, nor again should it be argued by you — when it is possible for a word to produce direct knowledge even prior to the pondering, and the removal of Ajñāna and its products capable of being removed by that itself, what is the use of any pondering further? — Because, at that time it (pondering) would not be competent to produce its effect, because it is obstructed by (the circumstances like) the impossibility of the same. But when the obstruction is removed by proper pondering, the direct indeterminate knowledge produced by the word, being unhindered would produce its own effect. There, this is the order in which it functions. — From the performance of the prescribed sacrifices etc., aiming at the knowledge of Brahman right upto the fruit, the wrong tendency of the mind acting as an impediment in the way of

नित्यानित्यविवेकेन, ऐहिकामुष्मिकवैतृष्ण्यप्रतिबन्धकश्चित्तदोषोऽपसार्यते । ततो विषयवैतृष्णेन शमदमादिप्रतिबन्धकश्चित्तदोषः । ततः शमदमादिभिर्विपरीतप्रवृत्तिहेतुर्कश्चित्तदोषः । ततोऽद्वितीयब्रह्मैक्यविषयवेदान्तशक्तितात्पर्य-निश्चयफलकेन श्रवणाख्यतर्केण क्रियार्थत्वादिभिर्हेत्वाभासैर्वा, अद्वितीय-ब्रह्मात्मैक्ये वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यासंभवरूपश्चित्तदोषः । एवं वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यासंभावनाप्रचयहेतुभूतचित्तैकाग्र्यप्रतिबन्धकश्चित्तदोषः प्रमेयसंभाव-

the discrimination between permanent and non-permanent is warded off. Thereupon, by the discrimination between permanent and impermanent the wrong tendency of the mind, which obstructs the absence of the greed (for enjoyment of objects) here and hereafter is brushed aside ; — then the wrong tendency of the mind obstructing the control and restraint by the absence of greed for the objects of senses ; — then, by control, restraint and others, the wrong tendency of the mind which is the cause of perverse activity ; — then (is removed) the wrong tendency of the mind entertaining the unauthoritative nature of the Vedānta-passages pointing out to the identity of Ātman and Brahman without a second, by logical reasoning involved in ‘ hearing ’, culminating in concluding the purport and denotation of the Vedānta concerning the oneness of Brahman without a second, or by (understanding) the Hetus (the Vedānta-passages) for the sake of sacrificial activity to be fallacious reasonings ; and thus, in the case of Vedānta, the wrong tendency of the mind, obstructing the concentration of the mind, which is the cause of the piling up of the unauthoritative concepts by the reasoning known as ‘ thinking ’, which results in the proper perspective of (the Brahman) to-be-known. Then is brushed away the wrong

१ A शमादिभि ... २ A drops क ३ IO and Ā drop
‘ प्रामाण्यासंभावना ’

नाफलकेन मननाख्येन तर्केण । ततोऽन्यानुपरक्तब्रह्मात्मैक्यविषयसंस्कार-
प्रचयेन हेतुज्ञानवृत्तिफलकेन प्रयत्नेन निदिध्यासनाख्येन, अनादिप्रवृत्त-
देहात्मज्ञानजनितसंस्कारप्रचयः, चित्तदोषोऽप्यस्यते । ततोऽशेषदोषशून्ये
स्वभावस्वच्छचित्तदर्पणे पूर्ववदेव वेदान्तवाक्येन जनिता, अखण्डवार्क्यार्थ-
विषया वृत्तिः सर्वदोषरहितत्वात्, अप्रतिबद्धात् स्वतःप्रामाण्यादेव कृत्स्नम्
अज्ञानतत्कार्यं निवर्तयति, ततः परं न शङ्का, न चोत्तरम् । तदुक्तम्—

‘ पुरुषापराधमलिना धिषणा निखद्यचक्षुरुदयापि यथा ।

न फलाय भर्तुर्विषया भवति श्रुतिसंभवापि तु तथात्मनि धीः ॥

tendency of the mind — the massing together of the impres-
sions produced by the knowledge of the body as Ātman,
which is going on continuously without any beginning,— by
the mental effort known as ‘ meditating ’ which results in
the functioning of knowledge which is the mass of impres-
sions concerning the oneness of Brahman and Ātman un-
affected by anything else. Then in the mind-mirror,
naturally clear, void of all the blemishes, the tendency
already produced by the Vedānta-passages pointing out to
(the Brahman as a) complete whole, turns away the entire
Ajñāna and its effects, verily, by virtue of its self-author-
itative nature which is without blemishes and obstructions.
And after that there can be neither any doubt, nor (any
scope for) reply. Thus has been said —

‘ The understanding (of a king) soiled by his personal
faults although prompted by the blameless eye, does not
produce the proper fruit, concerning Bhartsu (his minister)
So (is the case of) the idea in respect of the Ātman,
although arising from the Śruti passage.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| १ A ... प्रचयहेतुज्ञानवृत्तिफलकेन | २ A ... संस्कारप्रचयचित्तदोषो ... |
| ३ A adds स्थिरे after ... दोषशून्ये | ४ A adds या after ... र्थविषया |
| ५ A अप्रतिबद्धा | ६ A भर्तुर्विषया |

पुरुषापराधविगमे तु पुनः प्रतिबन्धकव्युदसनात्सफला ।

मणिमन्त्रयोरपगमे तु यथा सति पावकाद्भवति धूमलता ॥

पुरुषापराधनिवृत्तिफलः सकलो विचार इति वेदविदः ।

अनपेक्षतामनुपरुध्य गिरः फलवद्भवेत्प्रकरणं तदतः ॥ '

(सं. शा. १. १४)

[६८] तस्मात्, अद्वितीयब्रह्मात्मैक्यबोधस्य, अपरोक्षस्य स्वतः प्रमाणस्यापि बलवद्भिर्दोषैः परोक्षतामिव, अप्रामाण्यमिवापाद्य, अविद्या-निवर्तकत्वम्, अभिभूतम् । विचारेण तु दोषापगम एव केवलं क्रियते, न किञ्चिदाधीयते, तेन न स्वतःप्रामाण्यभङ्गप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्, शमादिसंपन्नेन परित्राजकेन मुमुक्षुणा गुरुमुपाश्रित्य चतुर्लक्षणमीमांसया विचार एवा-

But when the faults of a person are removed, it becomes fruitful again, owing to the driving out of the impediments, as the column of smoke comes out of the fire when the (antidotes) jewel and charm are not there.

The Veda-knowers say that all pondering has for its fruit the removal of the faults in a person. And, for this reason, not marring the independent nature of the words, this section would lead to the desired fruit. '

(Sankṣepa. I. 14)

[68] Therefore, in the case of the direct realisation of the knowledge of the one-ness of Ātman and Brahman without a second, although self-authoritative, having produced as though an unauthoritative nature, like the indirect perception due to strong blemishes — its being the remover of Ajñāna is thwarted. By the pondering is effected only the removal of blemishes ; nothing is imposed (by it) — so, there is no fear of its self-authoritative nature being given up. Therefore, who has gained control etc., who is an ascetic, desirous of salvation, resorting to a teacher, should

नुष्ठेयः फलपर्यन्तम्, इति विचारमेव विभज्य प्रदर्शयामः । तत्सिद्धम्, आत्मैव, अविद्यानिवृत्त्युपलक्षितो मोक्षः । तत्साधनं च वेदान्तवाक्य-करणकः, अन्यानुपरक्तब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कार एव श्रवणाद्यपनीतप्रतिबन्धः सन्, इति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ।

न्यायैर्निर्धूय दुष्टानिह कपिलकणादाक्षपादादिवादा-
नादायादुष्टमेकं श्रुतिमितममृतद्वारमद्वैतवादम् ।

वेदान्तैकप्रमेयं परमसुखमयं ज्ञानमज्ञानशून्यं

मोक्षं व्याचक्षते यं कमपि सुकृतिनः सोऽहमेवास्मि पूर्णः ॥

go on with the pondering in accordance with (the study of) the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra containing four parts, right upto the attainment of the fruit. — Dividing (into suitable sections) the consideration thus, we shall propound the same. Therefore, it is established that Ātman himself as characterised by the removal of Avidyā is Salvation. And its means is the realization itself of the oneness of Ātman and Brahman untinted by anything else, produced by the Vedānta-passages, with impediments removed by 'hearing' etc., — thus everything is quite reasonable.

Accepting the doctrines of Kapila, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda etc., with the blemishes therein smashed down by various reasonings, and resorting to the one Advaita-doctrine, conforming with the Śruti, without any blemish, the door to immortality — (I say) he whom the meritorious ones describe as Salvation, known only from the Vedāntas, constituted of the highest Bliss, knowledge (itself) void of Ajñāna, — he is the very Self of me, all-perfect.

इति श्रीवेदान्तकल्पलतिकायां परमहंसपरिव्राजकमधुसूदनसरस्वती-
कृतायां ससाधनापवर्गनिरूपणं नाम स्तवकः ।

वेदान्तकल्पलतिका समाप्ता

Here ends the 'Bunch' named 'Scrutiny of Mokṣa along with the
means thereof' of the 'Śrī Vedāntakalpalatikā' the composition
of Paramahansa-Parivrājaka-Madhusūdanasarasvatī

Here ends the Vedāntakalpalatikā.

१ श्री dropped in Ā २ Ā श्रीपरमहंस ... A श्रीमत्परम ...
३ Ā adds श्रीविश्वेश्वरसरस्वतीशिष्यश्री after ... जकाचार्य ४ A adds आचार्य after
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APPENDIX I

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ERRATA

Page	Line	Incorret	Correct
XXVI	11	thongh	though
1	3	भीमांसया	मीमांसया
15	3	मोक्ष-	मोक्षा-
21	19	Śruti-passage	Śruti-passages
38	4	क्षणिकभावना	क्षणिकत्वभावना
39	11	parapharnelia	paraphernalia
39	14	unauthritative	unauthoritative
41	26	arged	argued
47	1	आत्ममिन्ना	आत्ममिन्ना
79	20	adandoned	abandoned
85	10	Follw-	Follow-
103	27	parapharnelia	paraphernalia
111	24	pervaded the	pervaded by the
125	19	(Śveta.	(Śvetā.
131	6	मवम्,	मैवम्,
139	7	तीणा हि	तीर्णा हि
140	26	Maitra. VI. 30.)	Maitrā. VI. 30)
142	11	that (it)	that (is)
14	18	remebrance	remembrance
146	6	अपरोक्षम्,	अपरोक्षम्,
148	16	fwise	wise
148	16	discarding o	discarding of
158	1	सर्वदेहव्यापित्वेनैव	सर्वदेहव्यापित्वेनैव
162	9	(छा. ६. ५. ४)	(छा. ६. ५. ३)

